Arrow's impossibility theorem is not so impossible and Condorcet's paradox is not so paradoxical: the adequate definition of a social choice problem
In this article, we do two things: first, we present an alternative and simplified proof of the known fact that cardinal individual utility functions are necessary, but not sufficient, and that interpersonal comparability is sufficient, but not necessary, for the construction of a social welfare fun...
- Autores:
-
Castellanos, Daniel
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2005
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/7972
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/7972
- Palabra clave:
- Condition of independence of irrevelant alternatives
Social choice
Social welfare function
Cardinality and interpersonal comparability
Arrow's impossibility theorem
Condorcet's paradox
Condorcet, Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat - 1743-1794
Arrow, Kenneth Joseph - 1921
Economía del bienestar - Investigaciones
Elección social - Investigaciones
I30, D60, D61
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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Arrow's impossibility theorem is not so impossible and Condorcet's paradox is not so paradoxical: the adequate definition of a social choice problem |
| dc.title.alternative.none.fl_str_mv |
El teorema de la imposibilidad de Arrow no es tan imposible y la paradoja de condorcet no es tan paradójica: la definición adecuada de un problema de escogencia social |
| title |
Arrow's impossibility theorem is not so impossible and Condorcet's paradox is not so paradoxical: the adequate definition of a social choice problem |
| spellingShingle |
Arrow's impossibility theorem is not so impossible and Condorcet's paradox is not so paradoxical: the adequate definition of a social choice problem Condition of independence of irrevelant alternatives Social choice Social welfare function Cardinality and interpersonal comparability Arrow's impossibility theorem Condorcet's paradox Condorcet, Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat - 1743-1794 Arrow, Kenneth Joseph - 1921 Economía del bienestar - Investigaciones Elección social - Investigaciones I30, D60, D61 |
| title_short |
Arrow's impossibility theorem is not so impossible and Condorcet's paradox is not so paradoxical: the adequate definition of a social choice problem |
| title_full |
Arrow's impossibility theorem is not so impossible and Condorcet's paradox is not so paradoxical: the adequate definition of a social choice problem |
| title_fullStr |
Arrow's impossibility theorem is not so impossible and Condorcet's paradox is not so paradoxical: the adequate definition of a social choice problem |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Arrow's impossibility theorem is not so impossible and Condorcet's paradox is not so paradoxical: the adequate definition of a social choice problem |
| title_sort |
Arrow's impossibility theorem is not so impossible and Condorcet's paradox is not so paradoxical: the adequate definition of a social choice problem |
| dc.creator.fl_str_mv |
Castellanos, Daniel |
| dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv |
Castellanos, Daniel |
| dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv |
Condition of independence of irrevelant alternatives Social choice Social welfare function Cardinality and interpersonal comparability Arrow's impossibility theorem Condorcet's paradox |
| topic |
Condition of independence of irrevelant alternatives Social choice Social welfare function Cardinality and interpersonal comparability Arrow's impossibility theorem Condorcet's paradox Condorcet, Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat - 1743-1794 Arrow, Kenneth Joseph - 1921 Economía del bienestar - Investigaciones Elección social - Investigaciones I30, D60, D61 |
| dc.subject.armarc.none.fl_str_mv |
Condorcet, Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat - 1743-1794 Arrow, Kenneth Joseph - 1921 Economía del bienestar - Investigaciones Elección social - Investigaciones |
| dc.subject.jel.none.fl_str_mv |
I30, D60, D61 |
| description |
In this article, we do two things: first, we present an alternative and simplified proof of the known fact that cardinal individual utility functions are necessary, but not sufficient, and that interpersonal comparability is sufficient, but not necessary, for the construction of a social welfare function. This means that Arrow's impossibility theorem is simply a consequence of forcing the individual utility functions to be ordinal. And second, based on this proof, this article establishes two necessary conditions for the adequate definition of a social choice problem. It is shown that, if these two conditions are satisfied, a number of desirable properties for a social choice are satisfied, including transitivity. This means that Condorcet's paradox is simply the result of a social choice problem that is not well defined. |
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2005 |
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2005 |
| dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-09-27T16:49:49Z |
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2018-09-27T16:49:49Z |
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Documento de trabajo |
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http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
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http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
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https://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WP |
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http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
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1657-5334 |
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http://hdl.handle.net/1992/7972 |
