Bargaining in legislature: number of parties and ideological polarization

There is a common perception in the political economy literature that a larger number of parties makes it more difficult and more expensive - in terms of pork barrel programs - to implement policy-changes in a legislature. This paper proves that this perception is not necessarily true. The driving i...

Full description

Autores:
Nupia Martínez, Oskar Andrés
Tipo de recurso:
Work document
Fecha de publicación:
2007
Institución:
Universidad de los Andes
Repositorio:
Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8117
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8117
Palabra clave:
Number of parties
Bargaining
Legislature
Partidos políticos - Negociación
Pluralismo político - Modelos matemáticos
Poder legislativo
D72, D78
Rights
openAccess
License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/