Central bankers in government appointed committees
I study the policy choices of members of a central bank committee, who are appointed by the government. Central bankers balance their desire to protect the Central Bank's reputation against their interest to be reappointed. Committees can be more successful than single central bankers at reduci...
- Autores:
-
Eslava Mejía, Marcela
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2007
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8038
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8038
- Palabra clave:
- Banco central
Designación
Junta
Reputación
Bancos centrales - Toma de decisiones - Modelos matemáticos
Política monetaria - Modelos matemáticos
D71, E50, E58
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/