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1657-7191 |
| dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv |
10.57784/1992/7972 |
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instname:Universidad de los Andes |
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reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca |
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repourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/ |
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1657-5334 1657-7191 10.57784/1992/7972 instname:Universidad de los Andes reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca repourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/ |
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http://hdl.handle.net/1992/7972 |
| dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
| language |
eng |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries.none.fl_str_mv |
Documentos CEDE No. 63 Noviembre de 2005 |
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https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/002025.html |
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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
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openAccess |
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28 páginas |
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application/pdf |
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Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE |
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Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE |
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Universidad de los Andes |
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Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Castellanos, Danieleffb4dc0-799a-41de-a916-68e288a7e80f6002018-09-27T16:49:49Z2018-09-27T16:49:49Z20051657-5334http://hdl.handle.net/1992/79721657-719110.57784/1992/7972instname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional Sénecarepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/In this article, we do two things: first, we present an alternative and simplified proof of the known fact that cardinal individual utility functions are necessary, but not sufficient, and that interpersonal comparability is sufficient, but not necessary, for the construction of a social welfare function. This means that Arrow's impossibility theorem is simply a consequence of forcing the individual utility functions to be ordinal. And second, based on this proof, this article establishes two necessary conditions for the adequate definition of a social choice problem. It is shown that, if these two conditions are satisfied, a number of desirable properties for a social choice are satisfied, including transitivity. This means that Condorcet's paradox is simply the result of a social choice problem that is not well defined.En este artículo hacemos dos cosas. En primer lugar, presentamos una prueba alternativa, simplificada, del ya bien conocido hecho de que funciones cardinales de utilidad individual son necesarias, pero no suficientes, y de que la comparabilidad interpersonal es suficiente, pero no necesaria, para la construcción de una función de bienestar social. Esto significa que el teorema de la imposibilidad de Arrow es simplemente una consecuencia de forzar que las funciones de utilidad individual sean ordinales. En segundo lugar, basados en esta prueba, establecemos dos condiciones necesarias para la adecuada definición de un problema de escogencia social. Se muestra que, si esas dos condiciones se satisfacen, un número de propiedades deseables para una escogencia social se satisfacen, incluida la transitividad. Esto implica que la paradoja de Condorcet es simplemente el resultado de un problema de escogencia social que no está bien definido.28 páginasapplication/pdfengUniversidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDEDocumentos CEDE No. 63 Noviembre de 2005https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/002025.htmlArrow's impossibility theorem is not so impossible and Condorcet's paradox is not so paradoxical: the adequate definition of a social choice problemEl teorema de la imposibilidad de Arrow no es tan imposible y la paradoja de condorcet no es tan paradójica: la definición adecuada de un problema de escogencia socialDocumento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttps://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WPCondition of independence of irrevelant alternativesSocial choiceSocial welfare functionCardinality and interpersonal comparabilityArrow's impossibility theoremCondorcet's paradoxCondorcet, Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat - 1743-1794Arrow, Kenneth Joseph - 1921Economía del bienestar - InvestigacionesElección social - InvestigacionesI30, D60, D61Facultad de EconomíaPublicationTEXTdcede2005-63.pdf.txtdcede2005-63.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain76149https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/e568a440-1476-4b02-807d-8074f0e5af62/downloadd004f73abffccda2d8898877cf65584fMD54THUMBNAILdcede2005-63.pdf.jpgdcede2005-63.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg18521https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/7c9c7f0c-6f7c-4b74-8e3d-2b665e47e660/downloada75452ac359f05e0a37400f08faeaa2fMD55ORIGINALdcede2005-63.pdfdcede2005-63.pdfapplication/pdf542142https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/c9274f96-765d-4950-a828-73e5a3220bd1/downloade5be6abda3046f7c69faa69046f7b45bMD511992/7972oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/79722024-06-04 15:39:34.661http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/open.accesshttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.coRepositorio institucional Sénecaadminrepositorio@uniandes.edu.co |