A mechanism for the efficient provision of Potential Pareto public goods

Providing a public good that causes a local harm to its host poses two problems previously unexplored together: where to locate it and how large it should be. We propose a mechanism combining some market-like properties with a modified second-price auction. The mechanism selects a host, a facility s...

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Autores:
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2023
Institución:
Universidad del Rosario
Repositorio:
Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/42091
Acceso en línea:
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2023.104953
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/42091
Palabra clave:
NIMBY
LULU
Lindahl
outcomes Public projects
Mechanism design
Rights
License
Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International