Is board turnover driven by performance in family firms?

We study director turnover as a corporate governance mechanism in family firms; specifically, the effect that family involvement in management, ownership, and control has on director turnover (direct effect) and on director turnover-performance sensitivity (moderating effect). Using a sample of Colo...

Full description

Autores:
González Ferrero, Maximiliano
Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander
Pablo, Eduardo
Trujillo Dávila , María Andrea
Tipo de recurso:
Article of investigation
Fecha de publicación:
2019
Institución:
Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración
Repositorio:
Repositorio CESA
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.cesa.edu.co:10726/5089
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/10726/5089
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ribaf.2018.12.002
Palabra clave:
Family firms
Corporate governance
Director turnover
Emerging markets
Rights
License
Acceso Restringido