Las reglas predeterminadas de decisión en el derecho. Bases para una reflexión teórica

Las “reglas u opciones predeterminadas” son estructuras ubicuas en múltiples áreas del derecho. Aunque este tipo de reglas se han estudiado en el derecho de los contratos, más allá de este ámbito no han suscitado mayor interés en la doctrina jurídica de tradición civilista. Si bien esta doctrina ha...

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Autores:
Monroy Cely, Daniel Alejandro
Tipo de recurso:
Article of journal
Fecha de publicación:
2020
Institución:
Universidad Externado de Colombia
Repositorio:
Biblioteca Digital Universidad Externado de Colombia
Idioma:
spa
OAI Identifier:
oai:bdigital.uexternado.edu.co:001/11803
Acceso en línea:
https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/handle/001/11803
https://doi.org/10.18601/01234366.n40.04
Palabra clave:
default rules;
active choice;
civil law doctrine;
individual autonomy;
freedom of choice
reglas predeterminadas;
elección activa;
doctrina del derecho civil;
autonomía individual;
libertad de decisión
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openAccess
License
Daniel Alejandro Monroy Cely - 2020
id uexternad2_cb2bbea12776eda052755b9c3ada3cb5
oai_identifier_str oai:bdigital.uexternado.edu.co:001/11803
network_acronym_str uexternad2
network_name_str Biblioteca Digital Universidad Externado de Colombia
repository_id_str
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv Las reglas predeterminadas de decisión en el derecho. Bases para una reflexión teórica
dc.title.translated.eng.fl_str_mv Default Rules in the Law: Toward a Theoretical Framework
title Las reglas predeterminadas de decisión en el derecho. Bases para una reflexión teórica
spellingShingle Las reglas predeterminadas de decisión en el derecho. Bases para una reflexión teórica
default rules;
active choice;
civil law doctrine;
individual autonomy;
freedom of choice
reglas predeterminadas;
elección activa;
doctrina del derecho civil;
autonomía individual;
libertad de decisión
title_short Las reglas predeterminadas de decisión en el derecho. Bases para una reflexión teórica
title_full Las reglas predeterminadas de decisión en el derecho. Bases para una reflexión teórica
title_fullStr Las reglas predeterminadas de decisión en el derecho. Bases para una reflexión teórica
title_full_unstemmed Las reglas predeterminadas de decisión en el derecho. Bases para una reflexión teórica
title_sort Las reglas predeterminadas de decisión en el derecho. Bases para una reflexión teórica
dc.creator.fl_str_mv Monroy Cely, Daniel Alejandro
dc.contributor.author.none.fl_str_mv Monroy Cely, Daniel Alejandro
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv default rules;
active choice;
civil law doctrine;
individual autonomy;
freedom of choice
topic default rules;
active choice;
civil law doctrine;
individual autonomy;
freedom of choice
reglas predeterminadas;
elección activa;
doctrina del derecho civil;
autonomía individual;
libertad de decisión
dc.subject.spa.fl_str_mv reglas predeterminadas;
elección activa;
doctrina del derecho civil;
autonomía individual;
libertad de decisión
description Las “reglas u opciones predeterminadas” son estructuras ubicuas en múltiples áreas del derecho. Aunque este tipo de reglas se han estudiado en el derecho de los contratos, más allá de este ámbito no han suscitado mayor interés en la doctrina jurídica de tradición civilista. Si bien esta doctrina ha sostenido reiteradamente que las reglas predeterminadas preservan per se un continuum en la libertad de decisión de sus destinatarios, este artículo refuta esta tesis y argumenta que estas reglas producen una profunda pero inadvertida afectación a la autonomía individual y la libertad de decisión individual. En esta perspectiva, el artículo reflexiona en torno a por qué en algunas áreas del derecho ciertos contenidos de las reglas predeterminadas pueden calificarse como éticamente inadmisibles. El artículo además sugiere algunos criterios preliminares para determinar “cómo” debiera diseñarse el contenido de las reglas predeterminadas.
