Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública

En este trabajo se analiza un aspecto ortogonal de Lafont (2020): su rechazo de la tesis rawlsiana de la completitud de la razón pública. Con tal fin, se presenta sucintamente dicha doctrina y el debate que ha generado. Se introduce la posición de Lafont: la razón pública no es suficiente en algunos...

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Autores:
Moreso, J. J.
Tipo de recurso:
Article of journal
Fecha de publicación:
2023
Institución:
Universidad Externado de Colombia
Repositorio:
Biblioteca Digital Universidad Externado de Colombia
Idioma:
spa
OAI Identifier:
oai:bdigital.uexternado.edu.co:001/25493
Acceso en línea:
https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/handle/001/25493
https://doi.org/10.18601/01229893.n55.03
Palabra clave:
Cristina Lafont,
John Rawls,
public reason,
completeness,
the fact of pluralism
Cristina Lafont,
John Rawls,
razón pública,
completitud,
el hecho del pluralismo
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openAccess
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J. J. Moreso - 2023
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dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública
dc.title.translated.eng.fl_str_mv Cristina Lafont on the Completeness of Public Reason
title Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública
spellingShingle Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública
Cristina Lafont,
John Rawls,
public reason,
completeness,
the fact of pluralism
Cristina Lafont,
John Rawls,
razón pública,
completitud,
el hecho del pluralismo
title_short Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública
title_full Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública
title_fullStr Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública
title_full_unstemmed Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública
title_sort Cristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón pública
dc.creator.fl_str_mv Moreso, J. J.
dc.contributor.author.spa.fl_str_mv Moreso, J. J.
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv Cristina Lafont,
John Rawls,
public reason,
completeness,
the fact of pluralism
topic Cristina Lafont,
John Rawls,
public reason,
completeness,
the fact of pluralism
Cristina Lafont,
John Rawls,
razón pública,
completitud,
el hecho del pluralismo
dc.subject.spa.fl_str_mv Cristina Lafont,
John Rawls,
razón pública,
completitud,
el hecho del pluralismo
description En este trabajo se analiza un aspecto ortogonal de Lafont (2020): su rechazo de la tesis rawlsiana de la completitud de la razón pública. Con tal fin, se presenta sucintamente dicha doctrina y el debate que ha generado. Se introduce la posición de Lafont: la razón pública no es suficiente en algunos casos difíciles; aunque ello no significa que debamos acudir a las concepciones comprehensivas, debemos buscar algún tipo de acomodo institucional. Aquí, en cambio, se arguye a favor de la completitud de la razón pública y se presenta una objeción a la posición de Lafont.
publishDate 2023
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2023-03-22T10:51:03Z
2025-04-09T17:54:55Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2023-03-22T10:51:03Z
2025-04-09T17:54:55Z
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 2023-03-22
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv Artículo de revista
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dc.relation.citationedition.spa.fl_str_mv Núm. 55 , Año 2023 : Edición Especial
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dc.relation.ispartofjournal.spa.fl_str_mv Revista Derecho del Estado
dc.relation.references.spa.fl_str_mv Audi, R. The Good and the Right. A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.
Bayles, M. D. Mid-Level Principles and Justification. En Nomos: Am. Soc’y Pol. Legal Phil. Vol. 28, n.º 49, 1986, 49-67.
Beauchamp, T. L. y Childress, J. F. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 4.ª ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
Beauchamp, T. L. y Childress, J. F. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 7.ª ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Chang, R. Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997.
Dworkin, R. In Praise of Theory. En Arizona State Law Journal. Vol. 27, 1997, 353-376 (ahora en Dworkin, R. Justice in Robes. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006, cap. 2).
Dworkin, R. Justice in Robes. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006.
Dworkin, R. Keynote Address: Rawls and the Law. En Fordham Law Review. Vol. 72, 2004, 1387-1405 (ahora en Dworkin, R. Justice in Robes. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006, cap. 9).
Dworkin, R. Life’s Dominion. An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom. London: Harper Collins, 1993.
Dworkin, R.; Nagel, T. y Nozick, R. Assited Suicide: The Philosopher”s Brief. En New York Review of Books. 27 de marzo, 1997.
Finnis, J. The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion: A Reply to Judith Thomson. En Philosophy and Public Affairs. Vol. 2, 1973, 117-145.
Foot, P. The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect. En Oxford Review. Vol. 5, 1967, 1-7.
Freeman, S. Justice and the Social Contract: Essays in Rawlsian Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
Gaus, G. Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Gaus, G. The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Gödel, K. Obras completas. J. Mosterín (trad.). Madrid: Alianza, 1981.
Hart, H. L. A. Punishment and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968.
Henley, K. Abstract Principles, Mid-Level Principles, and the Rule of Law. En Law and Philosophy. Vol. 12, 1993, 121-132.
Kamm, F. M. Creation and Abortion: A Study in Moral and Legal Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
Kamm, F. M. Theory and Analogy in Law. En Arizona State Law Journal. Vol. 29, 1997, 405-426.
