Good faith in a sovereign debt restructuring sequential game
This study explores a legal and economic understanding of breach of good faith. First, it starts with a review of bona fide within the sovereign debt restructuring literature. Then, the study moves into a recent and emblematic case where a breach of good faith was invoked by minority creditors. This...
- Autores:
-
Rodríguez Correa , Tomás-Daniel
- Tipo de recurso:
- Article of journal
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2025
- Institución:
- Universidad Externado de Colombia
- Repositorio:
- Biblioteca Digital Universidad Externado de Colombia
- Idioma:
- spa
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- oai:bdigital.uexternado.edu.co:001/25261
- Acceso en línea:
- https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/handle/001/25261
https://doi.org/10.18601/01236458.n63.05
- Palabra clave:
- Sovereign Debt Restructuring,
Good Faith,
Public Debt,
Good Faith Breach,
Law and Economics
reestructuración de deuda soberana,
buena fe,
deuda pública,
incumplimiento de la buena fe,
análisis económico del derecho
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- Tomás-Daniel Rodríguez Correa - 2025
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dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv |
Good faith in a sovereign debt restructuring sequential game |
dc.title.translated.eng.fl_str_mv |
Good faith in a sovereign debt restructuring sequential game |
title |
Good faith in a sovereign debt restructuring sequential game |
spellingShingle |
Good faith in a sovereign debt restructuring sequential game Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Good Faith, Public Debt, Good Faith Breach, Law and Economics reestructuración de deuda soberana, buena fe, deuda pública, incumplimiento de la buena fe, análisis económico del derecho |
title_short |
Good faith in a sovereign debt restructuring sequential game |
title_full |
Good faith in a sovereign debt restructuring sequential game |
title_fullStr |
Good faith in a sovereign debt restructuring sequential game |
title_full_unstemmed |
Good faith in a sovereign debt restructuring sequential game |
title_sort |
Good faith in a sovereign debt restructuring sequential game |
dc.creator.fl_str_mv |
Rodríguez Correa , Tomás-Daniel |
dc.contributor.author.spa.fl_str_mv |
Rodríguez Correa , Tomás-Daniel |
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv |
Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Good Faith, Public Debt, Good Faith Breach, Law and Economics |
topic |
Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Good Faith, Public Debt, Good Faith Breach, Law and Economics reestructuración de deuda soberana, buena fe, deuda pública, incumplimiento de la buena fe, análisis económico del derecho |
dc.subject.spa.fl_str_mv |
reestructuración de deuda soberana, buena fe, deuda pública, incumplimiento de la buena fe, análisis económico del derecho |
description |
This study explores a legal and economic understanding of breach of good faith. First, it starts with a review of bona fide within the sovereign debt restructuring literature. Then, the study moves into a recent and emblematic case where a breach of good faith was invoked by minority creditors. This case illustrates controversial legal techniques that may be used for enforcing a bond restructuring which in turn rises arguments related to breach of good faith compliance. Next, the research constructs a sequential game for setting the limits of good faith in sovereign debt workouts. The concepts of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimal are examined in two scenarios: an unsupervised debt restructuring process, and a supervised restructuring process. After this, the article studies how good faith compliance is connected to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimality. Finally, the last part briefly discusses how the legal and economic approach to a breach of good faith could be implemented in legal practice. |
publishDate |
2025 |
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv |
2025-03-26T14:28:59Z 2025-04-09T17:03:17Z |
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv |
2025-03-26T14:28:59Z 2025-04-09T17:03:17Z |
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv |
2025-03-26 |
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Artículo de revista |
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Journal article |
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10.18601/01236458.n63.05 |
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2346-2078 |
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0123-6458 |
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https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/contexto/article/download/10293/17588 |
