South Korea’s leaders’ perceptions and the decision of hedging: Assessing China, the US and North Korea’s role

La competencia geoestratégica entre la red de seguridad liderada por Estados Unidos en el Indo-Pacífico y China se está intensi­ficando. En medio de la rivalidad hegemó­nica entre estos dos países, Corea del Sur surge como un actor que busca encontrar su lugar en esta creciente rivalidad entre Washi...

Full description

Autores:
Silva Viana , Thaisa da
Gonçalves de Oliveira , Alana Camoça
Silveira Nummer, Martha
Tipo de recurso:
Article of journal
Fecha de publicación:
2024
Institución:
Universidad Externado de Colombia
Repositorio:
Biblioteca Digital Universidad Externado de Colombia
Idioma:
spa
OAI Identifier:
oai:bdigital.uexternado.edu.co:001/25285
Acceso en línea:
https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/handle/001/25285
https://doi.org/10.18601/16577558.n41.04
Palabra clave:
South Korea;
hedging;
neoclassical realism;
leaders’ perceptions
Corea del Sur;
hedging;
realismo neoclásico;
percepciones de líderes
Rights
openAccess
License
Thaisa da Silva Viana , Alana Camoça Gonçalves de Oliveira , Martha Silveira Nummer - 2024
id uexternad2_0ce89d10b44b757e4ae7ef47e6b8eba9
oai_identifier_str oai:bdigital.uexternado.edu.co:001/25285
network_acronym_str uexternad2
network_name_str Biblioteca Digital Universidad Externado de Colombia
repository_id_str
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv South Korea’s leaders’ perceptions and the decision of hedging: Assessing China, the US and North Korea’s role
dc.title.translated.eng.fl_str_mv South Korea’s leaders’ perceptions and the decision of hedging: Assessing China, the US and North Korea’s role
title South Korea’s leaders’ perceptions and the decision of hedging: Assessing China, the US and North Korea’s role
spellingShingle South Korea’s leaders’ perceptions and the decision of hedging: Assessing China, the US and North Korea’s role
South Korea;
hedging;
neoclassical realism;
leaders’ perceptions
Corea del Sur;
hedging;
realismo neoclásico;
percepciones de líderes
title_short South Korea’s leaders’ perceptions and the decision of hedging: Assessing China, the US and North Korea’s role
title_full South Korea’s leaders’ perceptions and the decision of hedging: Assessing China, the US and North Korea’s role
title_fullStr South Korea’s leaders’ perceptions and the decision of hedging: Assessing China, the US and North Korea’s role
title_full_unstemmed South Korea’s leaders’ perceptions and the decision of hedging: Assessing China, the US and North Korea’s role
title_sort South Korea’s leaders’ perceptions and the decision of hedging: Assessing China, the US and North Korea’s role
dc.creator.fl_str_mv Silva Viana , Thaisa da
Gonçalves de Oliveira , Alana Camoça
Silveira Nummer, Martha
dc.contributor.author.spa.fl_str_mv Silva Viana , Thaisa da
Gonçalves de Oliveira , Alana Camoça
Silveira Nummer, Martha
dc.subject.eng.fl_str_mv South Korea;
hedging;
neoclassical realism;
leaders’ perceptions
topic South Korea;
hedging;
neoclassical realism;
leaders’ perceptions
Corea del Sur;
hedging;
realismo neoclásico;
percepciones de líderes
dc.subject.spa.fl_str_mv Corea del Sur;
hedging;
realismo neoclásico;
percepciones de líderes
description La competencia geoestratégica entre la red de seguridad liderada por Estados Unidos en el Indo-Pacífico y China se está intensi­ficando. En medio de la rivalidad hegemó­nica entre estos dos países, Corea del Sur surge como un actor que busca encontrar su lugar en esta creciente rivalidad entre Washington y Pekín. A pesar de ser un socio estratégico formal de Estados Uni­dos, es común en la literatura académica argumentar que Seúl ha mostrado un com­portamiento similar al hedging a lo largo de los años. En este artículo demostramos que el entorno estratégico, caracterizado por niveles variados de percepción de ame­nazas, y las orientaciones políticas de los líderes respecto a Corea del Norte son cru­ciales para dar forma al comportamien­to estratégico de Corea del Sur (hedging, balancing o bandwagoning). Evaluamos el comportamiento de Corea del Sur utili­zando un análisis realista neoclásico de las percepciones de sus líderes respecto a Corea del Norte, Estados Unidos y China. Las variables independientes incluyen la distri­bución de poder en el sistema internacional, el contexto regional, la interdependencia económica y la red de alianzas de Estados Unidos. Nuestras variables intervinientes son las percepciones de los líderes, especí­ficamente sus evaluaciones de riesgo, y las imágenes que guían sus decisiones de hed­ging, balancing o bandwagoning con China y Estados Unidos. La investigación se llevó a cabo a través de un análisis bibliográfico y un examen de documentos oficiales, inclui­dos libros blancos, informes de defensa y discursos oficiales. Un hallazgo clave es que comprender el comportamiento de seguri­dad de Seúl requiere un examen cuidadoso de las acciones de Corea del Norte. Además, la decisión de hacer hedging o balancing no está impulsada por factores ideológicos; más bien, proviene de la percepción de cuál de los dos –China o Estados Unidos– apoya mejor las estrategias políticas de Seúl y sus relaciones esperadas con Pyongyang.
