Political Competition and State Capacity Evidence from a Land Allocation Program in Mexico

We develop a model of the politics of state capacity building undertaken by incumbent parties that have a comparative advantage in clientelism rather than in public goods provision. The model predicts that, when challenged by opponents, clientelistic incumbents have the incentive to prevent investme...

Full description

Autores:
Fergusson, Leopoldo
Larreguy, Horacio
Riaño, Juan Felipe
Tipo de recurso:
Work document
Fecha de publicación:
2020
Institución:
Universidad de los Andes
Repositorio:
Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
Idioma:
spa
OAI Identifier:
oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/41128
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/41128
Palabra clave:
State capacity
Political competition
Land allocation
D72, D73, Q15
Rights
openAccess
License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/