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Núm. 63 , Año 2025 : Enero-Junio |
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Con-texto |
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Abbas, S. A., Pienkowski, A., & Rogoff, K. S. (2019). Sovereign debt : a guide for economists and practitioners (S. A. Abbas, A. Pienkowski, & K. S. Rogoff, Eds.). OUP Oxford. Borensztein, E., & Panizza, U. (2009). “The Costs of Sovereign Default”. IMF Staff Papers, 56(4), pp. 683-741. https://doi.org/10.1057/imfsp.2009.21 Bratton, W. lliam W., & Gulati, M. G. (2004). “Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of Creditors”. Vanderbilt Law Review, 57(1). https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2275/ Buchheit, L. C., & Gulati, M. (2021). “The Duty of Creditors to Cooperate in Sovereign Debt Workouts (with Spanish Translation)”. In Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2021-51, Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2021-26 . https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3950529 Buchheit, L. C., & Gulati, M. (2022). Enforcing Comparable Treatment in Sovereign Debt Workouts. University of Virginia School of Law. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=4229061 Buchheit, Lee; Chabert, Guillaume; Delong, Chanda; Zettelmeyer, Jeromin (2020). “The restructuring process”. In K. Abbas, S. A.; Pienkowski, Alex; Rogoff (Ed.), Sovereign debt. Oxoford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198850823.003.0009 City of Pontiac Policemen’s & Firemen’s Retirement System v. UBS AG (2014). https://casetext.com/case/city-of-pontiac-policemens-firemens-ret-sys-v-ubs-ag Clark, I., & Lyratzakis, D. (2021). “Towards a more robust sovereign debt restructuring architecture: innovations from Ecuador and Argentina”. Capital Markets Law Journal, 16(1), pp. 31-44. https://doi.org/10.1093/cmlj/kmaa032 Complaint. Contrarian Emerging Markets, L.P., GMO Emerging Country Debt Fund, GMO Emerging Country Debt Investment Fund PLC, and GMO Emerging Country Debt (UCITS) Fund, Individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, against The Repub (2020). De la Cruz, A., & Lagos, I. (2021). “CACs at Work: What Next?”. SSRN Electronic Journal, ii. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3765825 De La Cruz, A., & Lagos, I. (2021). CACs at work: What next? Lessons from the Argentine and Ecuadorian 2020 debt restructurings. Capital Markets Law Journal, 16(2), pp. 226-248. https://doi.org/10.1093/cmlj/kmab006 Dennis Edward Myers and Another v Kestrel Acquisitions Ltd and Others (2015). Goldman, M. (2014). “Good Faith and Transparency in Sovereign Debt Workouts”. In Second Session of the UNCTAD Working Group on a Debt Workout Mechanism. https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/gdsddf2014misc3_en.pdf International Monetary Fund (2021). Ex-post evaluation of exceptional access under the 2018 stand-by arrangement – press release and staff report. 21. International Monetary Fund (2022a). Pres Realease 22/295 IMF Staff Reaches Staff-Level Agree-ment on an Extended Fund Facility Arrangement with Sri Lanka. 2–5. https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2022/09/01/pr22295-imf-reaches-staff-level-agreement-on-an-extended-fund-facility-arrangement-with-sri-lanka International Monetary Fund (2022b). “Reviews of the fund’s sovereign arrears policies and perimeter”. In IMF Policy Papers. http://www.imf.org/external/pp/ppindex.aspx International Monetary Fund. (2022c). Zambia: request for an arrangement under the extended credit facility – press release; staff report; staff supplement; staff statement; and statement by the executive director for Zambia. In IMF Staff Country Reports No 22/292. https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484328255.002 Katz v. Oak Industries, Inc. (1986). https://advance-lexis-com.ezproxy.library.qmul.ac.uk/search/?pdmfid=1519360&crid=07f44bde-bde1-425b-8ec4-24e0beeddf6c&pdsearchterms=Katz+v.+Oak+Indus.%2C+Inc.+-+508+A.2d+873+(Del.+Ch.+1986)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtype Kirchner, C., & Ehmke, D. (2012). “Private Ordering in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Reforming the London Club”. Oxford University Comparative Law Forum. https://ouclf.law.ox.ac.uk/private-ordering-in-sovereign-debt-restructuring-reforming-the-london-club/#fn9sym Lastra, R., & Buchheit, L. (2014). Sovereign debt management (R. M. Lastra & L. Buchheit, Eds.; 1st ed.). OUP. Lastra, R. M., & Bodellini, M. (2018). Soft Law and Sovereign Debt. https://unctad.org/system/ files/non-official-document/SOFT LAW AND SOVEREIGN DEBT.pdf Li, Y. (2015). “Inter-creditor equity in sovereign debt restructuring: towards the establishment of a multilateral legal framework”. In Leiden University Repository. https://www.universit-eitleiden.nl/en/research/research-output/law/inter-creditor-equity-in-sovereign-debt-restructuring-towards-the-establishment-of-a-multilateral-legal-framework Principles Consultative Group (2010). Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring - Report on implementation by the principles consultative group (Issue October). https://www.iif. com/Advocacy_old/Policy-Issues/Principles-for-Stable-Capital-Flows-and-Fair-Debt- Restructuring Principles Consultative Group (2021). Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring - 2021 Annual Report Featuring an Interim Report on Updating the Principles with Contribution from the Principles Cosultative Group (Issue October). https://www.iif.com/Publications/ ID/4634/2021-PCG-Report-on-the-Implementation-of-the-Principles The Institute of International Finance (2005). Principles for stable capital flows and fair debt restructurings in Emerging Markets (Issue March). https://www.iif.com/file/4321/download?token=mBvJtcaR The Institute of International Finance (2012). Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Re-structuring - with 2012 addendum. The Republic of Ecuador (2020a). Ecuador´s debt management policy in light of the global health crisis – Press release 25-03-2020. The Republic of Ecuador (2020b). Ecuador invites all bond holders to join the majority in endorsing the Republic’s proposal. https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/ecuador-invites-all-bond-holders-to-join-the-majority-in-endorsing-the-republics-proposal-301097263.html The Republic of Ecuador (2020c). The Republic of Ecuador announces commencement of consent solicitation and invitation to exchange. Press realease July 20, 2020. https://gbsc-usa.com/ecuador/ The Republic of Ecuador (2020d). The Republic of Ecuador responds to certain press reports with respect to its invitation to consent and exchange. Press realease July 24, 2020. https://gbsc-usa.com/ecuador/ The Republic of Ecuador (2022). The Republic of Ecuador responds to legal action filed by Contrarian Capital Management and GMO. July 29, 2020. https://gbsc-usa.com/ecuador/ Thomas, D., & Garcia-Fronti, J. (2007). “Good Faith in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The Evolution of an Open Norm in ‘Localised’ Contexts?”. WEF Working Paper N° 0017, March. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1026248 Trebesch, C., Papaioannou, M. G., & Das, U. S. (2012). “Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950- 2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts”. IMF Working Papers, 12(203), i. https://doi.org/10.5089/9781475505535.001 United States District Court Southern District of New York. (2020). Contrarian Emerging Markets L.P., GMO Emerging Country Debt Fund, GMO Emerging Country Debt Investment Fund PLC, and GMO Emerging Country Debt (UCITS) Fund, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, V. The Republic of Ecuador. |
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Rodríguez Correa , Tomás-Daniel2025-03-26T14:28:59Z2025-04-09T17:03:17Z2025-03-26T14:28:59Z2025-04-09T17:03:17Z2025-03-26This study explores a legal and economic understanding of breach of good faith. First, it starts with a review of bona fide within the sovereign debt restructuring literature. Then, the study moves into a recent and emblematic case where a breach of good faith was invoked by minority creditors. This case illustrates controversial legal techniques that may be used for enforcing a bond restructuring which in turn rises arguments related to breach of good faith compliance. Next, the research constructs a sequential game for setting the limits of good faith in sovereign debt workouts. The concepts of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimal are examined in two scenarios: an unsupervised debt restructuring process, and a supervised restructuring process. After this, the article studies how good faith compliance is connected to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimality. Finally, the last part briefly discusses how the legal and economic approach to a breach of good faith could be implemented in legal practice.This study explores a legal and economic understanding of breach of good faith. First, it starts with a review of bona fide within the sovereign debt restructuring literature. Then, the study moves into a recent and emblematic case where a breach of good faith was invoked by minority creditors. This case illustrates controversial legal techniques that may be used for enforcing a bond restructuring which in turn rises arguments related to breach of good faith compliance. Next, the research constructs a sequential game for setting the limits of good faith in sovereign debt