Institutions influence preferences : evidence from a common pool resource experiment
We model the dynamic effects of external enforcement on the exploitation of a common pool resource. Fitting our model to the results of experimental data we find that institutions influence social preferences. We solve two puzzles in the data: the increase and later erosion of cooperation when commo...
- Autores:
-
Rodríguez-Sickert, Carlos
Guzmán, Ricardo Andrés
Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo
- Tipo de recurso:
- Work document
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2006
- Institución:
- Universidad de los Andes
- Repositorio:
- Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8000
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8000
- Palabra clave:
- Field experiments
Common-pool resources
Cooperation
Enforcement
Regulation
Social preferences
Social norms
Learning models
Bienes públicos - Investigaciones
Infraestructura económica - Investigaciones
Economía del bienestar - Modelos econométricos
C93, D01, D64, D83, H4, H3, Q28
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/