Competition and the hold-up problem: a setting with non exclusive contracts

This work studies how the introduction of competition to the side of the market offering trading contracts affects the equilibrium investment profile in a bilateral investment game. By using a common agency framework, where contracts are not exclusive, we find that the equilibrium investment profile...

Full description

Autores:

Tipo de recurso:

Fecha de publicación:

2014

Institución:

Universidad del Rosario

Repositorio:

Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario

Idioma:

eng

OAI Identifier:

oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/29850

Acceso en línea:

https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/29850

Palabra clave:

Hold-up
Bilateral investment
Common agency
Competition
Welfare

Rights

License

http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2