publishDate 2024
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2024-12-03T10:38:49Z
2025-04-09T17:18:09Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2024-12-03T10:38:49Z
2025-04-09T17:18:09Z
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 2024-12-03
dc.type.spa.fl_str_mv Artículo de revista
dc.type.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1
dc.type.coar.spa.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.type.coarversion.spa.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
dc.type.content.spa.fl_str_mv Text
dc.type.driver.spa.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
dc.type.local.eng.fl_str_mv Journal article
dc.type.version.spa.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
format http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv 10.18601/16577558.n41.04
dc.identifier.eissn.none.fl_str_mv 2346-2132
dc.identifier.issn.none.fl_str_mv 1657-7558
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/handle/001/25285
dc.identifier.url.none.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.18601/16577558.n41.04
identifier_str_mv 10.18601/16577558.n41.04
2346-2132
1657-7558
url https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/handle/001/25285
https://doi.org/10.18601/16577558.n41.04
dc.language.iso.spa.fl_str_mv spa
language spa
dc.relation.bitstream.none.fl_str_mv https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/oasis/article/download/10021/17524
https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/oasis/article/download/10021/17525
dc.relation.citationedition.spa.fl_str_mv Núm. 41 , Año 2025 : Enero-Junio
dc.relation.citationendpage.none.fl_str_mv 67
dc.relation.citationissue.spa.fl_str_mv 41
dc.relation.citationstartpage.none.fl_str_mv 43
dc.relation.ispartofjournal.spa.fl_str_mv Oasis
dc.relation.references.spa.fl_str_mv Abbondanza, G. (2022). Whither the Indo-Pacific? Middle power strategies from Australia, South Korea, and Indonesia. International Affairs, 98(2), 403-421.
Buzo, A. (2002). The making of modern Korea. Routledge.
Cha, V., and Pardo, R. P. (2023). Coreia: Uma breve história do Norte e do Sul [A brief history of North and South Korea]. Ideias de Ler.
Cha, V. D. (2009). Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. alliance system in Asia. International Security, 34(3), 158-196.
Chae, H., & Kim, S. (2008). Conservatives and progressives in South Korea. The Washington Quarterly, 31(4), 77-95.
Choo, J. (2019). Conservative and progressive stances on China and their impact on South Korea-China relations. In M. Milani, A. Fiori, and M. Dian (Eds.), The Korean paradox: Domestic political divide and foreign policy in South Korea (pp. 88-105). Routledge.
Choo, J. (2020). South Korea’s China policy (EAI Background Brief No. 1534). National University of Singapore, East Asian Institute. https://research.nus.edu.sg/eai/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2020/12/eaibb-No.-1534-South-Koreas-China-policy-2.pdf
Christensen, T. (2015). The China challenge: Shaping the choices of a rising power. W. W. Norton & Company.
Christensen, T. J., and Snyder, J. (1990). Chain gangs and passed bucks: Predicting alliance patterns in multipolarity. International Organization, 44, 137-168.
Han, S. (2008). From engagement to hedging: South Korea’s new China policy. Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 20(4), 335-351.
