Governance of family firms
We review what the financial economics literature has to say about the unique ways in which the following three classic agency problems manifest themselves in family firms: (a) shareholders versus managers, (b) controlling (family) shareholders versus noncontrolling shareholders, and (c) shareholder...
- Autores:
-
Villalonga, Belén
Amit, Raphael
Trujillo Dávila , María Andrea
Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander
- Tipo de recurso:
- Article of investigation
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2015
- Institución:
- Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio CESA
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repository.cesa.edu.co:10726/5116
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/10726/5116
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-110613-034357
- Palabra clave:
- Agency theory
Corporate governance
Family firms
Control
Minority shareholders
- Rights
- License
- Acceso Restringido
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Villalonga, Belén9451a0b4-1d0f-409d-9f47-eb885e18167f600Amit, Raphaelc0752beb-ccdb-4fce-9b35-e120709873d5600Trujillo Dávila , María Andrea5b131e3f-c0dd-4f10-9a55-2909001129ad600Guzmán Vásquez, Alexandere6815926-cc9f-40cd-bb0e-f549642805cf600Trujillo Dávila, María Andrea [0000-0002-9592-7890]Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander [0000-0001-7675-048X]Villalonga, Belén [6506527390]Amit, Raphael [7004998175]Trujillo Dávila, María Andrea [55206416700]Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander [55207224400]2023-06-21T22:23:10Z2023-06-21T22:23:10Z20151941-1367http://hdl.handle.net/10726/5116instname:Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración – CESAreponame:Biblioteca Digital – CESArepourl:https://repository.cesa.edu.co/1941-1375https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-110613-034357engAnnual ReviewsGovernance of family firmsarticlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ARThttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_71e4c1898caa6e32Acceso Restringidohttp://vocabularies.coar-repositories.org/access_rights/c_16ec/http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ecWe review what the financial economics literature has to say about the unique ways in which the following three classic agency problems manifest themselves in family firms: (a) shareholders versus managers, (b) controlling (family) shareholders versus noncontrolling shareholders, and (c) shareholders versus creditors. We also call attention to a fourth agency problem that is unique to family firms: the conflict of interest between family shareholders and the family at large, which can be thought of as the “superprincipal” in a multi-tier agency structure akin to those found in other concentrated ownership structures in which the controlling owner is the state, a bank, a corporation, or other institutions. We then discuss the solutions or corporate governance mechanisms that have been devised to address these problems and what research has taught us about these mechanisms' effectiveness at solving these four conflicts in family firms.https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9592-7890https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7675-048Xhttps://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=6506527390https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=7004998175https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=55206416700https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=5520722440071635654Annual Review of Financial EconomicsAgency theoryCorporate governanceFamily firmsControlMinority shareholders10726/5116oai:repository.cesa.edu.co:10726/51162023-09-29 10:22:29.765metadata only accessBiblioteca Digital - CESAbiblioteca@cesa.edu.co |
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv |
Governance of family firms |
title |
Governance of family firms |
spellingShingle |
Governance of family firms Agency theory Corporate governance Family firms Control Minority shareholders |
title_short |
Governance of family firms |
title_full |
Governance of family firms |
title_fullStr |
Governance of family firms |
title_full_unstemmed |
Governance of family firms |
title_sort |
Governance of family firms |
dc.creator.fl_str_mv |
Villalonga, Belén Amit, Raphael Trujillo Dávila , María Andrea Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander |
dc.contributor.author.spa.fl_str_mv |
Villalonga, Belén Amit, Raphael Trujillo Dávila , María Andrea Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander |
dc.contributor.orcid.none.fl_str_mv |
Trujillo Dávila, María Andrea [0000-0002-9592-7890] Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander [0000-0001-7675-048X] |
dc.contributor.scopus.none.fl_str_mv |
Villalonga, Belén [6506527390] Amit, Raphael [7004998175] Trujillo Dávila, María Andrea [55206416700] Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander [55207224400] |
dc.subject.proposal.none.fl_str_mv |
Agency theory Corporate governance Family firms Control Minority shareholders |
topic |
Agency theory Corporate governance Family firms Control Minority shareholders |
description |
We review what the financial economics literature has to say about the unique ways in which the following three classic agency problems manifest themselves in family firms: (a) shareholders versus managers, (b) controlling (family) shareholders versus noncontrolling shareholders, and (c) shareholders versus creditors. We also call attention to a fourth agency problem that is unique to family firms: the conflict of interest between family shareholders and the family at large, which can be thought of as the “superprincipal” in a multi-tier agency structure akin to those found in other concentrated ownership structures in which the controlling owner is the state, a bank, a corporation, or other institutions. We then discuss the solutions or corporate governance mechanisms that have been devised to address these problems and what research has taught us about these mechanisms' effectiveness at solving these four conflicts in family firms. |
publishDate |
2015 |
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv |
2015 |
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv |
2023-06-21T22:23:10Z |
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv |
2023-06-21T22:23:10Z |
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv |
article |
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501 |
dc.type.coar.none.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1 |
dc.type.driver.none.fl_str_mv |
info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
dc.type.redcol.none.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ART |
dc.type.coarversion.none.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_71e4c1898caa6e32 |
format |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1 |
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv |
1941-1367 |
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/10726/5116 |
dc.identifier.instname.none.fl_str_mv |
instname:Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración – CESA |
dc.identifier.reponame.none.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Biblioteca Digital – CESA |
dc.identifier.repourl.none.fl_str_mv |
repourl:https://repository.cesa.edu.co/ |
dc.identifier.eissn.none.fl_str_mv |
1941-1375 |
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv |
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-110613-034357 |
identifier_str_mv |
1941-1367 instname:Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración – CESA reponame:Biblioteca Digital – CESA repourl:https://repository.cesa.edu.co/ 1941-1375 |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/10726/5116 https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-110613-034357 |
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv |
eng |
language |
eng |
dc.relation.citationvolume.none.fl_str_mv |
7 |
dc.relation.citationissue.none.fl_str_mv |
1 |
dc.relation.citationstartpage.none.fl_str_mv |
635 |
dc.relation.citationendpage.none.fl_str_mv |
654 |
dc.relation.ispartofjournal.none.fl_str_mv |
Annual Review of Financial Economics |
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec |
dc.rights.local.none.fl_str_mv |
Acceso Restringido |
dc.rights.coar.none.fl_str_mv |
http://vocabularies.coar-repositories.org/access_rights/c_16ec/ |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Acceso Restringido http://vocabularies.coar-repositories.org/access_rights/c_16ec/ http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec |
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Annual Reviews |
publisher.none.fl_str_mv |
Annual Reviews |
institution |
Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Biblioteca Digital - CESA |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
biblioteca@cesa.edu.co |
_version_ |
1793339943888617472 |