Efficiency and stability of sampling equilibrium in public goods games

Most models of social preferences and bounded rationality that are effective in explaining efficiency-increasing departures from equilibrium behavior cannot easily account for similar deviations when they are efficiency-reducing. We show that the notion of sampling equilibrium, subject to a suitable...

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Autores:

Tipo de recurso:

Fecha de publicación:

2020

Institución:

Universidad del Rosario

Repositorio:

Repositorio EdocUR - U. Rosario

Idioma:

eng

OAI Identifier:

oai:repository.urosario.edu.co:10336/22441

Acceso en línea:

https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12351
https://repository.urosario.edu.co/handle/10336/22441

Palabra clave:

Efficiency
stability
sampling
equilibrium
public
goods
games

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