Preferences and beliefs in a sequential social dilemma: A within-subjects analysis
In empirical analyses of games, preferences and beliefs are typically treated as independent. However, if beliefs and preferences interact, this may have implications for the interpretation of observed behavior. Our sequential social dilemma experiment allows us to separate different interaction cha...
- Autores:
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2014
- Institución:
- Universidad del Rosario
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/24119
- Acceso en línea:
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.005
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/24119
- Palabra clave:
- Beliefs
Consensus effect
Experimental economics
Social dilemma
- Rights
- License
- Abierto (Texto Completo)