Forced Saving, redistribution, and nonlinear social security schemes

This paper studies the design of nonlinear social security schemes when individuals differ in productivity and in their degree of myopia. Myopic individuals may not save 'enough' for their retirement. The welfare function is paternalistic: The rate of time preference of the farsighted is u...

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Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2009
Institución:
Universidad del Rosario
Repositorio:
Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/23318
Acceso en línea:
https://doi.org/10.4284/sej.2009.76.1.86
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/23318
Palabra clave:
Forced
Saving
redistribution
nonlinear
social
security
schemes
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Abierto (Texto Completo)
id EDOCUR2_e7d415bdc721244bdec9987fd1106041
oai_identifier_str oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/23318
network_acronym_str EDOCUR2
network_name_str Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
repository_id_str
spelling f1491631-5f2e-4c0d-b9cf-430591d7c0a4-1d2dd0889-d1b0-45c9-acd3-66b9f017c757-15e277dd3-0720-47aa-9212-487e635730a1-18882ac23-c9b2-4636-9b79-68e5d28c4039-12020-05-26T00:01:07Z2020-05-26T00:01:07Z2009This paper studies the design of nonlinear social security schemes when individuals differ in productivity and in their degree of myopia. Myopic individuals may not save 'enough' for their retirement. The welfare function is paternalistic: The rate of time preference of the farsighted is used for both types. We show that the solution does not necessarily imply forced savings for the myopics: Paternalistic considerations are mitigated by incentive effects. Numerical results suggest that as the proportion of myopic individuals increases, there is less redistribution and more forced saving, and the desirability of social security increases.application/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.4284/sej.2009.76.1.86384038https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/23318engSouthern Economic Association98No. 186Southern Economic JournalVol. 76Southern Economic Journal, ISSN:384038, Vol.76, No.1 (2009); pp. 86-98https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-69549088897&doi=10.4284%2fsej.2009.76.1.86&partnerID=40&md5=ea0956181b6dad07b46bdf9e85c18ab8Abierto (Texto Completo)http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2instname:Universidad del Rosarioreponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURForcedSavingredistributionnonlinearsocialsecurityschemesForced Saving, redistribution, and nonlinear social security schemesarticleArtículohttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501Cremer, HelmuthDe Donder, PhilippeMaldonado, DarioPestieau, Pierre10336/23318oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/233182022-05-02 07:37:21.448832https://repository.urosario.edu.coRepositorio institucional EdocURedocur@urosario.edu.co
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv Forced Saving, redistribution, and nonlinear social security schemes
title Forced Saving, redistribution, and nonlinear social security schemes
spellingShingle Forced Saving, redistribution, and nonlinear social security schemes
Forced
Saving
redistribution
nonlinear
social
security
schemes
title_short Forced Saving, redistribution, and nonlinear social security schemes
title_full Forced Saving, redistribution, and nonlinear social security schemes
title_fullStr Forced Saving, redistribution, and nonlinear social security schemes
title_full_unstemmed Forced Saving, redistribution, and nonlinear social security schemes
title_sort Forced Saving, redistribution, and nonlinear social security schemes
dc.subject.keyword.spa.fl_str_mv Forced
Saving
redistribution
nonlinear
social
security
schemes
topic Forced
Saving
redistribution
nonlinear
social
security
schemes
description This paper studies the design of nonlinear social security schemes when individuals differ in productivity and in their degree of myopia. Myopic individuals may not save 'enough' for their retirement. The welfare function is paternalistic: The rate of time preference of the farsighted is used for both types. We show that the solution does not necessarily imply forced savings for the myopics: Paternalistic considerations are mitigated by incentive effects. Numerical results suggest that as the proportion of myopic individuals increases, there is less redistribution and more forced saving, and the desirability of social security increases.
publishDate 2009
dc.date.created.spa.fl_str_mv 2009
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2020-05-26T00:01:07Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2020-05-26T00:01:07Z
dc.type.eng.fl_str_mv article
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.type.spa.spa.fl_str_mv Artículo
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.4284/sej.2009.76.1.86
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv 384038
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/23318
url https://doi.org/10.4284/sej.2009.76.1.86
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/23318
identifier_str_mv 384038
dc.language.iso.spa.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.citationEndPage.none.fl_str_mv 98
dc.relation.citationIssue.none.fl_str_mv No. 1
dc.relation.citationStartPage.none.fl_str_mv 86
dc.relation.citationTitle.none.fl_str_mv Southern Economic Journal
dc.relation.citationVolume.none.fl_str_mv Vol. 76
dc.relation.ispartof.spa.fl_str_mv Southern Economic Journal, ISSN:384038, Vol.76, No.1 (2009); pp. 86-98
dc.relation.uri.spa.fl_str_mv https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-69549088897&doi=10.4284%2fsej.2009.76.1.86&partnerID=40&md5=ea0956181b6dad07b46bdf9e85c18ab8
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.acceso.spa.fl_str_mv Abierto (Texto Completo)
rights_invalid_str_mv Abierto (Texto Completo)
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv Southern Economic Association
institution Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.instname.spa.fl_str_mv instname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.reponame.spa.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositorio institucional EdocUR
repository.mail.fl_str_mv edocur@urosario.edu.co
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