Commons without tragedy: sampling dynamics and cooperative resource extraction

This paper reconsiders evidence from experimental common pool resource games from the perspective of a dynamic model of sampling. Despite being parameter-free, the model is able to replicate some striking features of the data: monotonic frequency distributions, the persistent use of strictly dominat...

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Autores:
Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo
Mantilla Ribero, César Andrés
Sethi, Rajiv
Tipo de recurso:
Work document
Fecha de publicación:
2013
Institución:
Universidad de los Andes
Repositorio:
Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8439
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8439
Palabra clave:
Common pool resources
Experiments
Sampling equilibrium
Propiedad - Modelos matemáticos
Economía experimental
Equilibrio (Economía)
C73, C91, D03, H41, Q20
Rights
openAccess
License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/