Arrow's impossibility theorem is not so impossible and Condorcet's paradox is not so paradoxical: the adequate definition of a social choice problem
In this article, we do two things: first, we present an alternative and simplified proof of the known fact that cardinal individual utility functions are necessary, but not sufficient, and that interpersonal comparability is sufficient, but not necessary, for the construction of a social welfare fun...
- Autores:
-
Castellanos, Daniel
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2005
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/7972
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/7972
- Palabra clave:
- Condition of independence of irrevelant alternatives
Social choice
Social welfare function
Cardinality and interpersonal comparability
Arrow's impossibility theorem
Condorcet's paradox
Condorcet, Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat - 1743-1794
Arrow, Kenneth Joseph - 1921
Economía del bienestar - Investigaciones
Elección social - Investigaciones
I30, D60, D61
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/