A mechanism for the efficient provision of Potential Pareto public goods

Providing a public good that causes a local harm to its host poses two problems previously unexplored together: where to locate it and how large it should be. We propose a mechanism combining some market-like properties with a modified second-price auction. The mechanism selects a host, a facility s...

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Autores:
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2023
Institución:
Universidad del Rosario
Repositorio:
Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/42091
Acceso en línea:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104953
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/42091
Palabra clave:
NIMBY
LULU
Lindahl
outcomes Public projects
Mechanism design
Rights
License
Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International
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spelling 995320600fa5ba0e9-4879-41d7-a386-a3a22f0674e72024-01-31T18:19:36Z2024-01-31T18:19:36Z2023-09-012023Providing a public good that causes a local harm to its host poses two problems previously unexplored together: where to locate it and how large it should be. We propose a mechanism combining some market-like properties with a modified second-price auction. The mechanism selects a host, a facility size, a compensation for hosting the project, and determines how the compensation is split among the non-hosts. If each community bids truthfully for becoming the host–a strategy from which no community has incentives to deviate–the selected allocation is globally optimal, even if communities’ preferences are private information. In contrast with the literature, the host pays the second-highest bid while receiving the market benefits to prevent distortions in the optimal size.application/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.1049530047-2727https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/42091engUniversidad del Rosariohttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272723001354Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 InternationalAbierto (Texto Completo)https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Journal of Public Economicsinstname:Universidad del Rosarioreponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocURNIMBYLULULindahloutcomes Public projectsMechanism designA mechanism for the efficient provision of Potential Pareto public goodsarticleArtículohttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501Ferraz Castelo Branco Ferreira, EduardoMantilla Ribero, César AndrésORIGINALA mechanism for the efficient provision.pdfapplication/pdf687244https://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstreams/75963831-de0e-4ae2-af46-4f97cb57e859/download8dd9fcebf41634e1543a27ae3d8ad040MD51TEXTA mechanism for the efficient provision.pdf.txtA mechanism for the efficient provision.pdf.txtExtracted texttext/plain53717https://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstreams/b67abd5a-d78c-4130-bb11-f56b818fab8f/download46903e0c4caead108f8e7bf1afb8db7dMD52THUMBNAILA mechanism for the efficient provision.pdf.jpgA mechanism for the efficient provision.pdf.jpgGenerated Thumbnailimage/jpeg4612https://repository.urosario.edu.co/bitstreams/07042714-51b2-4ee6-a49a-0a536880c141/downloadbc0ff7e57f53f41b03fad8f731319462MD5310336/42091oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/420912024-02-01 03:03:26.562https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 Internationalhttps://repository.urosario.edu.coRepositorio institucional EdocURedocur@urosario.edu.co
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv A mechanism for the efficient provision of Potential Pareto public goods
title A mechanism for the efficient provision of Potential Pareto public goods
spellingShingle A mechanism for the efficient provision of Potential Pareto public goods
NIMBY
LULU
Lindahl
outcomes Public projects
Mechanism design
title_short A mechanism for the efficient provision of Potential Pareto public goods
title_full A mechanism for the efficient provision of Potential Pareto public goods
title_fullStr A mechanism for the efficient provision of Potential Pareto public goods
title_full_unstemmed A mechanism for the efficient provision of Potential Pareto public goods
title_sort A mechanism for the efficient provision of Potential Pareto public goods
dc.subject.spa.fl_str_mv NIMBY
LULU
Lindahl
outcomes Public projects
Mechanism design
topic NIMBY
LULU
Lindahl
outcomes Public projects
Mechanism design
description Providing a public good that causes a local harm to its host poses two problems previously unexplored together: where to locate it and how large it should be. We propose a mechanism combining some market-like properties with a modified second-price auction. The mechanism selects a host, a facility size, a compensation for hosting the project, and determines how the compensation is split among the non-hosts. If each community bids truthfully for becoming the host–a strategy from which no community has incentives to deviate–the selected allocation is globally optimal, even if communities’ preferences are private information. In contrast with the literature, the host pays the second-highest bid while receiving the market benefits to prevent distortions in the optimal size.
publishDate 2023
dc.date.created.spa.fl_str_mv 2023-09-01
dc.date.issued.spa.fl_str_mv 2023
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2024-01-31T18:19:36Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2024-01-31T18:19:36Z
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv article
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dc.type.spa.spa.fl_str_mv Artículo
dc.identifier.doi.spa.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104953
dc.identifier.issn.spa.fl_str_mv 0047-2727
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/42091
url https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104953
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/42091
identifier_str_mv 0047-2727
dc.language.iso.spa.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
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dc.rights.acceso.spa.fl_str_mv Abierto (Texto Completo)
dc.rights.uri.spa.fl_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
rights_invalid_str_mv Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International
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dc.format.mimetype.spa.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.spa.fl_str_mv Journal of Public Economics
institution Universidad del Rosario
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