Duopolistic competition in markets where consumers have switching costs
In a dynamic competition model where firms initially share half of the market and consumers have switching costs, consumers’ sophistication, lifespan and concentration impact the possibility to set collusive prices. I first show that with strategic long-run consumers, collusion is harder to implemen...
- Autores:
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2017
- Institución:
- Universidad del Rosario
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
- Idioma:
- spa
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/13453
- Acceso en línea:
- https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_13453
http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/13453
- Palabra clave:
- Costes de cambio
Colision de precios
Consumidores estratégicos
Producción
D43
L13
L12
Switching cost
Price collusion
Strategic consumers
Oligopolios
Mercados
- Rights
- License
- http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2