Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare

We study many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences over students. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling.Roth and Sotomayor (1990) showed that equilibrium...

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Autores:
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2013
Institución:
Universidad del Rosario
Repositorio:
Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/24713
Acceso en línea:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.001
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24713
Palabra clave:
Deferred acceptance
Dropping strategies
Filled positions
Many-to-one matching
Nash equilibrium
Welfare
Rights
License
Bloqueado (Texto referencial)
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network_acronym_str EDOCUR2
network_name_str Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
repository_id_str
spelling e6c2ec8d-8d20-43cd-99a4-b6f77eac749f385471600604ffaef-f82d-40e0-902c-47c78121f2f62020-06-11T13:21:04Z2020-06-11T13:21:04Z2013We study many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences over students. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling.Roth and Sotomayor (1990) showed that equilibrium outcomes can be unstable. We prove that any stable matching is obtained in some equilibrium. We also show that the exhaustive class of dropping strategies does not necessarily generate the full set of equilibrium outcomes. Finally, we find that the 'rural hospital theorem' cannot be extended to the set of equilibrium outcomes and that welfare levels are in general unrelated to the set of stable matchings. Two important consequences are that, contrary to one-to-one matching markets, (a) filled positions depend on the equilibrium that is reached and (b) welfare levels are not bounded by the optimal stable matchings (with respect to the true preferences). © 2013 Elsevier Inc.application/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.0010899-8256https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24713engElsevier701693Games and Economic BehaviorVol. 82Games and Economic Behavior, ISSN: 0899-8256, Vol.82, (2013); pp. 693-701https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0899825613001358Bloqueado (Texto referencial)http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cbinstname:Universidad del Rosarioreponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURDeferred acceptanceDropping strategiesFilled positionsMany-to-one matchingNash equilibriumWelfareEquilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfarearticleArtículohttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501Jaramillo, PaulaKayi, CagatayKlijn, Flip10336/24713oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/247132021-09-07 00:04:39.574https://repository.urosario.edu.coRepositorio institucional EdocURedocur@urosario.edu.co
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
title Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
spellingShingle Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
Deferred acceptance
Dropping strategies
Filled positions
Many-to-one matching
Nash equilibrium
Welfare
title_short Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
title_full Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
title_fullStr Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
title_full_unstemmed Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
title_sort Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
dc.subject.keyword.spa.fl_str_mv Deferred acceptance
Dropping strategies
Filled positions
Many-to-one matching
Nash equilibrium
Welfare
topic Deferred acceptance
Dropping strategies
Filled positions
Many-to-one matching
Nash equilibrium
Welfare
description We study many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences over students. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling.Roth and Sotomayor (1990) showed that equilibrium outcomes can be unstable. We prove that any stable matching is obtained in some equilibrium. We also show that the exhaustive class of dropping strategies does not necessarily generate the full set of equilibrium outcomes. Finally, we find that the 'rural hospital theorem' cannot be extended to the set of equilibrium outcomes and that welfare levels are in general unrelated to the set of stable matchings. Two important consequences are that, contrary to one-to-one matching markets, (a) filled positions depend on the equilibrium that is reached and (b) welfare levels are not bounded by the optimal stable matchings (with respect to the true preferences). © 2013 Elsevier Inc.
publishDate 2013
dc.date.created.spa.fl_str_mv 2013
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2020-06-11T13:21:04Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2020-06-11T13:21:04Z
dc.type.eng.fl_str_mv article
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.type.spa.spa.fl_str_mv Artículo
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.001
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv 0899-8256
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24713
url https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.001
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24713
identifier_str_mv 0899-8256
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.citationEndPage.none.fl_str_mv 701
dc.relation.citationStartPage.none.fl_str_mv 693
dc.relation.citationTitle.none.fl_str_mv Games and Economic Behavior
dc.relation.citationVolume.none.fl_str_mv Vol. 82
dc.relation.ispartof.spa.fl_str_mv Games and Economic Behavior, ISSN: 0899-8256, Vol.82, (2013); pp. 693-701
dc.relation.uri.spa.fl_str_mv https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0899825613001358
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb
dc.rights.acceso.spa.fl_str_mv Bloqueado (Texto referencial)
rights_invalid_str_mv Bloqueado (Texto referencial)
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_14cb
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv Elsevier
institution Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.instname.spa.fl_str_mv instname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.reponame.spa.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositorio institucional EdocUR
repository.mail.fl_str_mv edocur@urosario.edu.co
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