Genetic testing with primary prevention and moral hazard
We develop a model where a genetic test reveals whether an individual has a Iow or high probability of developing a disease. A costly prevention effort allows high-risk agents to decrease this probability. Agents are not obliged to take the test, but must disclose its results to insurers, and taking...
- Autores:
-
Bardey, David
Donder, Philippe de
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2012
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8317
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8317
- Palabra clave:
- Discrimination risk
Informational value of test
Personalized medicine
Genética humana - Aspectos éticos y morales
Genética humana - Aspectos económicos
D82, I18
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/