Kant, I. Metafísica de las costumbres (1797). A. Cortina y J. Conill (trad.). Madrid: Tecnos, 1989.
Lafont, C. Democracy without Shortcuts. A Participatory Conception of Deliberative Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.
MacIntyre, A. Doctrine of Double Effect. En The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Spring 2019 Edition. Zalta, E. N. (ed.). De próxima publicación en: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/double-effect/
Moreso, J. J. Rawls, el derecho y el hecho del pluralismo. En Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez. Vol. 55, 2021, 49-74.
Moreso, J. J. y Valentini, C. In the Region of Middle Axioms: Judicial Dialogue as Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Mid-Level Principles. En Law and Philosophy. Vol. 40, n.º 5, 2021, 545-583.
Parfit, D. On what Matters. Vols. 1 y 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Parfit, D. On what Matters. Vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
Quong, J. Public Reason. En The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Summer 2022 Edition. Zalta, E. N. (ed.). De próxima publicación en: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/public-reason/
Rawls, J. An Interview with John Rawls. En Commonweal. 25 de septiembre, 1998. Disponible en: https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/interview-john-rawls
Rawls, J. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
Rawls, J. The Idea of Public Reason Revisited. En The University of Chicago Law Review. Vol. 64, n.º 3, 1997.
Raz, J. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.
Reidy, D. Public Political Reason. En Mandle, J. y Roberts-Cady, S. (eds.), John Rawls: Debating the Major Questions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020, 21-34.
Reidy, D. Rawls’s Wide View of Public Reason: Not Wide Enough. En Res Publica. Vol. 6, n.º 1, 2000, 49-72.
Ross, D. The Foundations of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939.
Ross, D. The Right and the Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930.
Sandel, M. Public Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005.
Schwartzman, M. The Completeness of Public Reason. En Politics, Philosophy, & Economics. Vol. 3, n.º 2, 2004, 191-220.
Shiffrin, S. V. Speech, Death, and the Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle. En New York University Law Review. Vol. 78, 2003, 1135-1185.
Sidgwick, H. Practical Ethics. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co, 1909.
Sunstein, C. From Theory to Practice. En Arizona State Law Journal. Vol. 29, 1997, 389-404.
Sunstein, C. Incompletely Theorized Agreements. En Harvard Law Review. Vol. 108, 1995, 1733-1772.
Sunstein, C. Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Thomson, J. J. A Defense of Abortion. En Philosophy & Public Affairs. Vol. 7, n.º 1, 1971, 47-66.
Williams, A. The Alleged Incompleteness of Public Reason. En Res Publica. Vol. 6, n.º 2, 2000, 199-211.
dc.rights.spa.fl_str_mv J. J. Moreso - 2023
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spelling Moreso, J. J.2023-03-22T10:51:03Z2025-04-09T17:54:55Z2023-03-22T10:51:03Z2025-04-09T17:54:55Z2023-03-22En este trabajo se analiza un aspecto ortogonal de Lafont (2020): su rechazo de la tesis rawlsiana de la completitud de la razón pública. Con tal fin, se presenta sucintamente dicha doctrina y el debate que ha generado. Se introduce la posición de Lafont: la razón pública no es suficiente en algunos casos difíciles; aunque ello no significa que debamos acudir a las concepciones comprehensivas, debemos buscar algún tipo de acomodo institucional. Aquí, en cambio, se arguye a favor de la completitud de la razón pública y se presenta una objeción a la posición de Lafont.In this paper, an orthogonal aspect of Lafont (2020) is analysed: her rejection of the Rawlsian thesis of completeness of public reason. For that purpose, such doctrine is succinctly presented and the generated debate too. Lafont’s account is introduced: public reason is not sufficient in some hard cases, but this insufficiency does not mean that we should resort to the comprehensive conceptions, we should looking for some kind of policy of accommodation. In the paper, instead, it is argued in favour of the completeness of public reason and an objection to the Lafont’s account is introduced.application/pdftext/htmltext/xml10.18601/01229893.n55.032346-20510122-9893https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/handle/001/25493https://doi.org/10.18601/01229893.n55.03spaDepartamento de Derecho Constitucionalhttps://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derest/article/download/8589/13957https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derest/article/download/8589/13958https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derest/article/download/8589/13981Núm. 55 , Año 2023 : Edición Especial315515Revista Derecho del EstadoAudi, R. The Good and the Right. A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004.Bayles, M. D. Mid-Level Principles and Justification. En Nomos: Am. Soc’y Pol. Legal Phil. Vol. 28, n.º 49, 1986, 49-67.Beauchamp, T. L. y Childress, J. F. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 4.ª ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.Beauchamp, T. L. y Childress, J. F. Principles of Biomedical Ethics. 7.ª ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.Chang, R. Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997.Dworkin, R. In Praise of Theory. En Arizona State Law Journal. Vol. 27, 1997, 353-376 (ahora en Dworkin, R. Justice in Robes. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006, cap. 2).Dworkin, R. Justice in Robes. