Optimal Early Termination in PPP Projects Based on Real Options Theory

La terminación anticipada es un mecanismo de compensación contractual implementado en proyectos de infraestructura de app, donde los inversionistas privados tienen derecho a abandonar el proyecto para mitigar riesgos como el de demanda. En este artículo utilizamos la teoría de opciones reales para v...

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Autores:: Zapata Quimbayo, Carlos Andrés
Mejía Veja, Carlos Armando

Tipo de recurso:: Article of journal

Fecha de publicación:: 2024

Institución:: Universidad Externado de Colombia

Repositorio:: Biblioteca Digital Universidad Externado de Colombia

Idioma:: spa

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repository_id_str
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv	Optimal Early Termination in PPP Projects Based on Real Options Theory
dc.title.translated.eng.fl_str_mv	Optimal Early Termination in PPP Projects Based on Real Options Theory
title	Optimal Early Termination in PPP Projects Based on Real Options Theory
spellingShingle	Optimal Early Termination in PPP Projects Based on Real Options Theory Infrastructure projects; option to abandon; early termination mechanism proyectos de infraestructura; opción de abandono; mecanismo de terminación anticipada
title_short	Optimal Early Termination in PPP Projects Based on Real Options Theory
title_full	Optimal Early Termination in PPP Projects Based on Real Options Theory
title_fullStr	Optimal Early Termination in PPP Projects Based on Real Options Theory
title_full_unstemmed	Optimal Early Termination in PPP Projects Based on Real Options Theory
title_sort	Optimal Early Termination in PPP Projects Based on Real Options Theory
dc.creator.fl_str_mv	Zapata Quimbayo, Carlos Andrés Mejía Veja, Carlos Armando
dc.contributor.author.spa.fl_str_mv	Zapata Quimbayo, Carlos Andrés Mejía Veja, Carlos Armando
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv	Infrastructure projects; option to abandon; early termination mechanism
topic	Infrastructure projects; option to abandon; early termination mechanism proyectos de infraestructura; opción de abandono; mecanismo de terminación anticipada
dc.subject.spa.fl_str_mv	proyectos de infraestructura; opción de abandono; mecanismo de terminación anticipada
description	La terminación anticipada es un mecanismo de compensación contractual implementado en proyectos de infraestructura de app, donde los inversionistas privados tienen derecho a abandonar el proyecto para mitigar riesgos como el de demanda. En este artículo utilizamos la teoría de opciones reales para valorar la terminación anticipada como una opción de abandono de un proyecto, en el que el riesgo de demanda y la tarifa de compensación se modelan asumiendo procesos estocásticos correlacionados. Así, se implementa el modelo de valoración de opciones con una solución analítica y se comparan los resultados con la técnica de simulación Monte Carlo. Los resultados confirman los beneficios que el mecanismo contractual ofrece a los inversionistas privados para mitigar riesgos y mejorar el valor del proyecto.
