Political budget cycles or voters as fiscal conservatives? : evidence from Colombia
Theoretical models of the political budget cycle suggest that electoral manipulation of government expenditures can take the form of changes in the composition of spending, without impacting the overall budget or the deficit, and that the form and extent of this manipulation depend on the fiscal pre...
- Autores:
-
Eslava Mejía, Marcela
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2005
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/7926
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/7926
- Palabra clave:
- Political budget cycle
Elections
Colombia
Local budgets and expenditures
Política de gastos públicos - Aspectos políticos - Modelos matemáticos
Gastos públicos - Aspectos políticos - Modelos matemáticos
Elecciones - Aspectos económicos - Modelos matemáticos
Política fiscal - Colombia
Presupuesto - Colombia
D72, E62, D78, H72
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/