Institutions influence preferences : evidence from a common pool resource experiment
We model the dynamic effects of external enforcement on the exploitation of a common pool resource. Fitting our model to the results of experimental data we find that institutions influence social preferences. We solve two puzzles in the data: the increase and later erosion of cooperation when commo...
- Autores:
-
Rodríguez-Sickert, Carlos
Guzmán, Ricardo Andrés
Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2006
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8000
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8000
- Palabra clave:
- Field experiments
Common-pool resources
Cooperation
Enforcement
Regulation
Social preferences
Social norms
Learning models
Bienes públicos - Investigaciones
Infraestructura económica - Investigaciones
Economía del bienestar - Modelos econométricos
C93, D01, D64, D83, H4, H3, Q28
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Rodríguez-Sickert, Carlos0b4d85a7-70fd-4a62-bced-456c2b1e0289500Guzmán, Ricardo Andrés784d1ee1-81e0-4078-a48f-4e8de028987d500Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo76335002018-09-27T16:49:58Z2018-09-27T16:49:58Z20061657-5334http://hdl.handle.net/1992/80001657-719110.57784/1992/8000instname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional Sénecarepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/We model the dynamic effects of external enforcement on the exploitation of a common pool resource. Fitting our model to the results of experimental data we find that institutions influence social preferences. We solve two puzzles in the data: the increase and later erosion of cooperation when commoners vote against the imposition of a fine, and the high deterrence power of low fines. When fines are rejected, internalization of a social norm explains the increased cooperation; violations (accidental or not), coupled with reciprocal preferences, account for the erosion. Low fines stabilize cooperation by preventing a spiral of negative reciprocation.En este artículo modelamos los efectos dinámicos del monitoreo y control externo en la explotación de un recurso de uso común. Al contrastar un modelo de preferencias con los resultados de datos experimentales encontramos que las instituciones afectan las preferencias. Con los datos empíricos intentamos resolver dos preguntas: el aumento y erosión posterior de la cooperación cuando los usuarios del recurso votan contra la imposición de una sanción, y el efecto positivo de las multas o sanciones bajas. Cuando las multas son rechazadas en una votación, la internalización de las normas sociales explica el aumento de la cooperación; las violaciones a las reglas (voluntarias o no), en conjunto con las preferencias por la reciprocidad, explican la erosión de la cooperación. Las multas o sanciones bajas estabilizan la cooperación al prevenir un espiral de reciprocidad negativa.28 páginasapplication/pdfengUniversidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDEDocumentos CEDE No. 24 Julio de 2006https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/002890.htmlInstitutions influence preferences : evidence from a common pool resource experimentLas instituciones influencian las preferencias : evidencia en un experimento de recursos comunesDocumento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttps://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WPField experimentsCommon-pool resourcesCooperationEnforcementRegulationSocial preferencesSocial normsLearning modelsBienes públicos - InvestigacionesInfraestructura económica - InvestigacionesEconomía del bienestar - Modelos econométricosC93, D01, D64, D83, H4, H3, Q28Facultad de EconomíaPublicationTHUMBNAILdcede2006-24.pdf.jpgdcede2006-24.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg16866https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/d339d6a6-59cb-4e89-b854-5f6f89b24c72/downloadb915888e8bc2fc9b7d6dd9bf3d2ff035MD55ORIGINALdcede2006-24.pdfdcede2006-24.pdfapplication/pdf157427https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/631c9576-68f3-477b-a1f0-df21cf7b0852/download08b7302d8b0f4c081be3dc9bfcc38055MD51TEXTdcede2006-24.pdf.txtdcede2006-24.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain41244https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/3511b500-9c84-43b7-be50-c7ed275a6256/download356b39e9030d0a138a9f6b5da39e1449MD541992/8000oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/80002024-06-04 15:39:52.774http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/open.accesshttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.coRepositorio institucional Sénecaadminrepositorio@uniandes.edu.co |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv |
Institutions influence preferences : evidence from a common pool resource experiment |
| dc.title.alternative.none.fl_str_mv |
Las instituciones influencian las preferencias : evidencia en un experimento de recursos comunes |
| title |
Institutions influence preferences : evidence from a common pool resource experiment |
| spellingShingle |
Institutions influence preferences : evidence from a common pool resource experiment Field experiments Common-pool resources Cooperation Enforcement Regulation Social preferences Social norms Learning models Bienes públicos - Investigaciones Infraestructura económica - Investigaciones Economía del bienestar - Modelos econométricos C93, D01, D64, D83, H4, H3, Q28 |
| title_short |
Institutions influence preferences : evidence from a common pool resource experiment |
| title_full |
Institutions influence preferences : evidence from a common pool resource experiment |
| title_fullStr |
Institutions influence preferences : evidence from a common pool resource experiment |
| title_full_unstemmed |
Institutions influence preferences : evidence from a common pool resource experiment |
| title_sort |
Institutions influence preferences : evidence from a common pool resource experiment |
| dc.creator.fl_str_mv |
Rodríguez-Sickert, Carlos Guzmán, Ricardo Andrés Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo |
| dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv |
Rodríguez-Sickert, Carlos Guzmán, Ricardo Andrés Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo |
| dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv |
Field experiments Common-pool resources Cooperation Enforcement Regulation Social preferences Social norms Learning models |
| topic |
Field experiments Common-pool resources Cooperation Enforcement Regulation Social preferences Social norms Learning models Bienes públicos - Investigaciones Infraestructura económica - Investigaciones Economía del bienestar - Modelos econométricos C93, D01, D64, D83, H4, H3, Q28 |
| dc.subject.armarc.none.fl_str_mv |
Bienes públicos - Investigaciones Infraestructura económica - Investigaciones Economía del bienestar - Modelos econométricos |
| dc.subject.jel.none.fl_str_mv |
C93, D01, D64, D83, H4, H3, Q28 |
| description |
We model the dynamic effects of external enforcement on the exploitation of a common pool resource. Fitting our model to the results of experimental data we find that institutions influence social preferences. We solve two puzzles in the data: the increase and later erosion of cooperation when commoners vote against the imposition of a fine, and the high deterrence power of low fines. When fines are rejected, internalization of a social norm explains the increased cooperation; violations (accidental or not), coupled with reciprocal preferences, account for the erosion. Low fines stabilize cooperation by preventing a spiral of negative reciprocation. |
| publishDate |
2006 |
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2006 |
| dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-09-27T16:49:58Z |
| dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv |
2018-09-27T16:49:58Z |
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Documento de trabajo |
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http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
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info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
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http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
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Text |
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https://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WP |
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http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042 |
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1657-5334 |
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http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8000 |
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10.57784/1992/8000 |
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reponame:Repositorio Institucional Séneca |
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http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8000 |
| dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
| language |
eng |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries.none.fl_str_mv |
Documentos CEDE No. 24 Julio de 2006 |
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https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/002890.html |
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28 páginas |
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application/pdf |
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Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE |
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Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE |
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