publishDate	2024
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv	2024-03-21T11:15:55Z 2024-06-07T07:31:21Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv	2024-03-21T11:15:55Z 2024-06-07T07:31:21Z
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv	2024-03-21
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv	Artículo de revista
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dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv	10.18601/17941113.n25.06
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dc.relation.citationedition.spa.fl_str_mv	Núm. 25 , Año 2023 : Julio-Diciembre
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dc.relation.references.spa.fl_str_mv	Ameyaw, E. & Chan, A. (2015). Evaluation and ranking of risk factors in public–private partnership water supply projects in developing countries using fuzzy synthetic evaluation approach. Expert Systems with Applications, 42(12), 5102-5116. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2015.02.041 Ashuri, B., Asce, M., Kashani, H., Molenaar, K., Asce, M., Lee, S. & Lu, J. (2012). Risk-neutral pricing approach for evaluating bot highway projects with government minimum revenue guarantee options. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 138(4), 545-557. https://doi.org/10.1061/(asce) co.1943-7862.0000447 Attarzadeh, M., Chua, D., Beer, M., & Abbott, E. (2017). Options-based negotiation management of PPP–BOT infrastructure projects. Construction Management and Economics, 35(11-12), 676-692. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2017.1325962 Black, F., & Scholes, M. (1973). The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. Journal of Political Economy, 81(3), 637-659. https://doi.org/10.1142/97898147595 88_0001 Bowe, M., & Lee, D. (2004). Project evaluation in the presence of multiple embedded real options: evidence from the Taiwan High-Speed Rail Project. Journal of Asian Economics, 15(1), 71-98. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.asieco.2003.12.001 Brandão, L., & Saraiva, E. (2008). The option value of government guarantees in infrastructure projects. Construction Management and Economics, 26(11), 1171- 1180. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446190802428051 Brennan, M., & Schwartz, E. (1985). Evaluating natural resource investments. The Journal of Business, 58(2), 135-157. Buso, M., Dosi, C., & Moretto, M. (2019). Termination fees and contract design in public-private partnerships. Working paper No. 032.2018. https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/191374/1/ndl2018-032.pdf Cabero, F., Sánchez, A., & Lara, A. (2017). Default and abandonment option in mo¬torway concessions. Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 23(1), 04016022. https:// doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)is.1943-555X.0000309 Carbonara, N., & Pellegrino, R. (2018). Revenue guarantee in public–private partnerships: a win–win model. Construction Management and Economics, 1-15. https:// doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2018.1467028 Caselli, S., Marciante, A. & Gatti, S. (2009). Pricing final indemnification payments to private sponsors in project-financed public-private partnerships: An application of real options valuation. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 21(3), 95-106. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.2009.00243.x Cheah, C., & Liu, J. (2006). Valuing governmental support in infrastructure projects as real options using Monte Carlo simulation. Construction Management and Economics, 24(5), 545-54. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446190500435572 Clark, E. & Rousseau, P. (2002). Strategic parameters for capital budgeting when abandonment value is stochastic. Applied Financial Economics, 12(2), 123-130. https://doi.org/10.1080/09603100110088049 Cox, J., Ross, S., & Rubinstein, M. (1979). Option pricing: A simplified approach. Journal of Financial Economics, 7(3), 229-263. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304- 405X(79)90015-1 Dixit, A., & Pindyck, R. (1994). Investment under Uncertainty. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Feng, Z., Zhang, S., & Gao, Y. (2015). Modelling the impact of government guarantees on toll charge, road quality and capacity for Build-Operate-Transfer (bot) road projects. