Who wants violence? The political economy of conflict and state building in Colombia

Enduring violent conflict is the flip side of the coin of a weak state. In this article, I propose some political economy underpinnings for the persistence of conflict (and the weak state). Focusing on the case of Colombia, I discuss three broad sets of mechanisms that are also relevant elsewhere. F...

Full description

Autores:

Fergusson Talero, Leopoldo

Tipo de recurso:

Work document

Fecha de publicación:

2017

Institución:

Universidad de los Andes

Repositorio:

Séneca: repositorio Uniandes

Idioma:

eng

OAI Identifier:

oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8866

Acceso en línea:

http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8866

Palabra clave:

Conflict
State capacity
Public goods
Political economy
Violencia - Aspectos políticos - Colombia - Estudio de casos
Bienes públicos - Colombia
Economía política - Colombia
D72, D73, D74, H26, H41, H42, O43

Rights

openAccess

License

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/