publishDate 2020
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2020-12-01 14:37:34
2022-09-09T21:11:36Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2020-12-01 14:37:34
2022-09-09T21:11:36Z
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 2020-12-01
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv Artículo de revista
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dc.type.local.eng.fl_str_mv Journal article
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dc.relation.bitstream.none.fl_str_mv https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derpri/article/download/6920/9487
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https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derpri/article/download/6920/10106
dc.relation.citationedition.spa.fl_str_mv Núm. 40 , Año 2021 : Enero-Junio
dc.relation.citationendpage.none.fl_str_mv 118
dc.relation.citationissue.spa.fl_str_mv 40
dc.relation.citationstartpage.none.fl_str_mv 87
dc.relation.ispartofjournal.spa.fl_str_mv Revista de Derecho Privado
dc.relation.references.spa.fl_str_mv 39530 Microsoft (Tying), Asunto comp/39.530, [en línea], Comisión Europea, 16 de diciembre de 2009, disponible en: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39530
Arruñada, B., “The role of institutions in the contractual process”, en Deffains, B. y Kirat, T., Law and Economics in Civil Law Countries, Amsterdam, Elsevier Science, 2001, 154.
Ayres, I., “Regulating opt-out: an economic theory of altering rules”, Yale Law Journal, vol. 121, 2012, 2032-2116.
Ayres, I. y Gertner, R., “Filling gaps in incomplete contracts: an economic theory of default rules”, The Yale Law Journal, vol. 99 n.° 1, 1989, 87-130.
Barnett, R., “The sound of silence: default rules and contractual consent”, Virginia Law Review, vol. 78, 1992, 821-911.
Bartling, B. y Fischbacher, U., “Shifting the blame: on delegation and responsibility”, The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 79, n.° 1, 2012, 67-87.
Beshears, J., Choi, J., Laibson, D. y Madrian, B., “The importance of default options for retirement saving outcomes: evidence from the United States”, en Brown, J., Liebman, J. y Wise, D., Social Security Policy in a Changing Environment, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2009, 167-195.
Beshears, J., Choi, J., Laibson, D. y Madrian, B., “How are preferences revealed?”, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 92 n.° 8-9, 2008, 1787-1794.
Bovens, L., “The ethics of nudge”, en Grüne-Yanoff, T. y Hansson, S., Preference Change, Dordrecht, Springer, 2009, 207-219.
Carroll, G., Choi, J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. y Metrick, A., “Optimal defaults and active decisions”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 124, n.° 4, 2009, 1639-1674.
Choi, J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. y Metrick, A., “Optimal defaults”, The American Economic Review, vol. 93 n.° 2, 2003, 180-185.
Choi, J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. y Metrick, A., “Passive decisions and potent defaults”, en Wise, D., Analyses in the Economics of Aging, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2005, 59-78.
Choi, J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. y Metrick, A., “For better or for worse: default effects and 401(k) savings behavior”, en Wise, D., Perspectives on the Economics of Aging, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2004, 81-125.
Choi, J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. y Metrick, A., “Defined contribution pensions: plan rules, participant choices, and the path of least resistance”, Tax Policy and the Economy, vol. 16, 2002, 67-113.
Cofone, I., “The way the cookie crumbles: online tracking meets behavioural economics”, International Journal of Law and Information Technology, vol. 25, n.° 1, 2017, 38-62.
Dinner, I. Johnson, E., Goldstein, D. y Liu, K., “Partitioning default effects: why people choose not to choose”, Journal of Experimental Psychology, vol. 17, n.º 4, 2011, 332-341.
Edelman, B. y Geradin, D., “Android and competition law: exploring and assessing Google’s practices in mobile”, European Competition Journal, vol. 12, n.° 2-3, 2016, 159-194.
Ferejohn, J. y Friedman, B., “Toward a Political Theory of Constitutional Default Rules”, Florida State University Law Review, vol. 33, n.º 3, 2006, 825-860.
Gevers, S., Janssen, A. y Friele, R. “Consent systems for post mortem organ donation in Europe”, European Journal of Health Law, vol. 11, 2004, 175-186.
Ginsberg, A., “Google - Do not pass go, do not collect $200: why the tech giant is a ‘bad’ monopoly”, Hastings Law Journal, vol. 71, n.° 3, 2020,783-812.
