Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
We study many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences over students. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling.Roth and Sotomayor (1990) showed that equilibrium...
- Autores:
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2013
- Institución:
- Universidad del Rosario
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/24713
- Acceso en línea:
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.001
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24713
- Palabra clave:
- Deferred acceptance
Dropping strategies
Filled positions
Many-to-one matching
Nash equilibrium
Welfare
- Rights
- License
- Bloqueado (Texto referencial)
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e6c2ec8d-8d20-43cd-99a4-b6f77eac749f385471600604ffaef-f82d-40e0-902c-47c78121f2f62020-06-11T13:21:04Z2020-06-11T13:21:04Z2013We study many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences over students. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling.Roth and Sotomayor (1990) showed that equilibrium outcomes can be unstable. We prove that any stable matching is obtained in some equilibrium. We also show that the exhaustive class of dropping strategies does not necessarily generate the full set of equilibrium outcomes. Finally, we find that the 'rural hospital theorem' cannot be extended to the set of equilibrium outcomes and that welfare levels are in general unrelated to the set of stable matchings. Two important consequences are that, contrary to one-to-one matching markets, (a) filled positions depend on the equilibrium that is reached and (b) welfare levels are not bounded by the optimal stable matchings (with respect to the true preferences). © 2013 Elsevier Inc.application/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.0010899-8256https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24713engElsevier701693Games and Economic BehaviorVol. 82Games and Economic Behavior, ISSN: 0899-8256, Vol.82, (2013); pp. 693-701https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0899825613001358Bloqueado (Texto referencial)http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cbinstname:Universidad del Rosarioreponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURDeferred acceptanceDropping strategiesFilled positionsMany-to-one matchingNash equilibriumWelfareEquilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfarearticleArtículohttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501Jaramillo, PaulaKayi, CagatayKlijn, Flip10336/24713oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/247132021-09-07 00:04:39.574https://repository.urosario.edu.coRepositorio institucional EdocURedocur@urosario.edu.co |
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv |
Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare |
title |
Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare |
spellingShingle |
Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare Deferred acceptance Dropping strategies Filled positions Many-to-one matching Nash equilibrium Welfare |
title_short |
Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare |
title_full |
Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare |
title_fullStr |
Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare |
title_full_unstemmed |
Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare |
title_sort |
Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare |
dc.subject.keyword.spa.fl_str_mv |
Deferred acceptance Dropping strategies Filled positions Many-to-one matching Nash equilibrium Welfare |
topic |
Deferred acceptance Dropping strategies Filled positions Many-to-one matching Nash equilibrium Welfare |
description |
We study many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences over students. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling.Roth and Sotomayor (1990) showed that equilibrium outcomes can be unstable. We prove that any stable matching is obtained in some equilibrium. We also show that the exhaustive class of dropping strategies does not necessarily generate the full set of equilibrium outcomes. Finally, we find that the 'rural hospital theorem' cannot be extended to the set of equilibrium outcomes and that welfare levels are in general unrelated to the set of stable matchings. Two important consequences are that, contrary to one-to-one matching markets, (a) filled positions depend on the equilibrium that is reached and (b) welfare levels are not bounded by the optimal stable matchings (with respect to the true preferences). © 2013 Elsevier Inc. |
publishDate |
2013 |
dc.date.created.spa.fl_str_mv |
2013 |
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-06-11T13:21:04Z |
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-06-11T13:21:04Z |
dc.type.eng.fl_str_mv |
article |
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 |
dc.type.spa.spa.fl_str_mv |
Artículo |
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv |
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.001 |
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv |
0899-8256 |
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv |
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24713 |
url |
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.001 https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24713 |
identifier_str_mv |
0899-8256 |
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.citationEndPage.none.fl_str_mv |
701 |
dc.relation.citationStartPage.none.fl_str_mv |
693 |
dc.relation.citationTitle.none.fl_str_mv |
Games and Economic Behavior |
dc.relation.citationVolume.none.fl_str_mv |
Vol. 82 |
dc.relation.ispartof.spa.fl_str_mv |
Games and Economic Behavior, ISSN: 0899-8256, Vol.82, (2013); pp. 693-701 |
dc.relation.uri.spa.fl_str_mv |
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0899825613001358 |
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb |
dc.rights.acceso.spa.fl_str_mv |
Bloqueado (Texto referencial) |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Bloqueado (Texto referencial) http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb |
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv |
Elsevier |
institution |
Universidad del Rosario |
dc.source.instname.spa.fl_str_mv |
instname:Universidad del Rosario |
dc.source.reponame.spa.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositorio institucional EdocUR |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
edocur@urosario.edu.co |
_version_ |
1814167606921265152 |