Institutions influence preferences : evidence from a common pool resource experiment

We model the dynamic effects of external enforcement on the exploitation of a common pool resource. Fitting our model to the results of experimental data we find that institutions influence social preferences. We solve two puzzles in the data: the increase and later erosion of cooperation when commoners vote against the imposition of a fine, and the high deterrence power of low fines. When fines are rejected, internalization of a social norm explains the increased cooperation; violations (accidental or not), coupled with reciprocal preferences, account for the erosion. Low fines stabilize cooperation by preventing a spiral of negative reciprocation.

• Autores: Rodríguez-Sickert, Carlos; Guzmán, Ricardo Andrés; Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo
• Tipo de recurso: Work document
• Fecha de publicación: 2006
• Institución: Universidad de los Andes
• Repositorio: Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
• Idioma: eng
• OAI Identifier: oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8000
• Acceso en línea: http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8000
• Palabra clave: Field experiments; Common-pool resources; Cooperation; Enforcement; Regulation; Social preferences; Social norms; Learning models; Bienes públicos - Investigaciones; Infraestructura económica - Investigaciones; Economía del bienestar - Modelos econométricos; C93, D01, D64, D83, H4, H3, Q28
• Rights: openAccess
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/