Informed entry in auctions

We examine entry decisions in first-price and English clock auctions with participation costs. Potential bidders observe their value and report maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to participate. Entry occurs if revealed WTP (weakly) exceeds the randomly drawn participation cost. We find no difference...

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Autores:
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2018
Institución:
Universidad del Rosario
Repositorio:
Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/24357
Acceso en línea:
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0583-9
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24357
Palabra clave:
Auctions
Bidding
Endogenous entry
Experiments
Rights
License
Abierto (Texto Completo)
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network_name_str Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
repository_id_str
spelling 7159706004f9aee7d-573f-4920-8480-f26dda729c752d4eb3e0-67d4-45c9-a24f-15c6d1a76a152020-05-26T00:12:05Z2020-05-26T00:12:05Z2018We examine entry decisions in first-price and English clock auctions with participation costs. Potential bidders observe their value and report maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to participate. Entry occurs if revealed WTP (weakly) exceeds the randomly drawn participation cost. We find no difference in WTP between auction formats, although males have a higher WTP for first-price auctions. WTP is decreasing in the number of potential bidders, but this reduction is less than predicted and small in magnitude. © 2017, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany.application/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0583-91432127000207276https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24357engSpringer Verlag205No. 1175International Journal of Game TheoryVol. 47International Journal of Game Theory, ISSN:14321270, 00207276, Vol.47, No.1 (2018); pp. 175-205https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85023742293&doi=10.1007%2fs00182-017-0583-9&partnerID=40&md5=6212617b53f5c19a1c086ed2d1659453Abierto (Texto Completo)http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2instname:Universidad del Rosarioreponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURAuctionsBiddingEndogenous entryExperimentsInformed entry in auctionsarticleArtículohttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501Aycinena Abascal, DiegoBejarano H.Rentschler L.10336/24357oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/243572022-05-02 07:37:13.836211https://repository.urosario.edu.coRepositorio institucional EdocURedocur@urosario.edu.co
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv Informed entry in auctions
title Informed entry in auctions
spellingShingle Informed entry in auctions
Auctions
Bidding
Endogenous entry
Experiments
title_short Informed entry in auctions
title_full Informed entry in auctions
title_fullStr Informed entry in auctions
title_full_unstemmed Informed entry in auctions
title_sort Informed entry in auctions
dc.subject.keyword.spa.fl_str_mv Auctions
Bidding
Endogenous entry
Experiments
topic Auctions
Bidding
Endogenous entry
Experiments
description We examine entry decisions in first-price and English clock auctions with participation costs. Potential bidders observe their value and report maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to participate. Entry occurs if revealed WTP (weakly) exceeds the randomly drawn participation cost. We find no difference in WTP between auction formats, although males have a higher WTP for first-price auctions. WTP is decreasing in the number of potential bidders, but this reduction is less than predicted and small in magnitude. © 2017, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany.
publishDate 2018
dc.date.created.spa.fl_str_mv 2018
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2020-05-26T00:12:05Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2020-05-26T00:12:05Z
dc.type.eng.fl_str_mv article
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.type.spa.spa.fl_str_mv Artículo
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0583-9
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv 14321270
00207276
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24357
url https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0583-9
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24357
identifier_str_mv 14321270
00207276
dc.language.iso.spa.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.citationEndPage.none.fl_str_mv 205
dc.relation.citationIssue.none.fl_str_mv No. 1
dc.relation.citationStartPage.none.fl_str_mv 175
dc.relation.citationTitle.none.fl_str_mv International Journal of Game Theory
dc.relation.citationVolume.none.fl_str_mv Vol. 47
dc.relation.ispartof.spa.fl_str_mv International Journal of Game Theory, ISSN:14321270, 00207276, Vol.47, No.1 (2018); pp. 175-205
dc.relation.uri.spa.fl_str_mv https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85023742293&doi=10.1007%2fs00182-017-0583-9&partnerID=40&md5=6212617b53f5c19a1c086ed2d1659453
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.acceso.spa.fl_str_mv Abierto (Texto Completo)
rights_invalid_str_mv Abierto (Texto Completo)
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv Springer Verlag
institution Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.instname.spa.fl_str_mv instname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.reponame.spa.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositorio institucional EdocUR
repository.mail.fl_str_mv edocur@urosario.edu.co
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