Efficiency and stability of sampling equilibrium in public goods games
Most models of social preferences and bounded rationality that are effective in explaining efficiency-increasing departures from equilibrium behavior cannot easily account for similar deviations when they are efficiency-reducing. We show that the notion of sampling equilibrium, subject to a suitable...
- Autores:
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2020
- Institución:
- Universidad del Rosario
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/22441
- Acceso en línea:
- https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12351
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22441
- Palabra clave:
- Efficiency
stability
sampling
equilibrium
public
goods
games
- Rights
- License
- Abierto (Texto Completo)
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1098626684600882c8965-a57b-4f08-9fb0-87a37268e6e7-181aaaf39-08d5-4be0-9fd3-6fda89d357c3-12020-05-25T23:56:29Z2020-05-25T23:56:29Z2020Most models of social preferences and bounded rationality that are effective in explaining efficiency-increasing departures from equilibrium behavior cannot easily account for similar deviations when they are efficiency-reducing. We show that the notion of sampling equilibrium, subject to a suitable stability refinement, can account for behavior in both efficiency-enhancing and efficiency-reducing conditions. In particular, in public goods games with dominant strategy equilibria, stable sampling equilibrium can involve the play of dominated strategies with positive probability both when such behavior increases aggregate payoffs (relative to the standard prediction) and when it reduces aggregate payoffs. The dominant strategy equilibrium prediction changes abruptly from zero contribution to full contribution as a parameter crosses a threshold, whereas the stable sampling equilibrium remains fully mixed throughout. This is consistent with the available experimental evidence. © 2018 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.application/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.123511467977910973923https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22441engBlackwell Publishing Inc.370No. 2355Journal of Public Economic TheoryVol. 22Journal of Public Economic Theory, ISSN:14679779, 10973923, Vol.22, No.2 (2020); pp. 355-370https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85059065703&doi=10.1111%2fjpet.12351&partnerID=40&md5=65705030d15ef0cf095022b849dabbddAbierto (Texto Completo)http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2instname:Universidad del Rosarioreponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUREfficiencystabilitysamplingequilibriumpublicgoodsgamesEfficiency and stability of sampling equilibrium in public goods gamesarticleArtículohttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501Mantilla Ribero, César AndrésSethi, RajivCárdenas, Juan Camilo10336/22441oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/224412022-05-02 07:37:14.171285https://repository.urosario.edu.coRepositorio institucional EdocURedocur@urosario.edu.co |
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv |
Efficiency and stability of sampling equilibrium in public goods games |
title |
Efficiency and stability of sampling equilibrium in public goods games |
spellingShingle |
Efficiency and stability of sampling equilibrium in public goods games Efficiency stability sampling equilibrium public goods games |
title_short |
Efficiency and stability of sampling equilibrium in public goods games |
title_full |
Efficiency and stability of sampling equilibrium in public goods games |
title_fullStr |
Efficiency and stability of sampling equilibrium in public goods games |
title_full_unstemmed |
Efficiency and stability of sampling equilibrium in public goods games |
title_sort |
Efficiency and stability of sampling equilibrium in public goods games |
dc.subject.keyword.spa.fl_str_mv |
Efficiency stability sampling equilibrium public goods games |
topic |
Efficiency stability sampling equilibrium public goods games |
description |
Most models of social preferences and bounded rationality that are effective in explaining efficiency-increasing departures from equilibrium behavior cannot easily account for similar deviations when they are efficiency-reducing. We show that the notion of sampling equilibrium, subject to a suitable stability refinement, can account for behavior in both efficiency-enhancing and efficiency-reducing conditions. In particular, in public goods games with dominant strategy equilibria, stable sampling equilibrium can involve the play of dominated strategies with positive probability both when such behavior increases aggregate payoffs (relative to the standard prediction) and when it reduces aggregate payoffs. The dominant strategy equilibrium prediction changes abruptly from zero contribution to full contribution as a parameter crosses a threshold, whereas the stable sampling equilibrium remains fully mixed throughout. This is consistent with the available experimental evidence. © 2018 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. |
publishDate |
2020 |
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-05-25T23:56:29Z |
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv |
2020-05-25T23:56:29Z |
dc.date.created.spa.fl_str_mv |
2020 |
dc.type.eng.fl_str_mv |
article |
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 |
dc.type.spa.spa.fl_str_mv |
Artículo |
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv |
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12351 |
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv |
14679779 10973923 |
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv |
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22441 |
url |
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12351 https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22441 |
identifier_str_mv |
14679779 10973923 |
dc.language.iso.spa.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.citationEndPage.none.fl_str_mv |
370 |
dc.relation.citationIssue.none.fl_str_mv |
No. 2 |
dc.relation.citationStartPage.none.fl_str_mv |
355 |
dc.relation.citationTitle.none.fl_str_mv |
Journal of Public Economic Theory |
dc.relation.citationVolume.none.fl_str_mv |
Vol. 22 |
dc.relation.ispartof.spa.fl_str_mv |
Journal of Public Economic Theory, ISSN:14679779, 10973923, Vol.22, No.2 (2020); pp. 355-370 |
dc.relation.uri.spa.fl_str_mv |
https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85059065703&doi=10.1111%2fjpet.12351&partnerID=40&md5=65705030d15ef0cf095022b849dabbdd |
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
dc.rights.acceso.spa.fl_str_mv |
Abierto (Texto Completo) |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Abierto (Texto Completo) http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv |
Blackwell Publishing Inc. |
institution |
Universidad del Rosario |
dc.source.instname.spa.fl_str_mv |
instname:Universidad del Rosario |
dc.source.reponame.spa.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositorio institucional EdocUR |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
edocur@urosario.edu.co |
_version_ |
1814167637150662656 |