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 78(1), 54-67. https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.tra.2015.05.006 Galilea, P., & Medda, F. (2010). Does the political and economic context influence the success of a transport project? An analysis of transport public–private partnerships. Research in Transportation Economics, 30(1), 102–109. https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.retrec.2010.10.011 Garvin, M., & Cheah, C. (2004). Valuation techniques for infrastructure investment decisions. Construction Management and Economics, 22(4), 373-83. https://doi. org/ 10.1080/01446190310001649010 Gatti, S. (2008). Project Finance in Theory and Practice. Project Finance in Theory and Practice. Oxford: Academic Press. Giraldo, A. (2019). Valoración del mecanismo de terminación anticipada en los con¬tratos de concesión 4G en Colombia. odeon, (16), 67-95. https://doi.org/10.18601/ 17941113.n16.04 Grimsey, D., & Lewis, M. (2002). Evaluating the risks of public private partnerships for infrastructure projects. International Journal of Project Management, 20(2), 107-118. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0263-7863(00)00040-5 Guasch, J., Laffont, J., & Straub, S. (2007). Concessions of infrastructure in Latin America: Government-led renegotiation. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 22(7), 1267-1294. https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.987 Guasch, J. L., & Straub, S. (2009). Corruption and concession renegotiations.: Evidence from the water and transport sectors in Latin America. Utilities Policy, 17(2), 185-190. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2008.07.003 Ho, P., & Liu, L. (2002). An option pricing-based model for evaluating the financial viability of privatized infrastructure projects. Construction Management and Economics, 20(2), 143-156. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446190110110533 Igrejas, R., Cordeiro, L. & Brandão, L. (2017). When is abandonment not an option? Dealing with PPP contract and government interests. Advances in Public-Private Partnerships–Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Public-Private Partnerships (pp. 486-498). https://doi.org/10.1061/9780784480267.038 Iossa, E., & Martimort, D. (2016). Corruption in PPPS, incentives and contract incom-pleteness. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 44(1), 85-100. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.10.007 Iyer, K., & Sagheer, M. (2011). A real options-based traffic risk mitigation model for build-operate-transfer highway projects in India. Construction Management and Economics, 29(8), 771-9. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2011.597412 Liu, J., Love, P., Davis, P., Smith, J., & Regan, M. (2015). Conceptual framework for the performance measurement of public-private partnerships. Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 21(1), 04014023. https://doi.org/10.1061/(asce)IS.1943-555X.0000210 Liu, J., Yu, X. & Cheah, C. (2014). Evaluation of restrictive competition in PPP projects using real option approach. International Journal of Project Management, 32(3), 473-481. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2013.07.007 Liu, J., Gao, R., & Cheah, C. (2017). Pricing mechanism of early termination of PPP projects based on real option theory. Journal of Management in Engineering, 33(6), 04017035. https://doi.org/10.1061/(asce)me.1943-5479.0000556 Longstaff, F., & Schwartz, E. (2001). Valuing American options by simulation: a simple least-squares approach. The Review of Financial Studies, 14(1), 113-147. https:// doi.org/ 10.1093/rfs/14.1.113 Martins, J., Marques, R., & Cruz, C. (2015). Real options in infrastructure: Revisiting the literature. Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 21(1), 04014026. https://doi.org/ 10.1061/(ASCE)is.1943-555X.0000188 Merton, R. (1973). The theory of rational option pricing. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 4(1), 141-183. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003143 McDonald, R., & Siegel, D. (1986). The value of waiting to invest. Quarterly Journal Economics, 101(4), 707-727. https://doi.org/10.2307/1884175 Myers, S., & Majd, S. (2001). Abandonment value and project life. In Real Options and Investment under Uncertainty: Classical Readings and Recent Contributions. Cambridge, 295-312. Scott, R., & Triantis, G. (2004). Embedded Options and the Case against Compensation in Contract Law. Columbia Law Review, 104, 1428. Song, J., Yu, Y., Jin, L., & Feng, Z. (2018). Early termination compensation under demand uncertainty in public-private partnership projects. International Journal of Strategic Property Management, 22(6), 532-543. https://doi.org/10.3846/ ijspm.2018.6049 Talus, K. (2009). Public–private partnerships in energy–termination of public service concessions and administrative acts in Europe. Journal of World Energy Law & Business, 2(1), 43-67. https://doi.org/10.1093/jwelb/jwn023 Trigeorgis, L. (1996). Real Options: Managerial Flexibility and Strategy in Resource Allocation. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. Xiong, W., & Han, Y. (2021). Incentives of Early Termination Compensation in Public–Private Partnership Projects. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management. 