Largo Plazo y Plan Nacional de Desarrollo

La Constitución Política de Colombia de 1991 implementó herramientas de planeación económica para alcanzar el desarrollo económico en el largo plazo. Sin embargo, estableció que cada Gobierno debe implementar un Plan Nacional de Desarrollo. Este escrito explica la interpretación legal de la expresió...

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Autores:: Trujillo Alfaro, Jorge Luis
Garay Forero, Juan Carlos

Tipo de recurso:: Article of journal

Fecha de publicación:: 2019

Institución:: Universidad Externado de Colombia

Repositorio:: Biblioteca Digital Universidad Externado de Colombia

Idioma:: spa

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dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv	Largo Plazo y Plan Nacional de Desarrollo
dc.title.translated.eng.fl_str_mv	The Colombian National Development Plan and the Long Term
title	Largo Plazo y Plan Nacional de Desarrollo
spellingShingle	Largo Plazo y Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Economic Planning Rules; Long Term Reglas de planeación económica; Largo plazo
title_short	Largo Plazo y Plan Nacional de Desarrollo
title_full	Largo Plazo y Plan Nacional de Desarrollo
title_fullStr	Largo Plazo y Plan Nacional de Desarrollo
title_full_unstemmed	Largo Plazo y Plan Nacional de Desarrollo
title_sort	Largo Plazo y Plan Nacional de Desarrollo
dc.creator.fl_str_mv	Trujillo Alfaro, Jorge Luis Garay Forero, Juan Carlos
dc.contributor.author.spa.fl_str_mv	Trujillo Alfaro, Jorge Luis Garay Forero, Juan Carlos
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv	Economic Planning Rules; Long Term
topic	Economic Planning Rules; Long Term Reglas de planeación económica; Largo plazo
dc.subject.spa.fl_str_mv	Reglas de planeación económica; Largo plazo
description	La Constitución Política de Colombia de 1991 implementó herramientas de planeación económica para alcanzar el desarrollo económico en el largo plazo. Sin embargo, estableció que cada Gobierno debe implementar un Plan Nacional de Desarrollo. Este escrito explica la interpretación legal de la expresión “largo plazo” en un contexto en que las herramientas regulatorias también son relevantes para alcanzar los objetivos del desarrollo económico.
publishDate	2019
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv	2019-08-12 08:52:45 2022-09-08T13:45:53Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv	2019-08-12 08:52:45 2022-09-08T13:45:53Z
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv	2019-08-12
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dc.relation.references.spa.fl_str_mv	Adelman, J. (2013). Worldly Philosopher: The Odyssey of Albert O. Hirschman. Princeton University Press. Alchian, Armen A. “Uncertainty, evolution, and economic theory.” The Journal of Political Economy (1950): 211-221. Boyck o Maxim, Shleifer Andrei and Vishny Robert W. (1996) “A Theory of Privatization.” The Economic Journal, Vol. 106, No. 435 (Mar) Coase, Ronald Harr y. “The nature of the firm.”Economica 4, n.° 16 (1937): 386-405. Coase, Ronald Harr y. “The Problem of social cost” Journal of law & economics. 3 (1960): 1. Coase, Ronald Harr y. “Accounting and the theory of the firm.” Journal of Accounting and Economics (1990): 3-13. Cox Gary “The Efficient Secret: The cabinet and the development of political parties in Victorian England.” Cambridge University Press. Cox, Gary. “The Organization of Democratic Legislatures”, en The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, editado por Barry Weingast y Donald Wittman (2006) Oxford University Press. Dell, Melissa. (2010). “The persistent effects of Peru’s mining mita.” Econometrica, 78(6), 1.863-1.903. Downs, Anthony. “An economic theory of political action in a democracy.” The Journal of Political Economy (1957): 135-150. Evans, P. & Bellamy, S. (1995). “Performance evaluation in the Australian public sector: The role of management and cost accounting control systems.” International Journal of Public Sector Management, 8(6). Fogel, Robert W. (1994). “Economic Growth, Population Theory, and Physiology: The Bearing of Long-Term Processes on the Making of Economic Policy.” The American Economic Review, 84(3), 369-395. Guinand, L. M. (2014). The changing role of the central planning offices Latin America: a comparative historical analysis perspective (1950-2013). Maastricht University. Hardin, Garr ett . “The tragedy of the commons.” Science 162, n.° 3859 (1968): 1.243-1.248. Hayek, Friedrich August. “The use of knowledge in society.” The American economic review (1945): 519-530. Hayek, Friedrich August. Law, legislation and liberty: a new statement of the liberal principles of justice and political economy. Routledge, 2012. Keynes, John Maynard (1971) Collected writings of John Maynard Keynes, Vol 4. (A tract on Monetary Reform). Macmillian. Kornai, Janos (1986). The soft budget constraint. Kyklos, 39(1), 3-30. Kornai, J.; Maskin, E. & Roland, G. (2003). “Understanding the soft budget constraint.” Journal of economic literature, 1095-1136. Majone, G. (1997). “From the positive to the regulatory state: causes and consequences of changes in the mode of governance.” Journal of Public Policy, 17(2), 139-167. McCubbins, Mathew. “Legislative Process and the Mirroring Principle”, en Handbook of New Institutional Economics, editado por Claude Ménard y Mary Shirley (2008) Editorial Srpinger. McKelvey, Richard D. “Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control.” Journal of Economic theory 12, n.