Bilateral Investment in a Delegated Common Agency

I study a bilateral investment game where a buyer privately trades with several suppliers who compete by offering menus of non-exclusive contracts. When market trading is structured so that competition among suppliers is the most intense, the hold-up problem disappears for an extensive range of the...

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Autores:
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2017
Institución:
Universidad del Rosario
Repositorio:
Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/14161
Acceso en línea:
https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_14161
http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/14161
Palabra clave:
Inversión bilaterales
Contratos no exclusivos
Competencia
Economía financiera
D44
L11
Bilateral Investment
Hold-up
Non-Exclusive Contracts
Competition
Inversiones privadas
Contratos comerciales
Proveedores
Negociación
Rights
License
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
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oai_identifier_str oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/14161
network_acronym_str EDOCUR2
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repository_id_str
spelling Bilateral Investment in a Delegated Common AgencyInversión bilateralesContratos no exclusivosCompetenciaEconomía financieraD44L11Bilateral InvestmentHold-upNon-Exclusive ContractsCompetitionInversiones privadasContratos comercialesProveedoresNegociaciónI study a bilateral investment game where a buyer privately trades with several suppliers who compete by offering menus of non-exclusive contracts. When market trading is structured so that competition among suppliers is the most intense, the hold-up problem disappears for an extensive range of the investment costs. The investment of the supplier does not affect its bargaining position, and both the supplier and the buyer have the right incentives to invest. In any other equilibria, the efficient investment is not implemented: the reallocation of bargaining power as a result of investment distorts the incentives to invest efficiently. However, because under some parameters of the model investment decisions are strategic complements welfare is maximised for an intermediate level of competition.2017-12-072017-12-12T19:06:12Zinfo:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaperhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_804246application/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.48713/10336_14161 http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/14161instname:Universidad del Rosarioreponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURenghttps://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/015892.htmlhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Roig Roig, Guillemoai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/141612019-09-19T07:37:01Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Bilateral Investment in a Delegated Common Agency
title Bilateral Investment in a Delegated Common Agency
spellingShingle Bilateral Investment in a Delegated Common Agency
Inversión bilaterales
Contratos no exclusivos
Competencia
Economía financiera
D44
L11
Bilateral Investment
Hold-up
Non-Exclusive Contracts
Competition
Inversiones privadas
Contratos comerciales
Proveedores
Negociación
title_short Bilateral Investment in a Delegated Common Agency
title_full Bilateral Investment in a Delegated Common Agency
title_fullStr Bilateral Investment in a Delegated Common Agency
title_full_unstemmed Bilateral Investment in a Delegated Common Agency
title_sort Bilateral Investment in a Delegated Common Agency
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Inversión bilaterales
Contratos no exclusivos
Competencia
Economía financiera
D44
L11
Bilateral Investment
Hold-up
Non-Exclusive Contracts
Competition
Inversiones privadas
Contratos comerciales
Proveedores
Negociación
topic Inversión bilaterales
Contratos no exclusivos
Competencia
Economía financiera
D44
L11
Bilateral Investment
Hold-up
Non-Exclusive Contracts
Competition
Inversiones privadas
Contratos comerciales
Proveedores
Negociación
description I study a bilateral investment game where a buyer privately trades with several suppliers who compete by offering menus of non-exclusive contracts. When market trading is structured so that competition among suppliers is the most intense, the hold-up problem disappears for an extensive range of the investment costs. The investment of the supplier does not affect its bargaining position, and both the supplier and the buyer have the right incentives to invest. In any other equilibria, the efficient investment is not implemented: the reallocation of bargaining power as a result of investment distorts the incentives to invest efficiently. However, because under some parameters of the model investment decisions are strategic complements welfare is maximised for an intermediate level of competition.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017-12-07
2017-12-12T19:06:12Z
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_14161
http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/14161
url https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_14161
http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/14161
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://ideas.repec.org/p/col/000092/015892.html
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
rights_invalid_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv 46
application/pdf
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reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
instname_str Universidad del Rosario
institution Universidad del Rosario
reponame_str Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
collection Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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