Bargaining in legislature: number of parties and ideological polarization
There is a common perception in the political economy literature that a larger number of parties makes it more difficult and more expensive - in terms of pork barrel programs - to implement policy-changes in a legislature. This paper proves that this perception is not necessarily true. The driving i...
- Autores:
-
Nupia Martínez, Oskar Andrés
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2007
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8117
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8117
- Palabra clave:
- Number of parties
Bargaining
Legislature
Partidos políticos - Negociación
Pluralismo político - Modelos matemáticos
Poder legislativo
D72, D78
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/