° 3 (1976): 472-482. Meng, Xin; Nancy Qian and Pierre Yared. The institutional causes of China’s great famine, 1959-61. n.° w16361. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010. Nort h, Douglass C. “Institutions and credible commitment.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (jite)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft (1993): 11-23. Nunn, Nathan, and Leonard Wantc hekon. 2011. “The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa.” American Economic Review, 101(7): 3221-52. Ostrom, Elinor. Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge University Press, 1990. Premchand, A. (1995). Effective government accounting. International Monetary Fund. Riker, William H. and Steven J. Brams. “The paradox of vote trading.” The American Political Science Review (1973): 1.235-1.247. Samuel, S.; Covaleski, M. A. & Dirsmith, M. W. (2008). “Accounting in and for us Governments and Non-profit Organizations: a Review of Research and a Call to Further Inquiry.” Handbooks of Management Accounting Research, 3, 1.299-1.322. Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barr y R. Weingast. “Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice.” Public choice 37, n.° 3 (1981): 503-519. Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barr y R. Weingast. “Uncovered sets and sophisticated voting outcomes with implications for agenda institutions.” American Journal of Political Science (1984): 49-74. Tataru, Maria, and Vincent Merlin. “On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules.” Mathematical Social Sciences 34, n.° 1 (1997): 81-90. Trujillo Alfaro, Jorge Luis (2007). Presupuesto. Una aproximación desde la Planeación y el Gasto Público, Editorial Universidad del Rosario. Weingast, Barr y R. and William J. Marshall. “The industrial organization of Congress; or, why legislatures, like firms, are not organized as markets.” The Journal of Political Economy (1988): 132-163. Williamson, Oliver E. “Transaction-cost economics: the governance of contractual relations.” Journal of law and economics (1979): 233-261. Young, Peyton. “Optimal Voting Rules.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 9, n.º 1 (1995): 51-64.
dc.rights.spa.fl_str_mv	Jorge Luis Trujillo Alfaro, Juan Carlos Garay Forero - 2019
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spelling	Trujillo Alfaro, Jorge Luis6cecfbae-0f71-4bda-9653-c1948abe4e75Garay Forero, Juan Carlos8292de64-72b2-44de-8d7a-7c9f45d1cd322019-08-12 08:52:452022-09-08T13:45:53Z2019-08-12 08:52:452022-09-08T13:45:53Z2019-08-12La Constitución Política de Colombia de 1991 implementó herramientas de planeación económica para alcanzar el desarrollo económico en el largo plazo. Sin embargo, estableció que cada Gobierno debe implementar un Plan Nacional de Desarrollo. Este escrito explica la interpretación legal de la expresión “largo plazo” en un contexto en que las herramientas regulatorias también son relevantes para alcanzar los objetivos del desarrollo económico.The Colombian Constitution of 1991 implemented planning tools to achieve economic development in the long term. However it stablished as a development strategy the implementation of a National Development Plan for every 4 year goverment period. This essay explains what legally must be interpreted for “long term” in a context where regulatory tools are seen as relevant to achieve development goals.application/pdf10.18601/01236458.n50.042346-20780123-6458https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/handle/001/8259https://doi.org/10.18601/01236458.n50.04spaDepartamento de Derecho Económicohttps://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/contexto/article/download/6133/7893Núm. 50 , Año 2018 : Julio-Diciembre645037Con-textoAdelman, J. (2013). Worldly Philosopher: The Odyssey of Albert O. Hirschman. Princeton University Press.Alchian, Armen A. “Uncertainty, evolution, and economic theory.” The Journal of Political Economy (1950): 211-221.Boyck o Maxim, Shleifer Andrei and Vishny Robert W. (1996) “A Theory of Privatization.” The Economic Journal, Vol. 106, No. 435 (Mar)Coase, Ronald Harr y. “The nature of the firm.”Economica 4, n.° 16 (1937): 386-405.Coase, Ronald Harr y. “The Problem of social cost” Journal of law & economics. 