Political Competition and State Capacity Evidence from a Land Allocation Program in Mexico

We develop a model of the politics of state capacity building undertaken by incumbent parties that have a comparative advantage in clientelism rather than in public goods provision. The model predicts that, when challenged by opponents, clientelistic incumbents have the incentive to prevent investme...

Full description

Autores:

Fergusson, Leopoldo
Larreguy, Horacio
Riaño, Juan Felipe

Tipo de recurso:

Work document

Fecha de publicación:

2020

Institución:

Universidad de los Andes

Repositorio:

Séneca: repositorio Uniandes

Idioma:

spa

OAI Identifier:

oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/41128

Acceso en línea:

http://hdl.handle.net/1992/41128

Palabra clave:

State capacity
Political competition
Land allocation
D72, D73, Q15

Rights

openAccess

License

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/