Johnson, E. y Goldstein, D., “Do defaults save lives?”, Science, vol. 302, n.º 5649, 2003, 1338-1339.
Johnson E., Bellman, S. y Lohse, G. “Defaults, framing and privacy: why opting in-opting out”, Marketing Letters, vol. 13, n.° 1, 2002, 5-15.
Johnson, E. y Goldstein, D., “Decisions by default”, en Shafir, E., The Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2013, 417-427.
Johnson, E., Shu, S., Dellaert, B., Fox, C., Goldstein, D., Häubl, G. y Weber, E., “Beyond nudges: tools of a choice architecture”, Marketing Letters, vol. 23, n.° 2, 2012, 491.
Kesan, J. P. y Shah, R., “Setting software defaults: perspectives from law, computer science and behavioral economics”, Notre Dame Law Review, vol. 82, n.º 2, 2006, 583-634.
Korobkin, R. “Inertia and preference in contract negotiation: the psychological power of default rules and form terms”, Vanderbilt Law Review, vol. 51, n.° 6, 1998, 1583-1651.
Korobkin, R., “The status quo bias and contract default rules”, Cornell Law Review, vol. 83, 1998, 608-687.
Lunn, P., Regulatory Policy and Behavioural Economics, oecd Publications, 2014.
Luoto, J. y Carman, K., Behavioral Economics Guidelines with Applications for Health Interventions, Washington, Inter-American Development Bank, 2014.
MacKay, D. y Robinson, A., “The ethics of organ donor registration policies: nudges and respect for autonomy”, The American Journal of Bioethics, vol. 16, n.° 11, 2016, 3-12.
Madrian, B. y Shea, D., “The power of suggestion: inertia in 401(k) participation and savings behavior”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 116, n.° 4, 2001, 1149-1187.
Mises, L. v., Economic Policy Thoughts for Today and Tomorrow, Alabama, Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2006.
Monroy, D., “Acerca del diseño óptimo de las reglas predeterminadas en el derecho de contratos”, en aa.vv., Colección Enrique Low Murtra: Derecho Económico, Bogotá, Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2017, 15-62.
Monroy, D., “Reglas supletivas ‘sancionatorias’ en el derecho de contratos colombiano: el caso del contrato de transporte”, Revista de Derecho Privado, Universidad Externado de Colombia, n.° 30, 2016, 221-254.
Rebonato, R., “A critical assessment of libertarian paternalism”, Journal of Consumer Policy, vol. 37, n.° 3, 2014, 357-396.
Schwartz, A., “The default rule paradigm and the limits of contract law”, Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal, vol. 3, 1994, 389-419.
Smith, N. C., Goldstein, D. y Johnson, E., “Choice without awareness: ethical and policy implications of defaults”, Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, vol. 32 n.° 2, 2013, 159-172.
Stucke, M., “Behavioral antitrust and monopolization”, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, vol. 8, n.° 3, 2012, 545-574.
Stucke, M., “Behavioral exploitation and its implications on competition and consumer protection policies”, en aa.vv., The Pros and Cons of Consumer Protection, Växjö, Davidsons Tryckeri, 2012, 77-122.
Sunstein, C., Choosing Not to Choose: Understanding the Value of Choice, New York, Oxford University Press, 2015.
Sunstein, C. y Thaler, R., “Libertarian paternalism is not an oxymoron”, The University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 70, n.° 4, 2003, 1159-1202.
Sunstein, C., “Deciding by default”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 162, n.° 1, 2013, 1-57.
Sunstein, C., Impersonal Default Rules vs. Active Choices vs. Personalized Default Rules: A Triptych, Working Paper, 2013.
Suntein, C., Paternalismo libertario, Barcelona, Herder, 2017.
Thaler, R., Sunstein, C. y Balz, J., “Choice architecture”, en Shafir, E., The Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2013, 428-439.
W3schools, The Most Popular Browsers 2002-2020, [en línea], disponible en: https://www.w3schools.com/browsers/ [consultado el 15 de septiembre de 2020]
White, M. “Behavioral Law and Economics: the assault on consent, will, and dignity”, en Favor C. et al., Essays on Philosophy, Politics & Economics: Integration & Common Research Projects, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2010.