He, K., and Feng, H. (2008). If not soft balancing, then what? Reconsidering soft balancing and US policy toward China. Security Studies, 17(2), 269-305.
He, K. (2012). Undermining adversaries: Unipolarity, threat perception, and negative balancing strategies after the Cold War. European Journal of International Relations, 18(1), 154-191.
Heo, J. Y. (2020). Contentious narratives on national identity of South Korea: How to understand the self and the significant others, North Korea and the US [Doctoral dissertation, Freie Universität Berlin]. https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/27659
Huynh, T.-S. (2021). Bolstering middle power standing: South Korea’s response to U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy from Trump to Biden. The Pacific Review, 36(1), 32-60.
Hwang, J. (2012). Seoul and Beijing’s troubled ties. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2012/01/seoul-and-beijings-troubled-ties/
Kang, D. (2019). South Korea, partisan politics, and the United States. In M. Milani, A. Fiori, and M. Dian (Eds.), The Korean paradox: Domestic political divide and foreign policy in South Korea (pp. 69-87). Routledge.
Kim, H. (2022). South Korea’s response to the BRI: Hedging amidst change and continuity in the international system. In The belt and road initiative in Asia, Africa, and Europe. Routledge.
Kim, L. (2018). South Korea’s nuclear hedging? The Washington Quarterly, 41(1), 115-133.
Kim, Y. S. (2008). Lee proposes shuttle diplomacy with N. Korea. Korea Times. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/05/103_20547.html
Koga, K. (2018). The concept of “hedging” revisited: The case of Japan’s foreign policy strategy in East Asia’s power shift. International Studies Review, 20(4), 633-660.
Kuik, C. C. (2021). Getting hedging right: A small-state perspective. China International Strategy Review, 3, 300-315.
Lee, J. Y. (2017). Hedging strategies of the middle powers in East Asian security: The cases of South Korea and Malaysia. East Asia, 34, 23-37.
Lee, M.-B. (2008). 제17대 대통령 취임사. [17th president’s inauguration speech]. https://www.pa.go.kr/research/contents/speech/index.jsp?spMode=view&catid=c_pa02062&artid=1310127
Lee, M.-B. (2009). 민주 평화 통일자 문회 의 14기 출범식 축사. https://www.pa.go.kr/research/contents/speech/index.jsp?spMode=view&catid=c_pa02062&artid=1330156
Lee, M.-B. (2012). 제88차 라디오·인터넷 연설–북 한이 살길은 스스로 핵무기를 포기하고 개혁·개방으로 국제사회와 협력하는 것 입니다.
Lee, S.-J. (2012). South Korea as new middle power seeking complex diplomacy. EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper 25. East Asian Institute.
Lee, Y. (2021). Riding the tide: Assessing South Korea’s hedging strategy through regional security initiatives. The Pacific Review, 36(3), 494-520. Maduz, L. (2023). Explaining Korea’s positioning in the US–China strategic competition. In M. Milani, A. Fiori, and M. Dian (Eds.), China-US competition (pp. 247-273). Springer International Publishing.
Marston, H. S. (2024). Navigating great power competition: A neoclassical realist view of hedging. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 24(1), 29-63.
Medeiros, E. S. (2005). Strategic hedging and the future of Asia-Pacific stability. Washington Quarterly, 29(1), 145-167.
Milani, M. (2019). Progressive and conservative visions of inter-Korean relations. In M. Milani, A. Fiori, and M. Dian (Eds.), The Korean paradox: Domestic political divide and foreign policy in South Korea (pp. 54-68). Routledge.
Minister of Unification (2017). Moon Jae-in’s policy on the Korean Peninsula: Three goals. https://web.archive.org/web/20200522081715/https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/policylssues/koreanpeninsula/goals/
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008). Diplomatic White Paper 2008. Republic of Korea. South Korea. https://www.mnd.go.kr.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011). Diplomatic White Paper 2011. Republic of Korea. South Korea. https://www.mnd.go.kr.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012). Diplomatic White Paper 2012. Republic of Korea. South Korea. https://www.mnd.go.kr.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018). Diplomatic White Paper 2018. Republic of Korea. South Korea. https://www.mnd.go.kr.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2019). Diplomatic White Paper 2019. Republic of Korea. South Korea. https://www.mnd.go.kr.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020). Diplomatic White Paper 2020. Republic of Korea. South Korea. https://www.mnd.go.kr.
