Commons without tragedy: sampling dynamics and cooperative resource extraction
This paper reconsiders evidence from experimental common pool resource games from the perspective of a dynamic model of sampling. Despite being parameter-free, the model is able to replicate some striking features of the data: monotonic frequency distributions, the persistent use of strictly dominat...
- Autores:
-
Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo
Mantilla Ribero, César Andrés
Sethi, Rajiv
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2013
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8439
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8439
- Palabra clave:
- Common pool resources
Experiments
Sampling equilibrium
Propiedad - Modelos matemáticos
Economía experimental
Equilibrio (Economía)
C73, C91, D03, H41, Q20
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/