3 (1960): 1.Coase, Ronald Harr y. “Accounting and the theory of the firm.” Journal of Accounting and Economics (1990): 3-13.Cox Gary “The Efficient Secret: The cabinet and the development of political parties in Victorian England.” Cambridge University Press.Cox, Gary. “The Organization of Democratic Legislatures”, en The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, editado por Barry Weingast y Donald Wittman (2006) Oxford University Press.Dell, Melissa. (2010). “The persistent effects of Peru’s mining mita.” Econometrica, 78(6), 1.863-1.903.Downs, Anthony. “An economic theory of political action in a democracy.” The Journal of Political Economy (1957): 135-150.Evans, P. & Bellamy, S. (1995). “Performance evaluation in the Australian public sector: The role of management and cost accounting control systems.” International Journal of Public Sector Management, 8(6).Fogel, Robert W. (1994). “Economic Growth, Population Theory, and Physiology: The Bearing of Long-Term Processes on the Making of Economic Policy.” The American Economic Review, 84(3), 369-395.Guinand, L. M. (2014). The changing role of the central planning offices Latin America: a comparative historical analysis perspective (1950-2013). Maastricht University.Hardin, Garr ett . “The tragedy of the commons.” Science 162, n.° 3859 (1968): 1.243-1.248.Hayek, Friedrich August. “The use of knowledge in society.” The American economic review (1945): 519-530.Hayek, Friedrich August. Law, legislation and liberty: a new statement of the liberal principles of justice and political economy. Routledge, 2012.Keynes, John Maynard (1971) Collected writings of John Maynard Keynes, Vol 4. (A tract on Monetary Reform). Macmillian.Kornai, Janos (1986). The soft budget constraint. Kyklos, 39(1), 3-30.Kornai, J.; Maskin, E. & Roland, G. (2003). “Understanding the soft budget constraint.” Journal of economic literature, 1095-1136.Majone, G. (1997). “From the positive to the regulatory state: causes and consequences of changes in the mode of governance.” Journal of Public Policy, 17(2), 139-167.McCubbins, Mathew. “Legislative Process and the Mirroring Principle”, en Handbook of New Institutional Economics, editado por Claude Ménard y Mary Shirley (2008) Editorial Srpinger.McKelvey, Richard D. “Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control.” Journal of Economic theory 12, n.° 3 (1976): 472-482.Meng, Xin; Nancy Qian and Pierre Yared. The institutional causes of China’s great famine, 1959-61. n.° w16361. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010.Nort h, Douglass C. “Institutions and credible commitment.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (jite)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft (1993): 11-23.Nunn, Nathan, and Leonard Wantc hekon. 2011. “The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa.” American Economic Review, 101(7): 3221-52.Ostrom, Elinor. Governing the commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge University Press, 1990.Premchand, A. (1995). Effective government accounting. International Monetary Fund.Riker, William H. and Steven J. Brams. “The paradox of vote trading.” The American Political Science Review (1973): 1.235-1.247.Samuel, S.; Covaleski, M. A. & Dirsmith, M. W. (2008). “Accounting in and for us Governments and Non-profit Organizations: a Review of Research and a Call to Further Inquiry.” Handbooks of Management Accounting Research, 3, 1.299-1.322.Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barr y R. Weingast. “Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice.” Public choice 37, n.° 3 (1981): 503-519.Shepsle, Kenneth A. and Barr y R. Weingast. “Uncovered sets and sophisticated voting outcomes with implications for agenda institutions.” American Journal of Political Science (1984): 49-74.Tataru, Maria, and Vincent Merlin. “On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules.” Mathematical Social Sciences 34, n.° 1 (1997): 81-90.Trujillo Alfaro, Jorge Luis (2007). Presupuesto. Una aproximación desde la Planeación y el Gasto Público, Editorial Universidad del Rosario.Weingast, Barr y R. and William J. Marshall. “The industrial organization of Congress; or, why legislatures, like firms, are not organized as markets.” The Journal of Political Economy (1988): 132-163.Williamson, Oliver E. “Transaction-cost economics: the governance of contractual relations.” Journal of law and economics (1979): 233-261.Young, Peyton. “Optimal Voting Rules.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 9, n.º 1 (1995): 51-64.Jorge Luis Trujillo Alfaro, Juan Carlos Garay Forero - 2019info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/contexto/article/view/6133Economic Planning Rules;Long TermReglas de planeación económica;Largo plazoLargo Plazo y Plan Nacional de DesarrolloThe Colombian National Development Plan and the Long TermArtículo de revistahttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Textinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleJournal articlehttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ARTREFinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPublicationOREORE.xmltext/xml2520https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/bitstreams/54e12c52-96ca-4a4f-8aba-8d0a94c0ccd9/download5f500813f43483e139aee368a3bdb8a3MD51001/8259oai:bdigital.uexternado.edu.co:001/82592023-08-14 15:03:32.473https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/Jorge Luis Trujillo Alfaro, Juan Carlos Garay Forero - 2019https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.coUniversidad Externado de Colombiametabiblioteca@metabiblioteca.org

Largo Plazo y Plan Nacional de Desarrollo

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