Ministry of National Defense (2008). Defense White Paper 2008. Republic of Korea. South Korea. https://www.mnd.go.kr.
Ministry of National Defense (2011). Diplomatic White Paper 2011. South Korea. https://www.mnd.go.kr.
Ministry of National Defense (2012). Defense White Paper 2012. South Korea. https://www.mnd. go.kr.
Ministry of National Defense (2018). Defense White Paper 2018. South Korea.
Ministry of National Defense (2018). Diplomatic White Paper 2018. South Korea.
Ministry of National Defense (2019). Diplomatic White Paper 2019. South Korea. https://www.mnd.go.kr.
Ministry of National Defense (2020). Diplomatic White Paper 2020. South Korea.
Ministry of National Defense (2021). Defense White Paper 2020. South Korea. https://www.mnd.go.kr.
Mo, J. (2016). South Korea’s middle power diplomacy: A case of growing compatibility between regional and global roles. International Journal, 71(4), 587-607.
Moon, J. (2017a). 6·15 남북공동선언 17주년 기념식. 문대통령연설문집본문(상권). https://www.pa.go.kr/research/contents/speech/index.jsp?spMode=view&catid=c_ pa02062&artid=1401711
Moon, J. (2017b). 제19대 대통령 취임식. 문 대통령연설문집본 문 (상 권 ) . ht tps : // www.pa.go.kr/research/contents/speech/index.jsp?spMode=view&catid=c_pa02062&artid=1401691
Moon, J. (2018). 2018년 신년 기자회견. 문 대통령연설문집본 문 (하 권 ) . ht tps : // www.pa.go.kr/research/contents/speech/index.jsp?spMode=view&catid=c_pa02062&artid=1401845
Mosler, H. B. (2022). Lessons learned? South Korea’s foreign policy toward North Korea under the Moon Jae-in administration (Working Papers on East Asian Studies, No. 132).
Murphy, A. M. (2017). Great power rivalries, domestic politics, and Southeast Asian foreign policy: Exploring the linkages. Asian Security, 13(3), 165-182.
Nummer, M. S., & Oliveira, A. C. G. de. (2024). As estratégias de hedging na política de segurança sul-coreana: Uma análise realista neoclássica sobre as percepções sul-coreanas acerca da China entre 2013-2022. Meridiano 47–Journal of Global Studies, 24.
Oliveira, A. C. G. de. (2019). Entre o sol, a águia e o dragão: Dinâmicas de poder e segurança entre Japão, Estados Unidos e China no Leste Asiático e o estudo de caso das ilhas Senkaku/Diaoyu no século XXI [Doctoral dissertation, UFRJ].
Park, B. S. (2017). South Korea’s “three no’s” announcement key to restoring relations with China. The Hankyoreh. https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/817213.html.
Park, C. K. (2021). South Korea doesn’t need to pick between the US and China, says presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3161488/south-korea-doesnt-need-pick-between-us-china-says-presidential
Park, J. (2015). Korea’s hedging strategy between the United States and China. In G. Rozman (Ed.), Joint U.S.-Korea academic studies (vol. 26, pp. 59-75). Korea Economic Institute of America.
Park, J. (2016). Korea between the US and China: How does hedging work? In Joint US-K adjustment and the rise of China: Power and politics in East Asia (pp. 41-68). Cornell University Press.
Paul, T. V. (2005). Soft balancing in the age of U.S. primacy. International Security, 30(1), 46-71.
Ripsman, N. M., Taliaferro, J. W., & Lobell, S. E. (2016). Neoclassical realist theory of international politics. Oxford University Press.
Rose, G. (1998). Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy. World Politics, 51(1), 145-177
Shin, G.-W., & Moon, R. J. (2017). South Korea after impeachment. Journal of Democracy, 28(4), 117-131.
Snyder, S. A. (2018). South Korea at the crossroads: Autonomy and alliance in an era of rival powers. Columbia University Press.
Terazawa, T. (2023). How Japan solved its rare earth minerals dependency issue. World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/10/japan-rare-earth-minerals/
Tessman, B. (2012). System structure and state strategy: Adding hedging to the menu. Security Studies, 21(2), 192-231.
