Equilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare

We study many-to-one matching markets where hospitals have responsive preferences over students. We study the game induced by the student-optimal stable matching mechanism. We assume that students play their weakly dominant strategy of truth-telling.Roth and Sotomayor (1990) showed that equilibrium...

Full description

Autores:

Tipo de recurso:

Fecha de publicación:

2013

Institución:

Universidad del Rosario

Repositorio:

Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario

Idioma:

eng

OAI Identifier:

oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/24713

Acceso en línea:

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.10.001
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24713

Palabra clave:

Deferred acceptance
Dropping strategies
Filled positions
Many-to-one matching
Nash equilibrium
Welfare

Rights

License

Bloqueado (Texto referencial)