Competition with Nonexclusive Contracts: Tackling the Hold-Up Problem

In an environment in which a buyer and a seller make ex-ante investments, competition among sellers can solve the hold-up problem without the design of ex-ante contracts but, in the case of low levels of competition, this may lead to inefficient investments. This paper shows that a seller invests ef...

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Autores:
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2020
Institución:
Universidad del Rosario
Repositorio:
Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/23456
Acceso en línea:
https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2018-0190
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/23456
Palabra clave:
Bilateral investment
Hold-up
Latent contracts
Rights
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