Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice

We consider school choice problems. We are interested in solutions that satisfy consistency. Consider a problem and a recommendation made by the solution for the problem. Suppose some students are removed with their positions in schools. Consider the "reduced" problem consisting of the rem...

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Autores:
Jaramillo Vidales, Paula
Tipo de recurso:
Work document
Fecha de publicación:
2014
Institución:
Universidad de los Andes
Repositorio:
Séneca: repositorio Uniandes
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8532
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8532
Palabra clave:
Boston mechanism
Consistency
Minimal consistent enlargement
School choice
Top trading cycles
Elección de escuela - Investigaciones - Modelos econométricos
C78, D47, D78
Rights
openAccess
License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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spelling Al consultar y hacer uso de este recurso, está aceptando las condiciones de uso establecidas por los autores.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Jaramillo Vidales, Paula88215002018-09-27T16:54:06Z2018-09-27T16:54:06Z20141657-5334http://hdl.handle.net/1992/85321657-719110.57784/1992/8532instname:Universidad de los Andesreponame:Repositorio Institucional Sénecarepourl:https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/We consider school choice problems. We are interested in solutions that satisfy consistency. Consider a problem and a recommendation made by the solution for the problem. Suppose some students are removed with their positions in schools. Consider the "reduced" problem consisting of the remaining students and the remaining positions. Consistency states that in the reduced problem, the solution should assign each remaining student to the same school as initially. Neither the immediate acceptance rule (also known as the Boston mechanism) nor the top trading cycles rule is consistent. We show that the efficient solution is the smallest consistent solution containing the immediate acceptance rule. It is also the smallest consistent solution containing the top trading cycles rule.Consideramos un problema de asignación escolar. Estamos interesados en soluciones que sean consistentes. Considere un problema y la recomendación hecha por la solución para este problema. Suponga que algunos estudiantes son removidos con sus posiciones en las escuelas. Considere el problema "reducido" de los estudiantes restantes y las posiciones restantes. Constencia dice que en este problema reducido, la solución debe asignar a cada estudiante restante la misma escuela que se le asignó originalmente. Ni la regla de aceptación inmediata (también conocida como el mecanismo de Boston), ni a regla de intercambios en la cima es consistente. Nosotros mostramos que la solución eficiente es la solución consistente más pequeña que contiene la regla de aceptación inmediata. También es la solución consistente más pequeña que contiene la regla de intercambios en la cima.26 páginasapplication/pdfengUniversidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDEDocumentos CEDE No. 45 Noviembre de 2014https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/012343.htmlMinimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choiceLa ampliación mínimamente consistente de la regla de aceptación inmediata y de la regla de intercambios en la cima en problemas de asignación escolarDocumento de trabajoinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Texthttps://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/WPBoston mechanismConsistencyMinimal consistent enlargementSchool choiceTop trading cyclesElección de escuela - Investigaciones - Modelos econométricosC78, D47, D78Facultad de EconomíaPublicationTEXTdcede2014-45.pdf.txtdcede2014-45.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain76814https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/22963d80-5f63-4a10-98a7-2bcf14791635/download7266b36f0bf947e213609c9b534a115cMD54ORIGINALdcede2014-45.pdfdcede2014-45.pdfapplication/pdf406435https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/cd7e596b-1c50-4a38-b104-95bc1024792c/download6684cf1ad371b7b8318fa0edd6c2fbc5MD51THUMBNAILdcede2014-45.pdf.jpgdcede2014-45.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg8981https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstreams/51fa35bb-d886-4da7-96df-aafce89589d6/downloada7e4859d435c526ea9e2a4859184c2edMD551992/8532oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/85322024-06-04 15:17:58.808http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/open.accesshttps://repositorio.uniandes.edu.coRepositorio institucional Sénecaadminrepositorio@uniandes.edu.co
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice
dc.title.alternative.none.fl_str_mv La ampliación mínimamente consistente de la regla de aceptación inmediata y de la regla de intercambios en la cima en problemas de asignación escolar
title Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice
spellingShingle Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice
Boston mechanism
Consistency
Minimal consistent enlargement
School choice
Top trading cycles
Elección de escuela - Investigaciones - Modelos econométricos
C78, D47, D78
title_short Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice
title_full Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice
title_fullStr Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice
title_full_unstemmed Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice
title_sort Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice
dc.creator.fl_str_mv Jaramillo Vidales, Paula
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv Jaramillo Vidales, Paula
dc.subject.keyword.none.fl_str_mv Boston mechanism
Consistency
Minimal consistent enlargement
School choice
Top trading cycles
topic Boston mechanism
Consistency
Minimal consistent enlargement
School choice
Top trading cycles
Elección de escuela - Investigaciones - Modelos econométricos
C78, D47, D78
dc.subject.armarc.none.fl_str_mv Elección de escuela - Investigaciones - Modelos econométricos
dc.subject.jel.none.fl_str_mv C78, D47, D78
description We consider school choice problems. We are interested in solutions that satisfy consistency. Consider a problem and a recommendation made by the solution for the problem. Suppose some students are removed with their positions in schools. Consider the "reduced" problem consisting of the remaining students and the remaining positions. Consistency states that in the reduced problem, the solution should assign each remaining student to the same school as initially. Neither the immediate acceptance rule (also known as the Boston mechanism) nor the top trading cycles rule is consistent. We show that the efficient solution is the smallest consistent solution containing the immediate acceptance rule. It is also the smallest consistent solution containing the top trading cycles rule.
publishDate 2014
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 2014
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2018-09-27T16:54:06Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2018-09-27T16:54:06Z
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv Documento de trabajo
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dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv 10.57784/1992/8532
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identifier_str_mv 1657-5334
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url http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8532
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.ispartofseries.none.fl_str_mv Documentos CEDE No. 45 Noviembre de 2014
dc.relation.repec.spa.fl_str_mv https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000089/012343.html
dc.rights.uri.*.fl_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.extent.none.fl_str_mv 26 páginas
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE
institution Universidad de los Andes
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