Constitutional design and political agency problems: the case of Colombia

This article presents and explores, from a law and economics’ perspective, the Colombian Constitutional structures that create potential for corruption by undermining the checks and balances, the accountability system over politicians and in particular, by altering the computation of the agent once...

Full description

Autores:

López, Paola Alarcón

Tipo de recurso:

Article of journal

Fecha de publicación:

2014

Institución:

Universidad Externado de Colombia

Repositorio:

Biblioteca Digital Universidad Externado de Colombia

Idioma:

spa

OAI Identifier:

oai:bdigital.uexternado.edu.co:001/7911

Acceso en línea:

https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/handle/001/7911
https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/contexto/article/view/3851

Palabra clave:

Law and Economics
Corruption
System failures
Agency problems
Constitutional design
Constitution of Colombia.

Rights

openAccess

License

http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2