workouts. The concepts of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimal are examined in two scenarios: an unsupervised debt restructuring process, and a supervised restructuring process. After this, the article studies how good faith compliance is connected to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and Pareto optimality. Finally, the last part briefly discusses how the legal and economic approach to a breach of good faith could be implemented in legal practice.application/pdf10.18601/01236458.n63.052346-20780123-6458https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/handle/001/25261https://doi.org/10.18601/01236458.n63.05spaDepartamento de Derecho Económicohttps://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/contexto/article/download/10293/17588Núm. 63 , Año 2025 : Enero-Junio946371Con-textoAbbas, S. A., Pienkowski, A., & Rogoff, K. S. (2019). Sovereign debt : a guide for economists and practitioners (S. A. Abbas, A. Pienkowski, & K. S. Rogoff, Eds.). OUP Oxford.Borensztein, E., & Panizza, U. (2009). “The Costs of Sovereign Default”. IMF Staff Papers, 56(4), pp. 683-741. https://doi.org/10.1057/imfsp.2009.21Bratton, W. lliam W., & Gulati, M. G. (2004). “Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of Creditors”. Vanderbilt Law Review, 57(1). https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2275/Buchheit, L. C., & Gulati, M. (2021). “The Duty of Creditors to Cooperate in Sovereign Debt Workouts (with Spanish Translation)”. In Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2021-51, Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2021-26 . https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3950529Buchheit, L. C., & Gulati, M. (2022). Enforcing Comparable Treatment in Sovereign Debt Workouts. University of Virginia School of Law. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ id=4229061Buchheit, Lee; Chabert, Guillaume; Delong, Chanda; Zettelmeyer, Jeromin (2020). “The restructuring process”. In K. Abbas, S. A.; Pienkowski, Alex; Rogoff (Ed.), Sovereign debt. Oxoford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198850823.003.0009City of Pontiac Policemen’s & Firemen’s Retirement System v. UBS AG (2014). https://casetext.com/case/city-of-pontiac-policemens-firemens-ret-sys-v-ubs-agClark, I., & Lyratzakis, D. (2021). “Towards a more robust sovereign debt restructuring architecture: innovations from Ecuador and Argentina”. Capital Markets Law Journal, 16(1), pp. 31-44. https://doi.org/10.1093/cmlj/kmaa032Complaint. Contrarian Emerging Markets, L.P., GMO Emerging Country Debt Fund, GMO Emerging Country Debt Investment Fund PLC, and GMO Emerging Country Debt (UCITS) Fund, Individually and on Behalf of Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiffs, against The Repub (2020).De la Cruz, A., & Lagos, I. (2021). “CACs at Work: What Next?”. SSRN Electronic Journal, ii. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3765825De La Cruz, A., & Lagos, I. (2021). CACs at work: What next? Lessons from the Argentine and Ecuadorian 2020 debt restructurings. Capital Markets Law Journal, 16(2), pp. 226-248. https://doi.org/10.1093/cmlj/kmab006Dennis Edward Myers and Another v Kestrel Acquisitions Ltd and Others (2015).Goldman, M. (2014). “Good Faith and Transparency in Sovereign Debt Workouts”. In Second Session of the UNCTAD Working Group on a Debt Workout Mechanism. https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/gdsddf2014misc3_en.pdfInternational Monetary Fund (2021). Ex-post evaluation of exceptional access under the 2018 stand-by arrangement – press release and staff report. 21.International Monetary Fund (2022a). Pres Realease 22/295 IMF Staff Reaches Staff-Level Agree-ment on an Extended Fund Facility Arrangement with Sri Lanka. 2–5. https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2022/09/01/pr22295-imf-reaches-staff-level-agreement-on-an-extended-fund-facility-arrangement-with-sri-lankaInternational Monetary Fund (2022b). “Reviews of the fund’s sovereign arrears policies and perimeter”. In IMF Policy Papers. http://www.imf.org/external/pp/ppindex.aspxInternational Monetary Fund. (2022c). Zambia: request for an arrangement under the extended credit facility – press release; staff report; staff supplement; staff statement; and statement by the executive director for Zambia. In IMF Staff Country Reports No 22/292. https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484328255.002Katz v. Oak Industries, Inc. (1986). https://advance-lexis-com.ezproxy.library.qmul.ac.uk/search/?pdmfid=1519360&crid=07f44bde-bde1-425b-8ec4-24e0beeddf6c&pdsearchterms=Katz+v.+Oak+Indus.%2C+Inc.+-+508+A.2d+873+(Del.+Ch.