Communication, Strategic Moves, and Commitment: An Analysis from the Experimental Economics

Thomas Schelling is one of the most important references in game theory and negotiation, as he has been recognized as a pioneer in proposing the concepts and laying the foundations of formal models, always based on observation and empirical contrast. His focus on communication, strategic moves and c...

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Tipo de recurso:
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6570
Fecha de publicación:
2022
Institución:
Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia
Repositorio:
RiUPTC: Repositorio Institucional UPTC
Idioma:
spa
OAI Identifier:
oai:repositorio.uptc.edu.co:001/12064
Acceso en línea:
https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cenes/article/view/13496
https://repositorio.uptc.edu.co/handle/001/12064
Palabra clave:
Teoría de juegos y teoría de la negociación
teoría de la confrontación
amenazas
poder de negociación
resolución de conflictos
compromiso creíble
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Matching Theory
threats
bargaining power
conflict resolution
credible commitment
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Copyright (c) 2022 Luis Alejandro Palacio Garcia, Brayan Snehider Díaz Pérez
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spelling 2022-02-222024-07-05T18:44:53Z2024-07-05T18:44:53Zhttps://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cenes/article/view/1349610.19053/01203053.v41.n73.2022.13496https://repositorio.uptc.edu.co/handle/001/12064Thomas Schelling is one of the most important references in game theory and negotiation, as he has been recognized as a pioneer in proposing the concepts and laying the foundations of formal models, always based on observation and empirical contrast. His focus on communication, strategic moves and commitment makes it possible to understand the advantages, in terms of bargaining power, of publicly announcing that the decision has been made, even when the message is cheap talk. Taking this starting point, this article focuses on how experimental economics has expanded and refined its original proposals. It is possible to classify this literature into three aspects: 1) non-binding communication, 2) use of strategic moves, 3) credibility and commitment. Among the findings, it is highlighted that communication is a useful mechanism for transmitting private information and, therefore, affects the beliefs and behavior of negotiators. For their part, strategic moves play a role since they transfer the advantage of the first move to the second player. Finally, the sense of justice, fear of punishment, and the reputation of negotiators affect the credibility of their threats.Thomas Schelling es uno de los grandes referentes en teoría de juegos y negociación, pues ha sido reconocido como un pionero al proponer los conceptos y sentar las bases de los modelos formales, basado siempre en la observación y el contraste empírico. Su enfoque sobre la comunicación, las jugadas estratégicas y el compromiso permite entender las ventajas, en términos de poder de negociación, de anunciar públicamente que la decisión ya está tomada, incluso cuando el mensaje es simple palabrería. Tomando este punto de partida, este artículo se centra en cómo la economía experimental ha permitido ampliar y afinar sus propuestas originales. Es posible clasificar esta literatura en tres vertientes: 1) comunicación no vinculante, 2) utilización de jugadas estratégicas, 3) credibilidad y compromiso. Entre los hallazgos se resalta que la comunicación es un mecanismo útil para transmitir información privada y, por lo tanto, afecta las creencias y el comportamiento de los negociadores. Por su parte, las jugadas estratégicas cumplen el rol de transferir la ventaja del primer movimiento al segundo jugador. Por último, el sentido de justicia, el temor a los castigos y la reputación de los negociadores afectan la credibilidad de sus amenazas.application/pdftext/xmlspaspaUniversidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombiahttps://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cenes/article/view/13496/11456https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cenes/article/view/13496/13355Copyright (c) 2022 Luis Alejandro Palacio Garcia, Brayan Snehider Díaz Pérezhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf71http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Apuntes del Cenes; Vol. 41 No. 73 (2022); 17-42Apuntes del Cenes; Vol. 41 Núm. 73 (2022); 17-422256-57790120-3053Teoría de juegos y teoría de la negociaciónteoría de la confrontaciónamenazaspoder de negociaciónresolución de conflictoscompromiso creíbleGame Theory and Bargaining TheoryMatching Theorythreatsbargaining powerconflict resolutioncredible commitmentCommunication, Strategic Moves, and Commitment: An Analysis from the Experimental EconomicsComunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimentalPeer reviewed Articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articletextohttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6570http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a154http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Palacio Garcia, Luis AlejandroDíaz Pérez, Brayan Snehider001/12064oai:repositorio.uptc.edu.co:001/120642025-07-18 12:12:58.74metadata.onlyhttps://repositorio.uptc.edu.coRepositorio Institucional UPTCrepositorio.uptc@uptc.edu.co
