Optimal Capital Requirement with Noisy Signals on Banking Risk

In this paper we analyze the optimal capital requirement in a model of banks with heterogeneous investment risks and asymmetric information. Asymmetric information prevents depositors from charging an actuarially-fair interest rate based on banking risk, and leads to cross-subsidization across banks...

Full description

Autores:

Kai, Ding
Enoch, Hill
Perez Reyna, David

Tipo de recurso:

Work document

Fecha de publicación:

2018

Institución:

Universidad de los Andes

Repositorio:

Séneca: repositorio Uniandes

Idioma:

spa

OAI Identifier:

oai:repositorio.uniandes.edu.co:1992/41038

Acceso en línea:

http://hdl.handle.net/1992/41038

Palabra clave:

Capital requirements
Banking regulation
Asymmetric information
G21, G28

Rights

openAccess

License

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/