Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice

We consider school choice problems. We are interested in solutions that satisfy consistency. Consider a problem and a recommendation made by the solution for the problem. Suppose some students are removed with their positions in schools. Consider the "reduced" problem consisting of the rem...

Full description

Autores:

Jaramillo Vidales, Paula

Tipo de recurso:

Work document

Fecha de publicación:

2014

Institución:

Universidad de los Andes

Repositorio:

Séneca: repositorio Uniandes

Idioma:

eng

OAI Identifier:

oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/8532

Acceso en línea:

http://hdl.handle.net/1992/8532

Palabra clave:

Boston mechanism
Consistency
Minimal consistent enlargement
School choice
Top trading cycles
Elección de escuela - Investigaciones - Modelos econométricos
C78, D47, D78

Rights

openAccess

License

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/