To suggest is to commit? a common pool resource experiment with non-enforceable recommendations

I report the results of an artefactual field experiment conducted with Colombian artisanal fishermen. I set up a common pool resource game in which subjects exchange recommendations prior to the extraction decision. The classical tension of this game between individual and collective incentives open...

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Autores:
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2015
Institución:
Universidad del Rosario
Repositorio:
Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/27116
Acceso en línea:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2015.09.001
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/27116
Palabra clave:
Consistency
Fisheries
Lie aversion
Responsiveness
Rights
License
Restringido (Acceso a grupos específicos)