Arrow's impossibility theorem is not so impossible and Condorcet's paradox is not so paradoxical: the adequate definition of a social choice problem

In this article, we do two things: first, we present an alternative and simplified proof of the known fact that cardinal individual utility functions are necessary, but not sufficient, and that interpersonal comparability is sufficient, but not necessary, for the construction of a social welfare fun...

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Autores:
Castellanos, Daniel
Tipo de recurso:
Work document
Fecha de publicación:
2005
Institución:
Universidad de los Andes
Repositorio:
Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/7972
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/7972
Palabra clave:
Condition of independence of irrevelant alternatives
Social choice
Social welfare function
Cardinality and interpersonal comparability
Arrow's impossibility theorem
Condorcet's paradox
Condorcet, Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat - 1743-1794
Arrow, Kenneth Joseph - 1921
Economía del bienestar - Investigaciones
Elección social - Investigaciones
I30, D60, D61
Rights
openAccess
License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/