1-13. https://doi.org/10.1109/tem.2021.3074662 Xiong, W., Zhang, X., & Chen, H. (2015). Early-termination compensation in public– private partnership projects. Journal of Construction Engineering & Management, 142(4), 04015098. https://doi.org/10.1061/(asce)co.1943-7862.0001084 Wang, S., Dulaimi, M. & Aguria, M. (2004). Risk management framework for construction projects in developing countries. Construction Management and Economics, 22(3), 237-252. https://doi.org/10.1080/0144619032000124689 Yescombe, E. R. (2002). Principles of Project Finance. Academic Press. Zhang, X., & Xiong, W. (2015). Renegotiation and early-termination in public private partnership. International Journal of Architecture, Engineering & Construction, 4(4), 204-213. http://dx.doi.org/10.7492/ijaec.2015.021 Zapata Quimbayo, C.A., & Mejía Vega, C. A. (2022). Credit risk in infrastructure PPP projects under the real options approach. Construction Management and Economics 41(4), 293-306. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2022.2151023
dc.rights.spa.fl_str_mv	Carlos Andrés Zapata Quimbayo, Carlos Armando Mejía Veja - 2024
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spelling	Zapata Quimbayo, Carlos AndrésMejía Veja, Carlos Armando2024-03-21T11:15:55Z2024-06-07T07:31:21Z2024-03-21T11:15:55Z2024-06-07T07:31:21Z2024-03-21La terminación anticipada es un mecanismo de compensación contractual implementado en proyectos de infraestructura de app, donde los inversionistas privados tienen derecho a abandonar el proyecto para mitigar riesgos como el de demanda. En este artículo utilizamos la teoría de opciones reales para valorar la terminación anticipada como una opción de abandono de un proyecto, en el que el riesgo de demanda y la tarifa de compensación se modelan asumiendo procesos estocásticos correlacionados. Así, se implementa el modelo de valoración de opciones con una solución analítica y se comparan los resultados con la técnica de simulación Monte Carlo. Los resultados confirman los beneficios que el mecanismo contractual ofrece a los inversionistas privados para mitigar riesgos y mejorar el valor del proyecto.Early termination is a contractual compensation mechanism implemented in PPP infrastructure projects where private investors have the right to abandon the project to mitigate risks such as traffic risk. In this paper we used the Real Options Theory to value early termination as an option to abandon a project where both the traffic risk and the compensation fee are modelled assuming correlated stochastic processes. The option pricing model was implemented with an analytical solution and results were compared with the Monte Carlo simulation technique. The results confirm the benefits that the contractual mechanism offers to private investors to mitigate risks, while at the same time improving a project’s value.application/pdf10.18601/17941113.n25.062346-21401794-1113https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/handle/001/15372https://doi.org/10.18601/17941113.n25.06spaUniversidad Externado de Colombiahttps://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/odeon/article/download/9339/15632Núm. 25 , Año 2023 : Julio-Diciembre14125117ODEONAmeyaw, E. & Chan, A. (2015). Evaluation and ranking of risk factors in public–private partnership water supply projects in developing countries using fuzzy synthetic evaluation approach. Expert Systems with Applications, 42(12), 5102-5116. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2015.02.041Ashuri, B., Asce, M., Kashani, H., Molenaar, K., Asce, M., Lee, S. & Lu, J. (2012). Risk-neutral pricing approach for evaluating bot highway projects with government minimum revenue guarantee options. Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 138(4), 545-557. https://doi.org/10.1061/(asce) co.1943-7862.0000447Attarzadeh, M., Chua, D., Beer, M., & Abbott, E. (2017). Options-based negotiation management of PPP–BOT infrastructure projects. Construction Management and Economics, 35(11-12), 676-692. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2017.1325962Black, F., & Scholes, M. (1973). The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. Journal of Political Economy, 81(3), 637-659. https://doi.org/10.1142/97898147595 88_0001Bowe, M., & Lee, D. (2004). Project evaluation in the presence of multiple embedded real options: evidence from the Taiwan High-Speed Rail Project. Journal of Asian Economics, 15(1), 71-98. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.asieco.2003.12.001Brandão, L., & Saraiva, E. (2008). The option value of government guarantees in infrastructure projects. Construction Management and Economics, 26(11), 1171- 1180. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446190802428051Brennan, M., & Schwartz, E. (1985). Evaluating natural resource investments. The Journal of Business, 58(2), 135-157.Buso, M., Dosi, C., & Moretto, M. (2019). Termination fees and contract design in public-private partnerships. Working paper No. 032.2018. https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/191374/1/ndl2018-032.pdfCabero, F., Sánchez, A., & Lara, A. (2017). Default and abandonment option in mo¬torway concessions. Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 23(1), 04016022. https:// doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)is.1943-555X.0000309Carbonara, N., & Pellegrino, R. (2018). Revenue guarantee in public–private partnerships: a win–win model. Construction Management and Economics, 1-15. https:// doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2018.1467028Caselli, S., Marciante, A. & Gatti, S. (2009). Pricing final indemnification payments to private sponsors in project-financed public-private partnerships: An application of real options valuation. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 21(3), 95-106. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6622.2009.00243.xCheah, C., & Liu, J. (2006). Valuing governmental support in infrastructure projects as real options using Monte Carlo simulation. Construction Management and Economics, 24(5), 545-54. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446190500435572Clark, E. & Rousseau, P. (2002). Strategic parameters for capital budgeting when abandonment value is stochastic. Applied Financial Economics, 12(2), 123-130. https://doi.org/10.1080/09603100110088049Cox, J., Ross, S., & Rubinstein, M. (1979). Option pricing: A simplified approach. Journal of Financial Economics, 7(3), 229-263. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304- 405X(79)90015-1Dixit, A., & Pindyck, R. (1994). Investment under Uncertainty. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.Feng, Z., Zhang, S., & Gao, Y. (2015). Modelling the impact of government guarantees on toll charge, road quality and capacity for Build-Operate-Transfer (bot) road projects. Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, 78(1), 54-67. https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.tra.2015.05.006Galilea, P., & Medda, F. (2010). Does the political and economic context influence the success of a transport project? An analysis of transport public–private partnerships. Research in Transportation Economics, 30(1), 102–109. https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.retrec.2010.10.011Garvin, M., & Cheah, C. (2004). Valuation techniques for infrastructure investment decisions. Construction Management and Economics, 22(4), 373-83. https://doi. org/ 10.1080/01446190310001649010Gatti, S. (2008). Project Finance in Theory and Practice. Project Finance in Theory and Practice. Oxford: Academic Press.Giraldo, A. (2019). Valoración del mecanismo de terminación anticipada en los con¬tratos de concesión 4G en Colombia. odeon, (16), 67-95. https://doi.org/10.18601/ 17941113.n16.04Grimsey, D., & Lewis, M. (2002). Evaluating the risks of public private partnerships for infrastructure projects. International Journal of Project Management, 20(2), 107-118. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0263-7863(00)00040-5Guasch, J., Laffont, J., & Straub, S. (2007). Concessions of infrastructure in Latin America: Government-led renegotiation. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 22(7), 1267-1294. https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.987Guasch, J. L., & Straub, S. (2009). Corruption and concession renegotiations.: Evidence from the water and transport sectors in Latin America. Utilities Policy, 17(2), 185-190. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2008.07.003Ho, P., & Liu, L. (2002). An option pricing-based model for evaluating the financial viability of privatized infrastructure projects. Construction Management and Economics, 20(2), 143-156. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446190110110533Igrejas, R., Cordeiro, L. & Brandão, L. (2017). When is abandonment not an option? Dealing with PPP contract and government interests. Advances in Public-Private Partnerships–Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Public-Private Partnerships (pp. 486-498). https://doi.org/10.1061/9780784480267.038Iossa, E., & Martimort, D. (2016). Corruption in PPPS, incentives and contract incom-pleteness. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 44(1), 85-100. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.10.007Iyer, K., & Sagheer, M. (2011). A real options-based traffic risk mitigation model for build-operate-transfer highway projects in India. Construction Management and Economics, 29(8), 771-9. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2011.597412Liu, J., Love, P., Davis, P., Smith, J., & Regan, M. (2015). Conceptual framework for the performance measurement of public-private partnerships. Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 21(1), 04014023. https://doi.org/10.1061/(asce)IS.1943-555X.0000210Liu, J., Yu, X. & Cheah, C. (2014). Evaluation of restrictive competition in PPP projects using real option approach. International Journal of Project Management, 32(3), 473-481. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2013.07.007Liu, J., Gao, R., & Cheah, C. (2017). Pricing mechanism of early termination of PPP projects based on real option theory. Journal of Management in Engineering, 33(6), 04017035. https://doi.org/10.1061/(asce)me.1943-5479.0000556Longstaff, F., & Schwartz, E. (2001). Valuing American options by simulation: a simple least-squares approach. The Review of Financial Studies, 14(1), 113-147. https:// doi.org/ 10.1093/rfs/14.1.113Martins, J., Marques, R., & Cruz, C. (2015). Real options in infrastructure: Revisiting the literature. Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 21(1), 04014026. https://doi.org/ 10.1061/(ASCE)is.1943-555X.0000188Merton, R. (1973). The theory of rational option pricing. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 4(1), 141-183. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003143McDonald, R., & Siegel, D. (1986). The value of waiting to invest. Quarterly Journal Economics, 101(4), 707-727. https://doi.org/10.2307/1884175Myers, S., & Majd, S. (2001). Abandonment value and project life. In Real Options and Investment under Uncertainty: Classical Readings and Recent Contributions. Cambridge, 295-312.Scott, R., & Triantis, G. (2004). Embedded Options and the Case against Compensation in Contract Law. Columbia Law Review, 104, 1428.Song, J., Yu, Y., Jin, L., & Feng, Z. (2018). Early termination compensation under demand uncertainty in public-private partnership projects. International Journal of Strategic Property Management, 22(6), 532-543. https://doi.org/10.3846/ ijspm.2018.6049Talus, K. (2009). Public–private partnerships in energy–termination of public service concessions and administrative acts in Europe. Journal of World Energy Law & Business, 2(1), 43-67. https://doi.org/10.1093/jwelb/jwn023Trigeorgis, L. (1996). Real Options: Managerial Flexibility and Strategy in Resource Allocation. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.Xiong, W., & Han, Y. (2021). Incentives of Early Termination Compensation in Public–Private Partnership Projects. IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management. 1-13. https://doi.org/10.1109/tem.2021.3074662Xiong, W., Zhang, X., & Chen, H. (2015). Early-termination compensation in public– private partnership projects. Journal of Construction Engineering & Management, 142(4), 04015098. https://doi.org/10.1061/(asce)co.1943-7862.0001084Wang, S., Dulaimi, M. & Aguria, M. (2004). Risk management framework for construction projects in developing countries. Construction Management and Economics, 22(3), 237-252. https://doi.org/10.1080/0144619032000124689Yescombe, E. R. (2002). Principles of Project Finance. Academic Press.Zhang, X., & Xiong, W. (2015). Renegotiation and early-termination in public private partnership. International Journal of Architecture, Engineering & Construction, 4(4), 204-213. http://dx.doi.org/10.7492/ijaec.2015.021Zapata Quimbayo, C.A., & Mejía Vega, C. A. (2022). Credit risk in infrastructure PPP projects under the real options approach. Construction Management and Economics 41(4), 293-306. https://doi.org/10.1080/01446193.2022.2151023Carlos Andrés Zapata Quimbayo, Carlos Armando Mejía Veja - 2024info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/odeon/article/view/9339Infrastructure projects;option to abandon;early termination mechanismproyectos de infraestructura;opción de abandono;mecanismo de terminación anticipadaOptimal Early Termination in PPP Projects Based on Real Options TheoryOptimal Early Termination in PPP Projects Based on Real Options TheoryArtículo de revistahttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Textinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleJournal articlehttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ARTREFinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPublicationOREORE.xmltext/xml2571https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/bitstreams/ac5a96ab-98c5-4e02-9974-a545cdbe9df0/download0a084764267452aeded75bbb7656df66MD51001/15372oai:bdigital.uexternado.edu.co:001/153722024-06-07 02:31:21.261http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0Carlos Andrés Zapata Quimbayo, Carlos Armando Mejía Veja - 2024https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.coUniversidad Externado de Colombiametabiblioteca@metabiblioteca.org

Optimal Early Termination in PPP Projects Based on Real Options Theory

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