Bilateral Investment in a Delegated Common Agency

I study a bilateral investment game where a buyer privately trades with several suppliers who compete by offering menus of non-exclusive contracts. When market trading is structured so that competition among suppliers is the most intense, the hold-up problem disappears for an extensive range of the...

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Autores:

Tipo de recurso:

Fecha de publicación:

2017

Institución:

Universidad del Rosario

Repositorio:

Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario

Idioma:

eng

OAI Identifier:

oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/14161

Acceso en línea:

https://doi.org/10.48713/10336_14161
http://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/14161

Palabra clave:

Inversión bilaterales
Contratos no exclusivos
Competencia
Economía financiera
D44
L11
Bilateral Investment
Hold-up
Non-Exclusive Contracts
Competition
Inversiones privadas
Contratos comerciales
Proveedores
Negociación

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License

http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2