Governance of family firms

We review what the financial economics literature has to say about the unique ways in which the following three classic agency problems manifest themselves in family firms: (a) shareholders versus managers, (b) controlling (family) shareholders versus noncontrolling shareholders, and (c) shareholder...

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Autores:

Villalonga, Belén
Amit, Raphael
Trujillo Dávila , María Andrea
Guzmán Vásquez, Alexander

Tipo de recurso:

Article of investigation

Fecha de publicación:

2015

Institución:

Colegio de Estudios Superiores de Administración

Repositorio:

Repositorio CESA

Idioma:

eng

OAI Identifier:

oai:repository.cesa.edu.co:10726/5116

Acceso en línea:

http://hdl.handle.net/10726/5116
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-110613-034357

Palabra clave:

Agency theory
Corporate governance
Family firms
Control
Minority shareholders

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