Is board turnover driven by performance in family firms?
We study director turnover as a corporate governance mechanism in family firms; specifically, the effect that family involvement in management, ownership, and control has on director turnover (direct effect) and on director turnover-performance sensitivity (moderating effect). Using a sample of Colo...
- Autores:
-
González Ferrero, Maximiliano
Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander
Pablo, Eduardo
Trujillo Dávila , María Andrea
- Tipo de recurso:
- Article of investigation
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2019
- Institución:
- Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio CESA
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repository.cesa.edu.co:10726/5089
- Palabra clave:
- Family firms
Corporate governance
Director turnover
Emerging markets
- Rights
- License
- Acceso Restringido