Efficiency and stability of sampling equilibrium in public goods games

Most models of social preferences and bounded rationality that are effective in explaining efficiency-increasing departures from equilibrium behavior cannot easily account for similar deviations when they are efficiency-reducing. We show that the notion of sampling equilibrium, subject to a suitable...

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Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2020
Institución:
Universidad del Rosario
Repositorio:
Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/22441
Acceso en línea:
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12351
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22441
Palabra clave:
Efficiency
stability
sampling
equilibrium
public
goods
games
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repository_id_str
spelling 1098626684600882c8965-a57b-4f08-9fb0-87a37268e6e7-181aaaf39-08d5-4be0-9fd3-6fda89d357c3-12020-05-25T23:56:29Z2020-05-25T23:56:29Z2020Most models of social preferences and bounded rationality that are effective in explaining efficiency-increasing departures from equilibrium behavior cannot easily account for similar deviations when they are efficiency-reducing. We show that the notion of sampling equilibrium, subject to a suitable stability refinement, can account for behavior in both efficiency-enhancing and efficiency-reducing conditions. In particular, in public goods games with dominant strategy equilibria, stable sampling equilibrium can involve the play of dominated strategies with positive probability both when such behavior increases aggregate payoffs (relative to the standard prediction) and when it reduces aggregate payoffs. The dominant strategy equilibrium prediction changes abruptly from zero contribution to full contribution as a parameter crosses a threshold, whereas the stable sampling equilibrium remains fully mixed throughout. This is consistent with the available experimental evidence. © 2018 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.application/pdfhttps://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.123511467977910973923https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22441engBlackwell Publishing Inc.370No. 2355Journal of Public Economic TheoryVol. 22Journal of Public Economic Theory, ISSN:14679779, 10973923, Vol.22, No.2 (2020); pp. 355-370https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85059065703&doi=10.1111%2fjpet.12351&partnerID=40&md5=65705030d15ef0cf095022b849dabbddAbierto (Texto Completo)http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2instname:Universidad del Rosarioreponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUREfficiencystabilitysamplingequilibriumpublicgoodsgamesEfficiency and stability of sampling equilibrium in public goods gamesarticleArtículohttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501Mantilla Ribero, César AndrésSethi, RajivCárdenas, Juan Camilo10336/22441oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/224412022-05-02 07:37:14.171285https://repository.urosario.edu.coRepositorio institucional EdocURedocur@urosario.edu.co
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv Efficiency and stability of sampling equilibrium in public goods games
title Efficiency and stability of sampling equilibrium in public goods games
spellingShingle Efficiency and stability of sampling equilibrium in public goods games
Efficiency
stability
sampling
equilibrium
public
goods
games
title_short Efficiency and stability of sampling equilibrium in public goods games
title_full Efficiency and stability of sampling equilibrium in public goods games
title_fullStr Efficiency and stability of sampling equilibrium in public goods games
title_full_unstemmed Efficiency and stability of sampling equilibrium in public goods games
title_sort Efficiency and stability of sampling equilibrium in public goods games
dc.subject.keyword.spa.fl_str_mv Efficiency
stability
sampling
equilibrium
public
goods
games
topic Efficiency
stability
sampling
equilibrium
public
goods
games
description Most models of social preferences and bounded rationality that are effective in explaining efficiency-increasing departures from equilibrium behavior cannot easily account for similar deviations when they are efficiency-reducing. We show that the notion of sampling equilibrium, subject to a suitable stability refinement, can account for behavior in both efficiency-enhancing and efficiency-reducing conditions. In particular, in public goods games with dominant strategy equilibria, stable sampling equilibrium can involve the play of dominated strategies with positive probability both when such behavior increases aggregate payoffs (relative to the standard prediction) and when it reduces aggregate payoffs. The dominant strategy equilibrium prediction changes abruptly from zero contribution to full contribution as a parameter crosses a threshold, whereas the stable sampling equilibrium remains fully mixed throughout. This is consistent with the available experimental evidence. © 2018 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2020-05-25T23:56:29Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2020-05-25T23:56:29Z
dc.date.created.spa.fl_str_mv 2020
dc.type.eng.fl_str_mv article
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.type.spa.spa.fl_str_mv Artículo
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12351
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv 14679779
10973923
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22441
url https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12351
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22441
identifier_str_mv 14679779
10973923
dc.language.iso.spa.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.citationEndPage.none.fl_str_mv 370
dc.relation.citationIssue.none.fl_str_mv No. 2
dc.relation.citationStartPage.none.fl_str_mv 355
dc.relation.citationTitle.none.fl_str_mv Journal of Public Economic Theory
dc.relation.citationVolume.none.fl_str_mv Vol. 22
dc.relation.ispartof.spa.fl_str_mv Journal of Public Economic Theory, ISSN:14679779, 10973923, Vol.22, No.2 (2020); pp. 355-370
dc.relation.uri.spa.fl_str_mv https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85059065703&doi=10.1111%2fjpet.12351&partnerID=40&md5=65705030d15ef0cf095022b849dabbdd
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.acceso.spa.fl_str_mv Abierto (Texto Completo)
rights_invalid_str_mv Abierto (Texto Completo)
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv Blackwell Publishing Inc.
institution Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.instname.spa.fl_str_mv instname:Universidad del Rosario
dc.source.reponame.spa.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositorio Institucional EdocUR
repository.name.fl_str_mv Repositorio institucional EdocUR
repository.mail.fl_str_mv edocur@urosario.edu.co
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