La tragedia de los comunes en la competencia vertical entre jurisdicciones
The benefits of the institutional competition are reached under certain norms that prevent the violation of rights and the depredation of the resources. The horizontal competition can take the form of violent aggression between jurisdictions (war) or that of cooperation and commerce. Its impact can...
- Autores:
-
Krause, Martín
- Tipo de recurso:
- Article of investigation
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2009
- Institución:
- Universidad Sergio Arboleda
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio U. Sergio Arboleda
- Idioma:
- spa
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repository.usergioarboleda.edu.co:11232/117
- Acceso en línea:
- http://hdl.handle.net/11232/117
- Palabra clave:
- Competencia fiscal
Competencia institucional
Derecho de propiedad - Argentina
Competencia vertical
Tragedia Comunes
Legalidad
Competencia
institucionalismo
Tragedia Comunes
institucionalismo
legalidad
competencia
common
institutionalism
legality
rivalry
- Rights
- License
- Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia (CC BY-NC-ND 2.5 CO)
id |
sergioarb2_0adeedbe6cbe0057e4f0cadd5a8ae4ce |
---|---|
oai_identifier_str |
oai:repository.usergioarboleda.edu.co:11232/117 |
network_acronym_str |
sergioarb2 |
network_name_str |
Repositorio U. Sergio Arboleda |
repository_id_str |
|
dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv |
La tragedia de los comunes en la competencia vertical entre jurisdicciones |
dc.title.translated.eng.fl_str_mv |
The tragedy of the Commons in the vertical competition between jurisdictions |
title |
La tragedia de los comunes en la competencia vertical entre jurisdicciones |
spellingShingle |
La tragedia de los comunes en la competencia vertical entre jurisdicciones Competencia fiscal Competencia institucional Derecho de propiedad - Argentina Competencia vertical Tragedia Comunes Legalidad Competencia institucionalismo Tragedia Comunes institucionalismo legalidad competencia common institutionalism legality rivalry |
title_short |
La tragedia de los comunes en la competencia vertical entre jurisdicciones |
title_full |
La tragedia de los comunes en la competencia vertical entre jurisdicciones |
title_fullStr |
La tragedia de los comunes en la competencia vertical entre jurisdicciones |
title_full_unstemmed |
La tragedia de los comunes en la competencia vertical entre jurisdicciones |
title_sort |
La tragedia de los comunes en la competencia vertical entre jurisdicciones |
dc.creator.fl_str_mv |
Krause, Martín |
dc.contributor.author.spa.fl_str_mv |
Krause, Martín |
dc.subject.lemb.spa.fl_str_mv |
Competencia fiscal Competencia institucional Derecho de propiedad - Argentina Competencia vertical Tragedia Comunes Legalidad Competencia |
topic |
Competencia fiscal Competencia institucional Derecho de propiedad - Argentina Competencia vertical Tragedia Comunes Legalidad Competencia institucionalismo Tragedia Comunes institucionalismo legalidad competencia common institutionalism legality rivalry |
dc.subject.proposal.spa.fl_str_mv |
institucionalismo Tragedia Comunes institucionalismo legalidad competencia |
dc.subject.proposal.eng.fl_str_mv |
common institutionalism legality rivalry |
description |
The benefits of the institutional competition are reached under certain norms that prevent the violation of rights and the depredation of the resources. The horizontal competition can take the form of violent aggression between jurisdictions (war) or that of cooperation and commerce. Its impact can be “a negative“ if substrae governments resources benevolentes compromised with the general well-being of the community, but “positives“ if they are considered to be another way of controlling the Leviathan. The vertical competition shows the same potential "positive" control panel and the same need for certain rules to fulfill this role. They are similar to the strict definition of the right of property that solves the “tragedy of the common property”. Of another form it can create a situation where the taxpayers are smart for different levels of fiscal authority as it shows the Argentine case |
publishDate |
2009 |
dc.date.issued.spa.fl_str_mv |
2009-12 |
dc.date.accessioned.spa.fl_str_mv |
2015-05-28T15:01:23Z 2016-05-11T14:15:28Z 2017-05-16T19:22:51Z |
dc.date.available.spa.fl_str_mv |
2015-05-28T15:01:23Z 2016-05-11T14:15:28Z 2017-05-16T19:22:51Z |
dc.date.spa.fl_str_mv |
2009 |
dc.type.coarversion.eng.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85 |
dc.type.coar.eng.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1 |
dc.type.redcol.eng.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ART |
dc.type.local.spa.fl_str_mv |
Artículo de revista |
format |
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1 |
dc.identifier.issn.spa.fl_str_mv |
2145-6194 |
dc.identifier.instname.spa.fl_str_mv |