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006.Dworkin, R. Keynote Address: Rawls and the Law. En Fordham Law Review. Vol. 72, 2004, 1387-1405 (ahora en Dworkin, R. Justice in Robes. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006, cap. 9).Dworkin, R. Life’s Dominion. An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom. London: Harper Collins, 1993.Dworkin, R.; Nagel, T. y Nozick, R. Assited Suicide: The Philosopher”s Brief. En New York Review of Books. 27 de marzo, 1997.Finnis, J. The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion: A Reply to Judith Thomson. En Philosophy and Public Affairs. Vol. 2, 1973, 117-145.Foot, P. The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of Double Effect. En Oxford Review. Vol. 5, 1967, 1-7.Freeman, S. Justice and the Social Contract: Essays in Rawlsian Political Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.Gaus, G. Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay on Epistemology and Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.Gaus, G. The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.Gödel, K. Obras completas. J. Mosterín (trad.). Madrid: Alianza, 1981.Hart, H. L. A. Punishment and Responsibility. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968.Henley, K. Abstract Principles, Mid-Level Principles, and the Rule of Law. En Law and Philosophy. Vol. 12, 1993, 121-132.Kamm, F. M. Creation and Abortion: A Study in Moral and Legal Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.Kamm, F. M. Theory and Analogy in Law. En Arizona State Law Journal. Vol. 29, 1997, 405-426.Kant, I. Metafísica de las costumbres (1797). A. Cortina y J. Conill (trad.). Madrid: Tecnos, 1989.Lafont, C. Democracy without Shortcuts. A Participatory Conception of Deliberative Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.MacIntyre, A. Doctrine of Double Effect. En The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Spring 2019 Edition. Zalta, E. N. (ed.). De próxima publicación en: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/double-effect/Moreso, J. J. Rawls, el derecho y el hecho del pluralismo. En Anales de la Cátedra Francisco Suárez. Vol. 55, 2021, 49-74.Moreso, J. J. y Valentini, C. In the Region of Middle Axioms: Judicial Dialogue as Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Mid-Level Principles. En Law and Philosophy. Vol. 40, n.º 5, 2021, 545-583.Parfit, D. On what Matters. Vols. 1 y 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.Parfit, D. On what Matters. Vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.Quong, J. Public Reason. En The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Summer 2022 Edition. Zalta, E. N. (ed.). De próxima publicación en: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2022/entries/public-reason/Rawls, J. An Interview with John Rawls. En Commonweal. 25 de septiembre, 1998. Disponible en: https://www.commonwealmagazine.org/interview-john-rawlsRawls, J. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.Rawls, J. The Idea of Public Reason Revisited. En The University of Chicago Law Review. Vol. 64, n.º 3, 1997.Raz, J. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986.Reidy, D. Public Political Reason. En Mandle, J. y Roberts-Cady, S. (eds.), John Rawls: Debating the Major Questions. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020, 21-34.Reidy, D. Rawls’s Wide View of Public Reason: Not Wide Enough. En Res Publica. Vol. 6, n.º 1, 2000, 49-72.Ross, D. The Foundations of Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939.Ross, D. The Right and the Good. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930.Sandel, M. Public Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005.Schwartzman, M. The Completeness of Public Reason. En Politics, Philosophy, & Economics. Vol. 3, n.º 2, 2004, 191-220.Shiffrin, S. V. Speech, Death, and the Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle. En New York University Law Review. Vol. 78, 2003, 1135-1185.Sidgwick, H. Practical Ethics. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co, 1909.Sunstein, C. From Theory to Practice. En Arizona State Law Journal. Vol. 29, 1997, 389-404.Sunstein, C. Incompletely Theorized Agreements. En Harvard Law Review. Vol. 108, 1995, 1733-1772.Sunstein, C. Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.Thomson, J. J. A Defense of Abortion. En Philosophy & Public Affairs. Vol. 7, n.º 1, 1971, 47-66.Williams, A. The Alleged Incompleteness of Public Reason. En Res Publica. Vol. 6, n.º 2, 2000, 199-211.J. J. Moreso - 2023info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/derest/article/view/8589Cristina Lafont,John Rawls,public reason,completeness,the fact of pluralismCristina Lafont,John Rawls,razón pública,completitud,el hecho del pluralismoCristina Lafont sobre la completitud de la razón públicaCristina Lafont on the Completeness of Public ReasonArtículo de revistahttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Textinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleJournal articlehttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ARTREFinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPublicationOREORE.xmltext/xml2498https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/bitstreams/9fedfdec-caa5-45ab-9fd9-3badb3ab0368/download39b820547f05843cf71e5c57706d92fdMD51001/25493oai:bdigital.uexternado.edu.co:001/254932025-04-09 12:54:55.682http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0J. J. Moreso - 2023https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.coUniversidad Externado de Colombiametabiblioteca@metabiblioteca.org

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