Communication, Strategic Moves, and Commitment: An Analysis from the Experimental Economics
Thomas Schelling is one of the most important references in game theory and negotiation, as he has been recognized as a pioneer in proposing the concepts and laying the foundations of formal models, always based on observation and empirical contrast. His focus on communication, strategic moves and c...
- Autores:
- Tipo de recurso:
- http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6570
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2022
- Institución:
- Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia
- Repositorio:
- RiUPTC: Repositorio Institucional UPTC
- Idioma:
- spa
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.uptc.edu.co:001/12064
- Acceso en línea:
- https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cenes/article/view/13496
https://repositorio.uptc.edu.co/handle/001/12064
- Palabra clave:
- Teoría de juegos y teoría de la negociación
teoría de la confrontación
amenazas
poder de negociación
resolución de conflictos
compromiso creíble
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Matching Theory
threats
bargaining power
conflict resolution
credible commitment
- Rights
- License
- Copyright (c) 2022 Luis Alejandro Palacio Garcia, Brayan Snehider Díaz Pérez
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2022-02-222024-07-05T18:44:53Z2024-07-05T18:44:53Zhttps://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cenes/article/view/1349610.19053/01203053.v41.n73.2022.13496https://repositorio.uptc.edu.co/handle/001/12064Thomas Schelling is one of the most important references in game theory and negotiation, as he has been recognized as a pioneer in proposing the concepts and laying the foundations of formal models, always based on observation and empirical contrast. His focus on communication, strategic moves and commitment makes it possible to understand the advantages, in terms of bargaining power, of publicly announcing that the decision has been made, even when the message is cheap talk. Taking this starting point, this article focuses on how experimental economics has expanded and refined its original proposals. It is possible to classify this literature into three aspects: 1) non-binding communication, 2) use of strategic moves, 3) credibility and commitment. Among the findings, it is highlighted that communication is a useful mechanism for transmitting private information and, therefore, affects the beliefs and behavior of negotiators. For their part, strategic moves play a role since they transfer the advantage of the first move to the second player. Finally, the sense of justice, fear of punishment, and the reputation of negotiators affect the credibility of their threats.Thomas Schelling es uno de los grandes referentes en teoría de juegos y negociación, pues ha sido reconocido como un pionero al proponer los conceptos y sentar las bases de los modelos formales, basado siempre en la observación y el contraste empírico. Su enfoque sobre la comunicación, las jugadas estratégicas y el compromiso permite entender las ventajas, en términos de poder de negociación, de anunciar públicamente que la decisión ya está tomada, incluso cuando el mensaje es simple palabrería. Tomando este punto de partida, este artículo se centra en cómo la economía experimental ha permitido ampliar y afinar sus propuestas originales. Es posible clasificar esta literatura en tres vertientes: 1) comunicación no vinculante, 2) utilización de jugadas estratégicas, 3) credibilidad y compromiso. Entre los hallazgos se resalta que la comunicación es un mecanismo útil para transmitir información privada y, por lo tanto, afecta las creencias y el comportamiento de los negociadores. Por su parte, las jugadas estratégicas cumplen el rol de transferir la ventaja del primer movimiento al segundo jugador. Por último, el sentido de justicia, el temor a los castigos y la reputación de los negociadores afectan la credibilidad de sus amenazas.application/pdftext/xmlspaspaUniversidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombiahttps://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cenes/article/view/13496/11456https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cenes/article/view/13496/13355Copyright (c) 2022 Luis Alejandro Palacio Garcia, Brayan Snehider Díaz Pérezhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf71http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Apuntes del Cenes; Vol. 41 No. 73 (2022); 17-42Apuntes del Cenes; Vol. 41 Núm. 73 (2022); 17-422256-57790120-3053Teoría de juegos y teoría de la negociaciónteoría de la confrontaciónamenazaspoder de negociaciónresolución de conflictoscompromiso creíbleGame Theory and Bargaining TheoryMatching Theorythreatsbargaining powerconflict resolutioncredible commitmentCommunication, Strategic Moves, and Commitment: An Analysis from the Experimental EconomicsComunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimentalPeer reviewed Articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articletextohttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6570http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a154http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Palacio Garcia, Luis AlejandroDíaz Pérez, Brayan Snehider001/12064oai:repositorio.uptc.edu.co:001/120642025-07-18 12:12:58.74metadata.onlyhttps://repositorio.uptc.edu.coRepositorio Institucional UPTCrepositorio.uptc@uptc.edu.co |
dc.title.en-US.fl_str_mv |
Communication, Strategic Moves, and Commitment: An Analysis from the Experimental Economics |
dc.title.es-ES.fl_str_mv |
Comunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimental |
title |
Communication, Strategic Moves, and Commitment: An Analysis from the Experimental Economics |
spellingShingle |
Communication, Strategic Moves, and Commitment: An Analysis from the Experimental Economics Teoría de juegos y teoría de la negociación teoría de la confrontación amenazas poder de negociación resolución de conflictos compromiso creíble Game Theory and Bargaining Theory Matching Theory threats bargaining power conflict resolution credible commitment |
title_short |
Communication, Strategic Moves, and Commitment: An Analysis from the Experimental Economics |
title_full |
Communication, Strategic Moves, and Commitment: An Analysis from the Experimental Economics |
title_fullStr |
Communication, Strategic Moves, and Commitment: An Analysis from the Experimental Economics |
title_full_unstemmed |
Communication, Strategic Moves, and Commitment: An Analysis from the Experimental Economics |
title_sort |
Communication, Strategic Moves, and Commitment: An Analysis from the Experimental Economics |
dc.subject.es-ES.fl_str_mv |
Teoría de juegos y teoría de la negociación teoría de la confrontación amenazas poder de negociación resolución de conflictos compromiso creíble |
topic |
Teoría de juegos y teoría de la negociación teoría de la confrontación amenazas poder de negociación resolución de conflictos compromiso creíble Game Theory and Bargaining Theory Matching Theory threats bargaining power conflict resolution credible commitment |
dc.subject.en-US.fl_str_mv |
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory Matching Theory threats bargaining power conflict resolution credible commitment |
description |
Thomas Schelling is one of the most important references in game theory and negotiation, as he has been recognized as a pioneer in proposing the concepts and laying the foundations of formal models, always based on observation and empirical contrast. His focus on communication, strategic moves and commitment makes it possible to understand the advantages, in terms of bargaining power, of publicly announcing that the decision has been made, even when the message is cheap talk. Taking this starting point, this article focuses on how experimental economics has expanded and refined its original proposals. It is possible to classify this literature into three aspects: 1) non-binding communication, 2) use of strategic moves, 3) credibility and commitment. Among the findings, it is highlighted that communication is a useful mechanism for transmitting private information and, therefore, affects the beliefs and behavior of negotiators. For their part, strategic moves play a role since they transfer the advantage of the first move to the second player. Finally, the sense of justice, fear of punishment, and the reputation of negotiators affect the credibility of their threats. |
publishDate |
2022 |
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv |
2024-07-05T18:44:53Z |
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv |
2024-07-05T18:44:53Z |
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv |
2022-02-22 |
dc.type.en-US.fl_str_mv |
Peer reviewed Article |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
dc.type.es-ES.fl_str_mv |
texto |
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1 |
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
dc.type.coar.spa.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6570 |
dc.type.version.spa.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
dc.type.coarversion.spa.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a154 |
format |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6570 |
status_str |
publishedVersion |
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cenes/article/view/13496 10.19053/01203053.v41.n73.2022.13496 |
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv |
https://repositorio.uptc.edu.co/handle/001/12064 |
url |
https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cenes/article/view/13496 https://repositorio.uptc.edu.co/handle/001/12064 |
identifier_str_mv |
10.19053/01203053.v41.n73.2022.13496 |
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv |
spa |
dc.language.iso.spa.fl_str_mv |
spa |
language |
spa |
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv |
https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cenes/article/view/13496/11456 https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cenes/article/view/13496/13355 |
dc.rights.en-US.fl_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2022 Luis Alejandro Palacio Garcia, Brayan Snehider Díaz Pérez http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0 |
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
dc.rights.coar.spa.fl_str_mv |
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rights_invalid_str_mv |
Copyright (c) 2022 Luis Alejandro Palacio Garcia, Brayan Snehider Díaz Pérez http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0 http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf71 http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf text/xml |
dc.publisher.en-US.fl_str_mv |
Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia |
dc.source.en-US.fl_str_mv |
Apuntes del Cenes; Vol. 41 No. 73 (2022); 17-42 |
dc.source.es-ES.fl_str_mv |
Apuntes del Cenes; Vol. 41 Núm. 73 (2022); 17-42 |
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv |
2256-5779 0120-3053 |
institution |
Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositorio Institucional UPTC |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
repositorio.uptc@uptc.edu.co |
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1839633794363031552 |