+1986)&pdstartin=hlct%3A1%3A1&pdtypeofsearch=searchboxclick&pdsearchtypeKirchner, C., & Ehmke, D. (2012). “Private Ordering in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: Reforming the London Club”. Oxford University Comparative Law Forum. https://ouclf.law.ox.ac.uk/private-ordering-in-sovereign-debt-restructuring-reforming-the-london-club/#fn9symLastra, R., & Buchheit, L. (2014). Sovereign debt management (R. M. Lastra & L. Buchheit, Eds.; 1st ed.). OUP.Lastra, R. M., & Bodellini, M. (2018). Soft Law and Sovereign Debt. https://unctad.org/system/ files/non-official-document/SOFT LAW AND SOVEREIGN DEBT.pdfLi, Y. (2015). “Inter-creditor equity in sovereign debt restructuring: towards the establishment of a multilateral legal framework”. In Leiden University Repository. https://www.universit-eitleiden.nl/en/research/research-output/law/inter-creditor-equity-in-sovereign-debt-restructuring-towards-the-establishment-of-a-multilateral-legal-frameworkPrinciples Consultative Group (2010). Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring - Report on implementation by the principles consultative group (Issue October). https://www.iif. com/Advocacy_old/Policy-Issues/Principles-for-Stable-Capital-Flows-and-Fair-Debt- RestructuringPrinciples Consultative Group (2021). Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring - 2021 Annual Report Featuring an Interim Report on Updating the Principles with Contribution from the Principles Cosultative Group (Issue October). https://www.iif.com/Publications/ ID/4634/2021-PCG-Report-on-the-Implementation-of-the-PrinciplesThe Institute of International Finance (2005). Principles for stable capital flows and fair debt restructurings in Emerging Markets (Issue March). https://www.iif.com/file/4321/download?token=mBvJtcaRThe Institute of International Finance (2012). Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Re-structuring - with 2012 addendum.The Republic of Ecuador (2020a). Ecuador´s debt management policy in light of the global health crisis – Press release 25-03-2020.The Republic of Ecuador (2020b). Ecuador invites all bond holders to join the majority in endorsing the Republic’s proposal. https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/ecuador-invites-all-bond-holders-to-join-the-majority-in-endorsing-the-republics-proposal-301097263.htmlThe Republic of Ecuador (2020c). The Republic of Ecuador announces commencement of consent solicitation and invitation to exchange. Press realease July 20, 2020. https://gbsc-usa.com/ecuador/The Republic of Ecuador (2020d). The Republic of Ecuador responds to certain press reports with respect to its invitation to consent and exchange. Press realease July 24, 2020. https://gbsc-usa.com/ecuador/The Republic of Ecuador (2022). The Republic of Ecuador responds to legal action filed by Contrarian Capital Management and GMO. July 29, 2020. https://gbsc-usa.com/ecuador/Thomas, D., & Garcia-Fronti, J. (2007). “Good Faith in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: The Evolution of an Open Norm in ‘Localised’ Contexts?”. WEF Working Paper N° 0017, March. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1026248Trebesch, C., Papaioannou, M. G., & Das, U. S. (2012). “Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950- 2010: Literature Survey, Data, and Stylized Facts”. IMF Working Papers, 12(203), i. https://doi.org/10.5089/9781475505535.001United States District Court Southern District of New York. (2020). Contrarian Emerging Markets L.P., GMO Emerging Country Debt Fund, GMO Emerging Country Debt Investment Fund PLC, and GMO Emerging Country Debt (UCITS) Fund, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, V. The Republic of Ecuador.Tomás-Daniel Rodríguez Correa - 2025info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/contexto/article/view/10293Sovereign Debt Restructuring,Good Faith,Public Debt,Good Faith Breach,Law and Economicsreestructuración de deuda soberana,buena fe,deuda pública,incumplimiento de la buena fe,análisis económico del derechoGood faith in a sovereign debt restructuring sequential gameGood faith in a sovereign debt restructuring sequential gameArtículo de revistahttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Textinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleJournal articlehttp://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ARTREFinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPublicationOREORE.xmltext/xml2511https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/bitstreams/e2541220-652c-42a9-b8ac-2f6fda15bd20/download3ef14510c1adabe1b970fc4611bfbb9aMD51001/25261oai:bdigital.uexternado.edu.co:001/252612025-04-09 12:03:17.915http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0Tomás-Daniel Rodríguez Correa - 2025https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.coUniversidad Externado de Colombiametabiblioteca@metabiblioteca.org |