Wilkinson, T. M., “Nudging and manipulation”, Political Studies, vol. 61, n.° 2, 2013, 341-355.
Willis, L., “When nudges fail: slippery defaults”, The University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 80, n.º 3, 2013, 1155-1229.
Willis, L., “Why not privacy by default?”, Loyola-LA Legal Studies, Paper No. 2013-37, 2014, 1-74.
Wright, J. y Ginsburg, D., “Behavioral Law and Economics: its origins, fatal flaws, and implications for liberty”, Northwestern University Law Review, vol. 106, n.° 3, 2012, 1033-1090.
Zamir, E. y Medina, B., Law, Economics, and Morality, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010.
dc.rights.spa.fl_str_mv Daniel Alejandro Monroy Cely - 2020
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spelling Monroy Cely, Daniel Alejandrovirtual::5113-12020-12-01 14:37:342022-09-09T21:11:36Z2020-12-01 14:37:342022-09-09T21:11:36Z2020-12-01Las “reglas u opciones predeterminadas” son estructuras ubicuas en múltiples áreas del derecho. Aunque este tipo de reglas se han estudiado en el derecho de los contratos, más allá de este ámbito no han suscitado mayor interés en la doctrina jurídica de tradición civilista. Si bien esta doctrina ha sostenido reiteradamente que las reglas predeterminadas preservan per se un continuum en la libertad de decisión de sus destinatarios, este artículo refuta esta tesis y argumenta que estas reglas producen una profunda pero inadvertida afectación a la autonomía individual y la libertad de decisión individual. En esta perspectiva, el artículo reflexiona en torno a por qué en algunas áreas del derecho ciertos contenidos de las reglas predeterminadas pueden calificarse como éticamente inadmisibles. El artículo además sugiere algunos criterios preliminares para determinar “cómo” debiera diseñarse el contenido de las reglas predeterminadas.Default rules are ubiquitous structures in multiple areas of law. Whereas these types of rules have been studied in contract law, beyond this area, default rules have not attracted much interest from civil law doctrine. Although this doctrine has repeatedly held that default rules preserve per se a continuum in the freedom of choice of their addressees, this paper contests this thesis and argues that these rules produce a deep but unnoticed impact on autonomy and individual freedom of choice. In this order, the paper reflects about why in certain areas of law and why certain contents of the default rules can be qualified as ethically inadmissible. The paper also suggests some preliminary criteria to determine “how” the content of the default rules should be designed.application/pdfapplication/xmltext/html10.18601/01234366.n40.042346-24420123-4366https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/handle/001/11803https://doi.org/10.18601/01234366.n40.04spaDepartamento de Derecho Civilhttps://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derpri/article/download/6920/9487https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derpri/article/download/6920/9696https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derpri/article/download/6920/10106Núm. 40 , Año 2021 : Enero-Junio1184087Revista de Derecho Privado39530 Microsoft (Tying), Asunto comp/39.530, [en línea], Comisión Europea, 16 de diciembre de 2009, disponible en: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39530Arruñada, B., “The role of institutions in the contractual process”, en Deffains, B. y Kirat, T., Law and Economics in Civil Law Countries, Amsterdam, Elsevier Science, 2001, 154.Ayres, I., “Regulating opt-out: an economic theory of altering rules”, Yale Law Journal, vol. 121, 2012, 2032-2116.Ayres, I. y Gertner, R., “Filling gaps in incomplete contracts: an economic theory of default rules”, The Yale Law Journal, vol. 99 n.° 1, 1989, 87-130.Barnett, R., “The sound of silence: default rules and contractual consent”, Virginia Law Review, vol. 78, 1992, 821-911.Bartling, B. y Fischbacher, U., “Shifting the blame: on delegation and responsibility”, The Review of Economic Studies, vol. 79, n.° 1, 2012, 67-87.Beshears, J., Choi, J., Laibson, D. y Madrian, B., “The importance of default options for retirement saving outcomes: evidence from the United States”, en Brown, J., Liebman, J. y Wise, D., Social Security Policy in a Changing Environment, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2009, 167-195.Beshears, J., Choi, J., Laibson, D. y Madrian, B., “How are preferences revealed?”, Journal of Public Economics, vol. 92 n.