Constitutional design and political agency problems: the case of Colombia

This article presents and explores, from a law and economics’ perspective, the Colombian Constitutional structures that create potential for corruption by undermining the checks and balances, the accountability system over politicians and in particular, by altering the computation of the agent once...

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Autores:
López, Paola Alarcón
Tipo de recurso:
Article of journal
Fecha de publicación:
2014
Institución:
Universidad Externado de Colombia
Repositorio:
Biblioteca Digital Universidad Externado de Colombia
Idioma:
spa
OAI Identifier:
oai:bdigital.uexternado.edu.co:001/7911
Acceso en línea:
https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/handle/001/7911
https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/contexto/article/view/3851
Palabra clave:
Law and Economics
Corruption
System failures
Agency problems
Constitutional design
Constitution of Colombia.
Rights
openAccess
License
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
Description
Summary:This article presents and explores, from a law and economics’ perspective, the Colombian Constitutional structures that create potential for corruption by undermining the checks and balances, the accountability system over politicians and in particular, by altering the computation of the agent once is facing the decision to act according to principal interest or behave in a corrupt way. A case study from a Colombian high court is presented in order to illustrate the interaction between the identified constitutional provisions to generate a scope for corruption. Finally, possible constitutional amendments are suggested in order to overcome these system failures.