Central bankers in government appointed committees

I study the policy choices of members of a central bank committee, who are appointed by the government. Central bankers balance their desire to protect the Central Bank's reputation against their interest to be reappointed. Committees can be more successful than single central bankers at reduci...

Full description

Autores:
Eslava Mejía, Marcela
Tipo de recurso:
Work document
Fecha de publicación:
2007
Institución:
Universidad de los Andes
Repositorio:
Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8038
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8038
Palabra clave:
Banco central
Designación
Junta
Reputación
Bancos centrales - Toma de decisiones - Modelos matemáticos
Política monetaria - Modelos matemáticos
D71, E50, E58
Rights
openAccess
License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/