The design of insurance coverage for medical products under imperfect competition

This paper studies the design of health insurance with ex post moral hazard, when there is imperfect competition in the market for the medical product. Various scenarios, such as monopoly pricing, price negotiation or horizontal differentiation are considered. The insurance contract specifies two ty...

Full description

Autores:

Bardey, David
Cremer, Helmuth
Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie

Tipo de recurso:

Work document

Fecha de publicación:

2015

Institución:

Universidad de los Andes

Repositorio:

Séneca: repositorio Uniandes

Idioma:

eng

OAI Identifier:

oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8540

Acceso en línea:

http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8540

Palabra clave:

Ex post moral hazard
Health insurance contracts
Copayments
Imperfect competition
Accesibilidad a los servicios de salud - Costos
Seguros de salud - Modelos matemáticos
Régimen subsidiado en salud - Modelos matemáticos
I11, I13, I18

Rights

openAccess

License

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/