instname:Universidad Sergio Arboleda |
dc.identifier.reponame.spa.fl_str_mv |
reponame:Repositorio Institucional Universidad Sergio Arboleda |
dc.identifier.repourl.*.fl_str_mv |
repourl:https://repository.usergioarboleda.edu.co/ |
dc.identifier.url.spa.fl_str_mv |
http://hdl.handle.net/11232/117 |
identifier_str_mv |
2145-6194 instname:Universidad Sergio Arboleda reponame:Repositorio Institucional Universidad Sergio Arboleda repourl:https://repository.usergioarboleda.edu.co/ |
url |
http://hdl.handle.net/11232/117 |
dc.language.iso.spa.fl_str_mv |
spa |
language |
spa |
dc.relation.ispartof.spa.fl_str_mv |
Revista Civilizar de Empresa y Economía; vol. 1, núm. 1 (2009) |
dc.relation.references.spa.fl_str_mv |
Krause, M. (2009). La tragedia de los Comunes en la competencia vertical entre jurisdicciones. Civilizar de Empresa y Economía. 1 (1), 79-86. Bertea, Aníbal O. (2004), “La coparticipación de impuestos nacionales y el teorema de Coase” Periódico Económico Tributario, La Ley, Año XIII Nº 306, Buenos Aires, 17/8/04. Bertea, Aníbal O. (2004), “La coparticipación de impuestos nacionales y el teorema de Coase” Periódico Económico Tributario, La Ley, Año XIII Nº 306, Buenos Aires, 17/8/04. Buchanan, James A. & Yong J. Yoon (2001), “Majoritarian Management of the Commons”,Economic Inquiry, Vol. 39, Nr. 3, July 2001, 396-405. |
dc.relation.references.eng.fl_str_mv |
Berkowitz, Daniel & Wei Li (2000), “Tax rights in transition economies: a tragedy of the commons?”, Journal of Public Economics, Nr 76, 369-397. Brennan Geoffrey y James M. Buchanan, (1980) The Power to Tax, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.). Berkowitz, Daniel & Wei Li (2000), “Tax rights in transition economies: a tragedy of the commons?”, Journal of Public Economics, Nr 76, 369-397. Brennan Geoffrey y James M. Buchanan, (1980) The Power to Tax, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.). Buchanan, James M, (1995/96), “Federalism and Individual Sovereignty”,Cato Journal, Vol. 15 Nº 2-3 (Fall/Winter 1995/96) Buchanan, James A. & Yong J. Yoon (2004), “Majoritarian exploitation of the fiscal commons: general taxes-differential transfers”,European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 20, 73-90. Hamilton, Madison & Jay (1787/88), The Federalist Papers, http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/. Hayek, Friedrich A., (1945) “The Use of Knowledge in Society”,American Economic Review, 35, pp. 519-30. Hayek, Friedrich A., (1948) “The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism”,Individualismand Economic Order, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press), p. 255-272. Hirschman, Albert O., (1970) Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms,Organizations and States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press) Jin, Hehui, Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, (1999) “Regional Decentralization and FiscalIncentives: Federalism, Chinese Style”,Stanford Economics Working Paper, March 1999, http://www-econ.stanford.edu/faculty/workp/swp99013.html Migue, Jean-Luc, (1995/96) “Federalism and Individual Sovereignty: Comment on Buchanan”, Cato Journal, Vol. 15 Nº 2-3, (Fall/Winter 1995/96). Oates, Wallace, (1998) (editor) The Economics of Fiscal Federalism and Local Finance, The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics, 88 (Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.) Ostrom Vincent, (1971), The Political Theory of a Compound Republic: Designing the AmericanExperiment, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press). Teather, Richard (2005), The Benefits of Tax Competition (London: Institute of Economic Affairs). Tiebout, Charles M., (1956) “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures”, Jounal of Political Economy64 (October, 1956): 416-24, reproduced in Cowen, Tyler (editor) The Theory of MarketFailure, (Fairfax, Virginia: George Mason University Press, 1988). |
dc.relation.ispartofjournal.spa.fl_str_mv |
Civilizar Empresa y Economía |
dc.relation.citationvolumen.spa.fl_str_mv |
1 |
dc.relation.citationissue.spa.fl_str_mv |
1 |
dc.relation.citationstartpage.spa.fl_str_mv |
79 |
dc.relation.citationendpage.spa.fl_str_mv |
85 |
dc.rights.license.*.fl_str_mv |
Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia (CC BY-NC-ND 2.5 CO) |
dc.rights.uri.*.fl_str_mv |
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/co/ |
dc.rights.acceso.spa.fl_str_mv |
Abierto (Texto Completo) |
dc.rights.coar.*.fl_str_mv |
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
rights_invalid_str_mv |
Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia (CC BY-NC-ND 2.5 CO) http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/co/ Abierto (Texto Completo) http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2 |
dc.format.extent.spa.fl_str_mv |
8 |
dc.format.medium.spa.fl_str_mv |
Digital |
dc.format.mimetype.eng.fl_str_mv |