Tunsjø, Ø. (2017). US-China relations: From unipolar hedging to bipolar balancing. In R. S. Ross & Ø. Tunsjø (Eds.), Strategic adjustment and the rise of China: Power and politics in East Asia (pp. 41-68). Cornell University Press.
Walt, S. M. (1987). The origins of alliances. Cornell University Press.
Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of international politics. Waveland Press.
dc.rights.spa.fl_str_mv Thaisa da Silva Viana , Alana Camoça Gonçalves de Oliveira , Martha Silveira Nummer - 2024
dc.rights.accessrights.spa.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights.coar.spa.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.uri.spa.fl_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0
rights_invalid_str_mv Thaisa da Silva Viana , Alana Camoça Gonçalves de Oliveira , Martha Silveira Nummer - 2024
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.mimetype.spa.fl_str_mv application/pdf
text/html
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv Facultad de Finanzas, Gobierno y Relaciones Internacionales
dc.source.spa.fl_str_mv https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/oasis/article/view/10021
institution Universidad Externado de Colombia
bitstream.url.fl_str_mv https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/bitstreams/c6429657-333f-41d7-9606-f3160e18cd18/download
bitstream.checksum.fl_str_mv 3eaa632a0a04652bc693b68a5b4ed677
bitstream.checksumAlgorithm.fl_str_mv MD5
repository.name.fl_str_mv Universidad Externado de Colombia
repository.mail.fl_str_mv metabiblioteca@metabiblioteca.org
_version_ 1834110478423425024
spelling Silva Viana , Thaisa daGonçalves de Oliveira , Alana CamoçaSilveira Nummer, Martha2024-12-03T10:38:49Z2025-04-09T17:18:09Z2024-12-03T10:38:49Z2025-04-09T17:18:09Z2024-12-03La competencia geoestratégica entre la red de seguridad liderada por Estados Unidos en el Indo-Pacífico y China se está intensi­ficando. En medio de la rivalidad hegemó­nica entre estos dos países, Corea del Sur surge como un actor que busca encontrar su lugar en esta creciente rivalidad entre Washington y Pekín. A pesar de ser un socio estratégico formal de Estados Uni­dos, es común en la literatura académica argumentar que Seúl ha mostrado un com­portamiento similar al hedging a lo largo de los años. En este artículo demostramos que el entorno estratégico, caracterizado por niveles variados de percepción de ame­nazas, y las orientaciones políticas de los líderes respecto a Corea del Norte son cru­ciales para dar forma al comportamien­to estratégico de Corea del Sur (hedging, balancing o bandwagoning). Evaluamos el comportamiento de Corea del Sur utili­zando un análisis realista neoclásico de las percepciones de sus líderes respecto a Corea del Norte, Estados Unidos y China. Las variables independientes incluyen la distri­bución de poder en el sistema internacional, el contexto regional, la interdependencia económica y la red de alianzas de Estados Unidos. Nuestras variables intervinientes son las percepciones de los líderes, especí­ficamente sus evaluaciones de riesgo, y las imágenes que guían sus decisiones de hed­ging, balancing o bandwagoning con China y Estados Unidos. La investigación se llevó a cabo a través de un análisis bibliográfico y un examen de documentos oficiales, inclui­dos libros blancos, informes de defensa y discursos oficiales. Un hallazgo clave es que comprender el comportamiento de seguri­dad de Seúl requiere un examen cuidadoso de las acciones de Corea del Norte. Además, la decisión de hacer hedging o balancing no está impulsada por factores ideológicos; más bien, proviene de la percepción de cuál de los dos –China o Estados Unidos– apoya mejor las estrategias políticas de Seúl y sus relaciones esperadas con Pyongyang.The geostrategic competition between the U.S.