dc.title.en-US.fl_str_mv Communication, Strategic Moves, and Commitment: An Analysis from the Experimental Economics
dc.title.es-ES.fl_str_mv Comunicación, jugadas estratégicas y compromiso: un análisis desde la economía experimental
title Communication, Strategic Moves, and Commitment: An Analysis from the Experimental Economics
spellingShingle Communication, Strategic Moves, and Commitment: An Analysis from the Experimental Economics
Teoría de juegos y teoría de la negociación
teoría de la confrontación
amenazas
poder de negociación
resolución de conflictos
compromiso creíble
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Matching Theory
threats
bargaining power
conflict resolution
credible commitment
title_short Communication, Strategic Moves, and Commitment: An Analysis from the Experimental Economics
title_full Communication, Strategic Moves, and Commitment: An Analysis from the Experimental Economics
title_fullStr Communication, Strategic Moves, and Commitment: An Analysis from the Experimental Economics
title_full_unstemmed Communication, Strategic Moves, and Commitment: An Analysis from the Experimental Economics
title_sort Communication, Strategic Moves, and Commitment: An Analysis from the Experimental Economics
dc.subject.es-ES.fl_str_mv Teoría de juegos y teoría de la negociación
teoría de la confrontación
amenazas
poder de negociación
resolución de conflictos
compromiso creíble
topic Teoría de juegos y teoría de la negociación
teoría de la confrontación
amenazas
poder de negociación
resolución de conflictos
compromiso creíble
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Matching Theory
threats
bargaining power
conflict resolution
credible commitment
dc.subject.en-US.fl_str_mv Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Matching Theory
threats
bargaining power
conflict resolution
credible commitment
description Thomas Schelling is one of the most important references in game theory and negotiation, as he has been recognized as a pioneer in proposing the concepts and laying the foundations of formal models, always based on observation and empirical contrast. His focus on communication, strategic moves and commitment makes it possible to understand the advantages, in terms of bargaining power, of publicly announcing that the decision has been made, even when the message is cheap talk. Taking this starting point, this article focuses on how experimental economics has expanded and refined its original proposals. It is possible to classify this literature into three aspects: 1) non-binding communication, 2) use of strategic moves, 3) credibility and commitment. Among the findings, it is highlighted that communication is a useful mechanism for transmitting private information and, therefore, affects the beliefs and behavior of negotiators. For their part, strategic moves play a role since they transfer the advantage of the first move to the second player. Finally, the sense of justice, fear of punishment, and the reputation of negotiators affect the credibility of their threats.
publishDate 2022
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2024-07-05T18:44:53Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2024-07-05T18:44:53Z
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2022-02-22
dc.type.en-US.fl_str_mv Peer reviewed Article
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.es-ES.fl_str_mv texto
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.coar.spa.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6570
dc.type.version.spa.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
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format http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6570
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cenes/article/view/13496
10.19053/01203053.v41.n73.2022.13496
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv https://repositorio.uptc.edu.co/handle/001/12064
url https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cenes/article/view/13496
https://repositorio.uptc.edu.co/handle/001/12064
identifier_str_mv 10.19053/01203053.v41.n73.2022.13496
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv spa
dc.language.iso.spa.fl_str_mv spa
language spa
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cenes/article/view/13496/11456
https://revistas.uptc.edu.co/index.php/cenes/article/view/13496/13355
dc.rights.en-US.fl_str_mv Copyright (c) 2022 Luis Alejandro Palacio Garcia, Brayan Snehider Díaz Pérez
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.coar.spa.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf71
rights_invalid_str_mv Copyright (c) 2022 Luis Alejandro Palacio Garcia, Brayan Snehider Díaz Pérez
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf71
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
text/xml
dc.publisher.en-US.fl_str_mv Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia
dc.source.en-US.fl_str_mv Apuntes del Cenes; Vol. 41 No. 73 (2022); 17-42
dc.source.es-ES.fl_str_mv Apuntes del Cenes; Vol. 41 Núm. 73 (2022); 17-42
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv 2256-5779
0120-3053
institution Universidad Pedagógica y Tecnológica de Colombia
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositorio Institucional UPTC
repository.mail.fl_str_mv repositorio.uptc@uptc.edu.co
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