° 8-9, 2008, 1787-1794.Bovens, L., “The ethics of nudge”, en Grüne-Yanoff, T. y Hansson, S., Preference Change, Dordrecht, Springer, 2009, 207-219.Carroll, G., Choi, J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. y Metrick, A., “Optimal defaults and active decisions”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 124, n.° 4, 2009, 1639-1674.Choi, J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. y Metrick, A., “Optimal defaults”, The American Economic Review, vol. 93 n.° 2, 2003, 180-185.Choi, J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. y Metrick, A., “Passive decisions and potent defaults”, en Wise, D., Analyses in the Economics of Aging, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2005, 59-78.Choi, J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. y Metrick, A., “For better or for worse: default effects and 401(k) savings behavior”, en Wise, D., Perspectives on the Economics of Aging, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2004, 81-125.Choi, J., Laibson, D., Madrian, B. y Metrick, A., “Defined contribution pensions: plan rules, participant choices, and the path of least resistance”, Tax Policy and the Economy, vol. 16, 2002, 67-113.Cofone, I., “The way the cookie crumbles: online tracking meets behavioural economics”, International Journal of Law and Information Technology, vol. 25, n.° 1, 2017, 38-62.Dinner, I. Johnson, E., Goldstein, D. y Liu, K., “Partitioning default effects: why people choose not to choose”, Journal of Experimental Psychology, vol. 17, n.º 4, 2011, 332-341.Edelman, B. y Geradin, D., “Android and competition law: exploring and assessing Google’s practices in mobile”, European Competition Journal, vol. 12, n.° 2-3, 2016, 159-194.Ferejohn, J. y Friedman, B., “Toward a Political Theory of Constitutional Default Rules”, Florida State University Law Review, vol. 33, n.º 3, 2006, 825-860.Gevers, S., Janssen, A. y Friele, R. “Consent systems for post mortem organ donation in Europe”, European Journal of Health Law, vol. 11, 2004, 175-186.Ginsberg, A., “Google - Do not pass go, do not collect $200: why the tech giant is a ‘bad’ monopoly”, Hastings Law Journal, vol. 71, n.° 3, 2020,783-812.Johnson, E. y Goldstein, D., “Do defaults save lives?”, Science, vol. 302, n.º 5649, 2003, 1338-1339.Johnson E., Bellman, S. y Lohse, G. “Defaults, framing and privacy: why opting in-opting out”, Marketing Letters, vol. 13, n.° 1, 2002, 5-15.Johnson, E. y Goldstein, D., “Decisions by default”, en Shafir, E., The Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2013, 417-427.Johnson, E., Shu, S., Dellaert, B., Fox, C., Goldstein, D., Häubl, G. y Weber, E., “Beyond nudges: tools of a choice architecture”, Marketing Letters, vol. 23, n.° 2, 2012, 491.Kesan, J. P. y Shah, R., “Setting software defaults: perspectives from law, computer science and behavioral economics”, Notre Dame Law Review, vol. 82, n.º 2, 2006, 583-634.Korobkin, R. “Inertia and preference in contract negotiation: the psychological power of default rules and form terms”, Vanderbilt Law Review, vol. 51, n.° 6, 1998, 1583-1651.Korobkin, R., “The status quo bias and contract default rules”, Cornell Law Review, vol. 83, 1998, 608-687.Lunn, P., Regulatory Policy and Behavioural Economics, oecd Publications, 2014.Luoto, J. y Carman, K., Behavioral Economics Guidelines with Applications for Health Interventions, Washington, Inter-American Development Bank, 2014.MacKay, D. y Robinson, A., “The ethics of organ donor registration policies: nudges and respect for autonomy”, The American Journal of Bioethics, vol. 16, n.° 11, 2016, 3-12.Madrian, B. y Shea, D., “The power of suggestion: inertia in 401(k) participation and savings behavior”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 116, n.° 4, 2001, 1149-1187.Mises, L. v., Economic Policy Thoughts for Today and Tomorrow, Alabama, Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2006.Monroy, D., “Acerca del diseño óptimo de las reglas predeterminadas en el derecho de contratos”, en aa.vv., Colección Enrique Low Murtra: Derecho Económico, Bogotá, Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2017, 15-62.Monroy, D., “Reglas supletivas ‘sancionatorias’ en el derecho de contratos colombiano: el caso del contrato de transporte”, Revista de Derecho Privado, Universidad Externado de Colombia, n.