Competition with Nonexclusive Contracts: Tackling the Hold-Up Problem
In an environment in which a buyer and a seller make ex-ante investments, competition among sellers can solve the hold-up problem without the design of ex-ante contracts but, in the case of low levels of competition, this may lead to inefficient investments. This paper shows that a seller invests ef...
- Autores:
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2020
- Institución:
- Universidad del Rosario
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/23456
- Acceso en línea:
- https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2018-0190
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/23456
- Palabra clave:
- Bilateral investment
Hold-up
Latent contracts
- Rights
- License
- Abierto (Texto Completo)