Informed entry in auctions
We examine entry decisions in first-price and English clock auctions with participation costs. Potential bidders observe their value and report maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to participate. Entry occurs if revealed WTP (weakly) exceeds the randomly drawn participation cost. We find no difference...
- Autores:
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2018
- Institución:
- Universidad del Rosario
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/24357
- Acceso en línea:
- https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0583-9
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24357
- Palabra clave:
- Auctions
Bidding
Endogenous entry
Experiments
- Rights
- License
- Abierto (Texto Completo)