Forced Saving, redistribution, and nonlinear social security schemes

This paper studies the design of nonlinear social security schemes when individuals differ in productivity and in their degree of myopia. Myopic individuals may not save 'enough' for their retirement. The welfare function is paternalistic: The rate of time preference of the farsighted is u...

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Autores:

Tipo de recurso:

Fecha de publicación:

2009

Institución:

Universidad del Rosario

Repositorio:

Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario

Idioma:

eng

OAI Identifier:

oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/23318

Acceso en línea:

https://doi.org/10.4284/sej.2009.76.1.86
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/23318

Palabra clave:

Forced
Saving
redistribution
nonlinear
social
security
schemes

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