Institutions influence preferences : evidence from a common pool resource experiment

We model the dynamic effects of external enforcement on the exploitation of a common pool resource. Fitting our model to the results of experimental data we find that institutions influence social preferences. We solve two puzzles in the data: the increase and later erosion of cooperation when commo...

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Autores:
Rodríguez-Sickert, Carlos
Guzmán, Ricardo Andrés
Cárdenas Campo, Juan Camilo
Tipo de recurso:
Work document
Fecha de publicación:
2006
Institución:
Universidad de los Andes
Repositorio:
Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8000
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8000
Palabra clave:
Field experiments
Common-pool resources
Cooperation
Enforcement
Regulation
Social preferences
Social norms
Learning models
Bienes públicos - Investigaciones
Infraestructura económica - Investigaciones
Economía del bienestar - Modelos econométricos
C93, D01, D64, D83, H4, H3, Q28
Rights
openAccess
License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Description
Summary:We model the dynamic effects of external enforcement on the exploitation of a common pool resource. Fitting our model to the results of experimental data we find that institutions influence social preferences. We solve two puzzles in the data: the increase and later erosion of cooperation when commoners vote against the imposition of a fine, and the high deterrence power of low fines. When fines are rejected, internalization of a social norm explains the increased cooperation; violations (accidental or not), coupled with reciprocal preferences, account for the erosion. Low fines stabilize cooperation by preventing a spiral of negative reciprocation.