-led security network in the Indo- Pacific and China is intensifying. Amid this hegemonic rivalry between the US and China, South Korea emerges as an actor grappling with finding its position between Washington and Beijing. Despite its formal strategic partnership with the United States, much of the academic literature argues that Seoul has displayed behavior resem­bling hedging over the years. This article demonstrates that South Korea’s strategic behavior—whether hedging, balancing, or bandwagoning—is shaped by the strategic environment, varying levels of threat per­ception, and the political orientations of its leaders concerning North Korea. Using a neoclassical realist framework, we assess South Korea’s actions through an analysis of its leaders’ perceptions of North Korea, the U.S., and China. The independent vari­ables include the distribution of power in the international system, the regional con­text, economic interdependence, and the U.S. network of alliances. The interven­ing variables are the leaders’ perceptions, particularly their risk assessments and the images guiding their decisions to hedge, balance, or bandwagoning with China and the United States. The research is based on a bibliographic analysis and a review of official documents, including White Papers, defense reports, and official speeches. A key finding is that understanding Seoul’s secu­rity behavior requires careful consideration of North Korea’s actions. Furthermore, the decision to hedge or balance is driven not by ideology but by perceptions of which actor better supports Seoul’s political goals and relations with Pyongyang.application/pdftext/html10.18601/16577558.n41.042346-21321657-7558https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/handle/001/25285https://doi.org/10.18601/16577558.n41.04spaFacultad de Finanzas, Gobierno y Relaciones Internacionaleshttps://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/oasis/article/download/10021/17524https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/oasis/article/download/10021/17525Núm. 41 , Año 2025 : Enero-Junio674143OasisAbbondanza, G. (2022). Whither the Indo-Pacific? Middle power strategies from Australia, South Korea, and Indonesia. International Affairs, 98(2), 403-421.Buzo, A. (2002). The making of modern Korea. Routledge.Cha, V., and Pardo, R. P. (2023). Coreia: Uma breve história do Norte e do Sul [A brief history of North and South Korea]. Ideias de Ler.Cha, V. D. (2009). Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. alliance system in Asia. International Security, 34(3), 158-196.Chae, H., & Kim, S. (2008). Conservatives and progressives in South Korea. The Washington Quarterly, 31(4), 77-95.Choo, J. (2019). Conservative and progressive stances on China and their impact on South Korea-China relations. In M. Milani, A. Fiori, and M. Dian (Eds.), The Korean paradox: Domestic political divide and foreign policy in South Korea (pp. 88-105). Routledge.Choo, J. (2020). South Korea’s China policy (EAI Background Brief No. 1534). National University of Singapore, East Asian Institute. https://research.nus.edu.sg/eai/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2020/12/eaibb-No.-1534-South-Koreas-China-policy-2.pdfChristensen, T. (2015). The China challenge: Shaping the choices of a rising power. W. W. Norton & Company.Christensen, T. J., and Snyder, J. (1990). Chain gangs and passed bucks: Predicting alliance patterns in multipolarity. International Organization, 44, 137-168.Han, S. (2008). From engagement to hedging: South Korea’s new China policy. Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 20(4), 335-351.He, K., and Feng, H. (2008). If not soft balancing, then what? Reconsidering soft balancing and US policy toward China. Security Studies, 17(2), 269-305.He, K. (2012). Undermining adversaries: Unipolarity, threat perception, and negative balancing strategies after the Cold War. European Journal of International Relations, 18(1), 154-191.Heo, J. Y. (2020). Contentious narratives on national identity of South Korea: How to understand the self and the significant others, North Korea and the US [Doctoral dissertation, Freie Universität Berlin]. https://refubium.fu-berlin.de/handle/fub188/27659Huynh, T.-S. (2021). Bolstering middle power standing: South Korea’s response to U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy from Trump to Biden. The Pacific Review, 36(1), 32-60.Hwang, J. (2012). Seoul and Beijing’s troubled ties. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2012/01/seoul-and-beijings-troubled-ties/Kang, D. (2019). South Korea, partisan politics, and the United States. In M. Milani, A. Fiori, and M. Dian (Eds.), The Korean paradox: Domestic political divide and foreign policy in South Korea (pp. 69-87). Routledge.Kim, H. (2022). South Korea’s response to the BRI: Hedging amidst change and continuity in the international system. In The belt and road initiative in Asia, Africa, and Europe. Routledge.Kim, L. (2018). South Korea’s nuclear hedging? The Washington Quarterly, 41(1), 115-133.Kim, Y. S. (2008). Lee proposes shuttle diplomacy with N. Korea. Korea Times. https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2024/05/103_20547.htmlKoga, K. (2018). The concept of “hedging” revisited: The case of Japan’s foreign policy strategy in East Asia’s power shift. International Studies Review, 20(4), 633-660.Kuik, C. C. (2021). Getting hedging right: A small-state perspective. China International Strategy Review, 3, 300-315.Lee, J. Y. (2017). Hedging strategies of the middle powers in East Asian security: The cases of South Korea and Malaysia. East Asia, 34, 23-37.Lee, M.-B. (2008). 제17대 대통령 취임사. [17th president’s inauguration speech]. https://www.pa.go.kr/research/contents/speech/index.jsp?spMode=view&catid=c_pa02062&artid=1310127Lee, M.-B. (2009). 민주 평화 통일자 문회 의 14기 출범식 축사. https://www.pa.go.kr/research/contents/speech/index.jsp?spMode=view&catid=c_pa02062&artid=1330156Lee, M.-B. (2012). 제88차 라디오·인터넷 연설–북 한이 살길은 스스로 핵무기를 포기하고 개혁·개방으로 국제사회와 협력하는 것 입니다.Lee, S.-J. (2012). South Korea as new middle power seeking complex diplomacy. EAI Asia Security Initiative Working Paper 25. East Asian Institute.Lee, Y. (2021). Riding the tide: Assessing South Korea’s hedging strategy through regional security initiatives. The Pacific Review, 36(3), 494-520. Maduz, L. (2023). Explaining Korea’s positioning in the US–China strategic competition. In M. Milani, A. Fiori, and M. Dian (Eds.), China-US competition (pp. 247-273). Springer International Publishing.Marston, H. S. (2024). Navigating great power competition: A neoclassical realist view of hedging. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 24(1), 29-63.Medeiros, E. S. (2005). Strategic hedging and the future of Asia-Pacific stability. Washington Quarterly, 29(1), 145-167.Milani, M. (2019). Progressive and conservative visions of inter-Korean relations. In M. Milani, A. Fiori, and M. Dian (Eds.), The Korean paradox: Domestic political divide and foreign policy in South Korea (pp. 54-68). Routledge.Minister of Unification (2017). Moon Jae-in’s policy on the Korean Peninsula: Three goals. https://web.archive.org/web/20200522081715/https://www.unikorea.go.kr/eng_unikorea/policylssues/koreanpeninsula/goals/Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008). Diplomatic White Paper 2008. Republic of Korea. South Korea. https://www.mnd.go.kr.Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011). Diplomatic White Paper 2011. Republic of Korea. South Korea. https://www.mnd.go.kr.Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2012). Diplomatic White Paper 2012. Republic of Korea. South Korea. https://www.mnd.go.kr.Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2018). Diplomatic White Paper 2018. Republic of Korea. South Korea. https://www.mnd.go.kr.Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2019). Diplomatic White Paper 2019. Republic of Korea. South Korea. https://www.mnd.go.kr.Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2020). Diplomatic White Paper 2020. Republic of Korea. South Korea. https://www.mnd.go.kr.Ministry of National Defense (2008). Defense White Paper 2008. Republic of Korea. South Korea. https://www.mnd.go.kr.Ministry of National Defense (2011). Diplomatic White Paper 2011. South Korea. https://www.mnd.go.kr.Ministry of National Defense (2012). Defense White Paper 2012. South Korea. https://www.mnd. go.kr.Ministry of National Defense (2018). Defense White Paper 2018. South Korea.Ministry of National Defense (2018). Diplomatic White Paper 2018. South Korea.Ministry of National Defense (2019). Diplomatic White Paper 2019. South Korea. https://www.mnd.go.kr.Ministry of National Defense (2020). Diplomatic White Paper 2020. South Korea.Ministry of National Defense (2021). Defense White Paper 2020. South Korea. https://www.mnd.go.kr.Mo, J. (2016). South Korea’s middle power diplomacy: A case of growing compatibility between regional and global roles. International Journal, 71(4), 587-607.Moon, J. (2017a). 6·15 남북공동선언 17주년 기념식. 문대통령연설문집본문(상권). https://www.pa.go.kr/research/contents/speech/index.jsp?spMode=view&catid=c_ pa02062&artid=1401711Moon, J. (2017b). 제19대 대통령 취임식. 문 대통령연설문집본 문 (상 권 ) . ht tps : // www.pa.go.kr/research/contents/speech/index.jsp?spMode=view&catid=c_pa02062&artid=1401691Moon, J. (2018). 2018년 신년 기자회견. 