A mechanism for the efficient provision of Potential Pareto public goods
Providing a public good that causes a local harm to its host poses two problems previously unexplored together: where to locate it and how large it should be. We propose a mechanism combining some market-like properties with a modified second-price auction. The mechanism selects a host, a facility s...
- Autores:
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2023
- Institución:
- Universidad del Rosario
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/42091
- Acceso en línea:
- https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104953
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/42091
- Palabra clave:
- NIMBY
LULU
Lindahl
outcomes Public projects
Mechanism design
- Rights
- License
- Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International