Informed entry in auctions

We examine entry decisions in first-price and English clock auctions with participation costs. Potential bidders observe their value and report maximum willingness to pay (WTP) to participate. Entry occurs if revealed WTP (weakly) exceeds the randomly drawn participation cost. We find no difference...

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Autores:
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2018
Institución:
Universidad del Rosario
Repositorio:
Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/24357
Acceso en línea:
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-017-0583-9
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24357
Palabra clave:
Auctions
Bidding
Endogenous entry
Experiments
Rights
License
Abierto (Texto Completo)