문 대통령연설문집본 문 (하 권 ) . ht tps : // www.pa.go.kr/research/contents/speech/index.jsp?spMode=view&catid=c_pa02062&artid=1401845Mosler, H. B. (2022). Lessons learned? South Korea’s foreign policy toward North Korea under the Moon Jae-in administration (Working Papers on East Asian Studies, No. 132).Murphy, A. M. (2017). Great power rivalries, domestic politics, and Southeast Asian foreign policy: Exploring the linkages. Asian Security, 13(3), 165-182.Nummer, M. S., & Oliveira, A. C. G. de. (2024). As estratégias de hedging na política de segurança sul-coreana: Uma análise realista neoclássica sobre as percepções sul-coreanas acerca da China entre 2013-2022. Meridiano 47–Journal of Global Studies, 24.Oliveira, A. C. G. de. (2019). Entre o sol, a águia e o dragão: Dinâmicas de poder e segurança entre Japão, Estados Unidos e China no Leste Asiático e o estudo de caso das ilhas Senkaku/Diaoyu no século XXI [Doctoral dissertation, UFRJ].Park, B. S. (2017). South Korea’s “three no’s” announcement key to restoring relations with China. The Hankyoreh. https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/817213.html.Park, C. K. (2021). South Korea doesn’t need to pick between the US and China, says presidential candidate Lee Jae-myung. South China Morning Post. https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3161488/south-korea-doesnt-need-pick-between-us-china-says-presidentialPark, J. (2015). Korea’s hedging strategy between the United States and China. In G. Rozman (Ed.), Joint U.S.-Korea academic studies (vol. 26, pp. 59-75). Korea Economic Institute of America.Park, J. (2016). Korea between the US and China: How does hedging work? In Joint US-K adjustment and the rise of China: Power and politics in East Asia (pp. 41-68). Cornell University Press.Paul, T. V. (2005). Soft balancing in the age of U.S. primacy. International Security, 30(1), 46-71.Ripsman, N. M., Taliaferro, J. W., & Lobell, S. E. (2016). Neoclassical realist theory of international politics. Oxford University Press.Rose, G. (1998). Neoclassical realism and theories of foreign policy. World Politics, 51(1), 145-177Shin, G.-W., & Moon, R. J. (2017). South Korea after impeachment. Journal of Democracy, 28(4), 117-131.Snyder, S. A. (2018). South Korea at the crossroads: Autonomy and alliance in an era of rival powers. Columbia University Press.Terazawa, T. (2023). How Japan solved its rare earth minerals dependency issue. World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2023/10/japan-rare-earth-minerals/Tessman, B. (2012). System structure and state strategy: Adding hedging to the menu. Security Studies, 21(2), 192-231.Tunsjø, Ø. (2017). US-China relations: From unipolar hedging to bipolar balancing. In R. S. Ross & Ø. Tunsjø (Eds.), Strategic adjustment and the rise of China: Power and politics in East Asia (pp. 41-68). Cornell University Press.Walt, S. M. (1987). The origins of alliances. Cornell University Press.Waltz, K. (1979). Theory of international politics. Waveland Press.Thaisa da Silva Viana , Alana Camoça Gonçalves de Oliveira , Martha Silveira Nummer - 2024info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-CompartirIgual 4.0.http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0https://revistas.uexternado.edu.co/index.php/oasis/article/view/10021South Korea;hedging;neoclassical realism;leaders’ perceptionsCorea del Sur;hedging;realismo neoclásico;percepciones de líderesSouth Korea’s leaders’ perceptions and the decision of hedging: Assessing China, the US and North Korea’s roleSouth Korea’s leaders’ perceptions and the decision of hedging: Assessing China, the US and North Korea’s roleArtículo de revistahttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85Textinfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleJournal articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionPublicationOREORE.xmltext/xml2763https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.co/bitstreams/c6429657-333f-41d7-9606-f3160e18cd18/download3eaa632a0a04652bc693b68a5b4ed677MD51001/25285oai:bdigital.uexternado.edu.co:001/252852025-04-09 12:18:09.998http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0Thaisa da Silva Viana , Alana Camoça Gonçalves de Oliveira , Martha Silveira Nummer - 2024https://bdigital.uexternado.edu.coUniversidad Externado de Colombiametabiblioteca@metabiblioteca.org

Publicaciones similares