° 30, 2016, 221-254.Rebonato, R., “A critical assessment of libertarian paternalism”, Journal of Consumer Policy, vol. 37, n.° 3, 2014, 357-396.Schwartz, A., “The default rule paradigm and the limits of contract law”, Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal, vol. 3, 1994, 389-419.Smith, N. C., Goldstein, D. y Johnson, E., “Choice without awareness: ethical and policy implications of defaults”, Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, vol. 32 n.° 2, 2013, 159-172.Stucke, M., “Behavioral antitrust and monopolization”, Journal of Competition Law & Economics, vol. 8, n.° 3, 2012, 545-574.Stucke, M., “Behavioral exploitation and its implications on competition and consumer protection policies”, en aa.vv., The Pros and Cons of Consumer Protection, Växjö, Davidsons Tryckeri, 2012, 77-122.Sunstein, C., Choosing Not to Choose: Understanding the Value of Choice, New York, Oxford University Press, 2015.Sunstein, C. y Thaler, R., “Libertarian paternalism is not an oxymoron”, The University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 70, n.° 4, 2003, 1159-1202.Sunstein, C., “Deciding by default”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 162, n.° 1, 2013, 1-57.Sunstein, C., Impersonal Default Rules vs. Active Choices vs. Personalized Default Rules: A Triptych, Working Paper, 2013.Suntein, C., Paternalismo libertario, Barcelona, Herder, 2017.Thaler, R., Sunstein, C. y Balz, J., “Choice architecture”, en Shafir, E., The Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2013, 428-439.W3schools, The Most Popular Browsers 2002-2020, [en línea], disponible en: https://www.w3schools.com/browsers/ [consultado el 15 de septiembre de 2020]White, M. “Behavioral Law and Economics: the assault on consent, will, and dignity”, en Favor C. et al., Essays on Philosophy, Politics & Economics: Integration & Common Research Projects, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2010.Wilkinson, T. M., “Nudging and manipulation”, Political Studies, vol. 61, n.° 2, 2013, 341-355.Willis, L., “When nudges fail: slippery defaults”, The University of Chicago Law Review, vol. 80, n.º 3, 2013, 1155-1229.Willis, L., “Why not privacy by default?”, Loyola-LA Legal Studies, Paper No. 2013-37, 2014, 1-74.Wright, J. y Ginsburg, D., “Behavioral Law and Economics: its origins, fatal flaws, and implications for liberty”, Northwestern University Law Review, vol. 106, n.° 3, 2012, 1033-1090.Zamir, E. y Medina, B., Law, Economics, and Morality, New York, Oxford University Press, 2010.Daniel Alejandro Monroy Cely - 2020info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derpri/article/view/6920default rules;active choice;civil law doctrine;individual autonomy;freedom of choicereglas predeterminadas;elección activa;doctrina del derecho civil;autonomía individual;libertad de decisiónLas reglas predeterminadas de decisión en el derecho. Bases para una reflexión teóricaDefault Rules in the Law: Toward a Theoretical FrameworkArtículo de revistahttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Textinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleJournal articlehttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ARTREFinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPublicationMonroy Celyvirtual::5113-1Daniel Alejandrovirtual::5113-1https://scholar.google.com/citations?user=Ye87yykAAAAJ&hl=esvirtual::5113-10000-0003-0519-7992virtual::5113-128514f3c-5539-4f4a-b1b4-5571ef1756b2virtual::5113-128514f3c-5539-4f4a-b1b4-5571ef1756b2virtual::5113-1OREORE.xmltext/xml2568https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/bitstreams/60e0accf-1052-4dc3-812c-d46099268a1f/downloadb7ee606b0b05bde582e379f2406d9f2eMD51001/11803oai:bdigital.uexternado.edu.co:001/118032022-12-02 13:48:02.481https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/Daniel Alejandro Monroy Cely - 2020https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.coUniversidad Externado de Colombiametabiblioteca@metabiblioteca.org

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