Governance of family firms

We review what the financial economics literature has to say about the unique ways in which the following three classic agency problems manifest themselves in family firms: (a) shareholders versus managers, (b) controlling (family) shareholders versus noncontrolling shareholders, and (c) shareholder...

Full description

Autores:
Villalonga, Belén
Amit, Raphael
Trujillo Dávila , María Andrea
Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander
Tipo de recurso:
Article of investigation
Fecha de publicación:
2015
Institución:
Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración
Repositorio:
Repositorio CESA
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repository.cesa.edu.co:10726/5116
Acceso en línea:
http://hdl.handle.net/10726/5116
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-110613-034357
Palabra clave:
Agency theory
Corporate governance
Family firms
Control
Minority shareholders
Rights
License
Acceso Restringido
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network_acronym_str CESA2
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repository_id_str
spelling Villalonga, Belén9451a0b4-1d0f-409d-9f47-eb885e18167f600Amit, Raphaelc0752beb-ccdb-4fce-9b35-e120709873d5600Trujillo Dávila , María Andrea5b131e3f-c0dd-4f10-9a55-2909001129ad600Guzmán Vásquez, Alexandere6815926-cc9f-40cd-bb0e-f549642805cf600Trujillo Dávila, María Andrea [0000-0002-9592-7890]Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander [0000-0001-7675-048X]Villalonga, Belén [6506527390]Amit, Raphael [7004998175]Trujillo Dávila, María Andrea [55206416700]Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander [55207224400]2023-06-21T22:23:10Z2023-06-21T22:23:10Z20151941-1367http://hdl.handle.net/10726/5116instname:Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración – CESAreponame:Biblioteca Digital – CESArepourl:https://repository.cesa.edu.co/1941-1375https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-110613-034357engAnnual ReviewsGovernance of family firmsarticlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:eu-repo/semantics/articlehttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ARThttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_71e4c1898caa6e32Acceso Restringidohttp://vocabularies.coar-repositories.org/access_rights/c_16ec/http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ecWe review what the financial economics literature has to say about the unique ways in which the following three classic agency problems manifest themselves in family firms: (a) shareholders versus managers, (b) controlling (family) shareholders versus noncontrolling shareholders, and (c) shareholders versus creditors. We also call attention to a fourth agency problem that is unique to family firms: the conflict of interest between family shareholders and the family at large, which can be thought of as the “superprincipal” in a multi-tier agency structure akin to those found in other concentrated ownership structures in which the controlling owner is the state, a bank, a corporation, or other institutions. We then discuss the solutions or corporate governance mechanisms that have been devised to address these problems and what research has taught us about these mechanisms' effectiveness at solving these four conflicts in family firms.https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9592-7890https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7675-048Xhttps://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=6506527390https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=7004998175https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=55206416700https://www.scopus.com/authid/detail.uri?authorId=5520722440071635654Annual Review of Financial EconomicsAgency theoryCorporate governanceFamily firmsControlMinority shareholders10726/5116oai:repository.cesa.edu.co:10726/51162023-09-29 10:22:29.765metadata only accessBiblioteca Digital - CESAbiblioteca@cesa.edu.co
dc.title.eng.fl_str_mv Governance of family firms
title Governance of family firms
spellingShingle Governance of family firms
Agency theory
Corporate governance
Family firms
Control
Minority shareholders
title_short Governance of family firms
title_full Governance of family firms
title_fullStr Governance of family firms
title_full_unstemmed Governance of family firms
title_sort Governance of family firms
dc.creator.fl_str_mv Villalonga, Belén
Amit, Raphael
Trujillo Dávila , María Andrea
Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander
dc.contributor.author.spa.fl_str_mv Villalonga, Belén
Amit, Raphael
Trujillo Dávila , María Andrea
Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander
dc.contributor.orcid.none.fl_str_mv Trujillo Dávila, María Andrea [0000-0002-9592-7890]
Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander [0000-0001-7675-048X]
dc.contributor.scopus.none.fl_str_mv Villalonga, Belén [6506527390]
Amit, Raphael [7004998175]
Trujillo Dávila, María Andrea [55206416700]
Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander [55207224400]
dc.subject.proposal.none.fl_str_mv Agency theory
Corporate governance
Family firms
Control
Minority shareholders
topic Agency theory
Corporate governance
Family firms
Control
Minority shareholders
description We review what the financial economics literature has to say about the unique ways in which the following three classic agency problems manifest themselves in family firms: (a) shareholders versus managers, (b) controlling (family) shareholders versus noncontrolling shareholders, and (c) shareholders versus creditors. We also call attention to a fourth agency problem that is unique to family firms: the conflict of interest between family shareholders and the family at large, which can be thought of as the “superprincipal” in a multi-tier agency structure akin to those found in other concentrated ownership structures in which the controlling owner is the state, a bank, a corporation, or other institutions. We then discuss the solutions or corporate governance mechanisms that have been devised to address these problems and what research has taught us about these mechanisms' effectiveness at solving these four conflicts in family firms.
publishDate 2015
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 2015
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2023-06-21T22:23:10Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2023-06-21T22:23:10Z
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv article
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.type.coar.none.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1
dc.type.driver.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
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format http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv 1941-1367
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dc.identifier.instname.none.fl_str_mv instname:Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración – CESA
dc.identifier.reponame.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Biblioteca Digital – CESA
dc.identifier.repourl.none.fl_str_mv repourl:https://repository.cesa.edu.co/
dc.identifier.eissn.none.fl_str_mv 1941-1375
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-110613-034357
identifier_str_mv 1941-1367
instname:Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración – CESA
reponame:Biblioteca Digital – CESA
repourl:https://repository.cesa.edu.co/
1941-1375
url http://hdl.handle.net/10726/5116
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-110613-034357
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.citationvolume.none.fl_str_mv 7
dc.relation.citationissue.none.fl_str_mv 1
dc.relation.citationstartpage.none.fl_str_mv 635
dc.relation.citationendpage.none.fl_str_mv 654
dc.relation.ispartofjournal.none.fl_str_mv Annual Review of Financial Economics
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
dc.rights.local.none.fl_str_mv Acceso Restringido
dc.rights.coar.none.fl_str_mv http://vocabularies.coar-repositories.org/access_rights/c_16ec/
rights_invalid_str_mv Acceso Restringido
http://vocabularies.coar-repositories.org/access_rights/c_16ec/
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Annual Reviews
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Annual Reviews
institution Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración
repository.name.fl_str_mv Biblioteca Digital - CESA
repository.mail.fl_str_mv biblioteca@cesa.edu.co
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