application/pdf |
dc.format.tipo.spa.fl_str_mv |
documentos |
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv |
Bogotá : Universidad Sergio Arboleda |
institution |
Universidad Sergio Arboleda |
bitstream.url.fl_str_mv |
https://repository.usergioarboleda.edu.co/bitstream/11232/117/1/La%20tragedia%20de%20los%20comunes%20en%20la%20competencia%20vertical%20entre%20jurisdicciones.html https://repository.usergioarboleda.edu.co/bitstream/11232/117/2/La%20tragedia%20de%20los%20comunes%20en%20la%20competencia%20vertical%20entre%20jurisdicciones.html.txt |
bitstream.checksum.fl_str_mv |
e0d03bc4a8407af696f58daf7d4cb72e 40ea728eed9f2fbf047725e423051ed6 |
bitstream.checksumAlgorithm.fl_str_mv |
MD5 MD5 |
repository.name.fl_str_mv |
Repositorio Institucional Universidad Sergio Arboleda |
repository.mail.fl_str_mv |
dspace-help@myu.edu |
_version_ |
1814076309843738624 |
spelling |
Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 2.5 Colombia (CC BY-NC-ND 2.5 CO)http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/co/Abierto (Texto Completo)http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Krause, Martín20092015-05-28T15:01:23Z2016-05-11T14:15:28Z2017-05-16T19:22:51Z2015-05-28T15:01:23Z2016-05-11T14:15:28Z2017-05-16T19:22:51Z2009-122145-6194instname:Universidad Sergio Arboledareponame:Repositorio Institucional Universidad Sergio Arboledarepourl:https://repository.usergioarboleda.edu.co/http://hdl.handle.net/11232/117The benefits of the institutional competition are reached under certain norms that prevent the violation of rights and the depredation of the resources. The horizontal competition can take the form of violent aggression between jurisdictions (war) or that of cooperation and commerce. Its impact can be “a negative“ if substrae governments resources benevolentes compromised with the general well-being of the community, but “positives“ if they are considered to be another way of controlling the Leviathan. The vertical competition shows the same potential "positive" control panel and the same need for certain rules to fulfill this role. They are similar to the strict definition of the right of property that solves the “tragedy of the common property”. Of another form it can create a situation where the taxpayers are smart for different levels of fiscal authority as it shows the Argentine caseLos beneficios de la competencia institucional se alcanzan bajo ciertas normas que impiden la violación de derechos y la depredación de los recursos. La competencia horizontal puede tomar la forma de agresión violenta entre jurisdicciones (guerra) o la de cooperación y comercio. Su impacto puede ser “negativo” si substrae recursos de gobiernos benevolentes comprometidos con el bienestar general de la comunidad, pero “positivos” si se los considera como otra forma de controlar el Leviatán. La competencia vertical muestra los mismos controles “positivos” potenciales y la misma necesidad de ciertas reglas para cumplir ese papel. Son similares a la definición estricta del derecho de propiedad que resuelve la “tragedia de la propiedad común”. De otra forma puede crear una situación donde los contribuyentes son abusados por distintos niveles de autoridad fiscal como muestra el caso argentino.8Digitalapplication/pdfdocumentosspaBogotá : Universidad Sergio ArboledaRevista Civilizar de Empresa y Economía; vol. 1, núm. 1 (2009)Krause, M. (2009). La tragedia de los Comunes en la competencia vertical entre jurisdicciones. Civilizar de Empresa y Economía. 1 (1), 79-86.Bertea, Aníbal O. (2004), “La coparticipación de impuestos nacionales y el teorema de Coase” Periódico Económico Tributario, La Ley, Año XIII Nº 306, Buenos Aires, 17/8/04.Bertea, Aníbal O. (2004), “La coparticipación de impuestos nacionales y el teorema de Coase” Periódico Económico Tributario, La Ley, Año XIII Nº 306, Buenos Aires, 17/8/04.Buchanan, James A. & Yong J. Yoon (2001), “Majoritarian Management of the Commons”,Economic Inquiry, Vol. 39, Nr. 3, July 2001, 396-405.Berkowitz, Daniel & Wei Li (2000), “Tax rights in transition economies: a tragedy of the commons?”, Journal of Public Economics, Nr 76, 369-397.Brennan Geoffrey y James M. Buchanan, (1980) The Power to Tax, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.).Berkowitz, Daniel & Wei Li (2000), “Tax rights in transition economies: a tragedy of the commons?”, Journal of Public Economics, Nr 76, 369-397.Brennan Geoffrey y James M. Buchanan, (1980) The Power to Tax, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.).Buchanan, James M, (1995/96), “Federalism and Individual Sovereignty”,Cato Journal, Vol. 15 Nº 2-3 (Fall/Winter 1995/96)Buchanan, James A. & Yong J. Yoon (2004), “Majoritarian exploitation of the fiscal commons: general taxes-differential transfers”,European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 20, 73-90.Hamilton, Madison & Jay (1787/88), The Federalist Papers, http://www.foundingfathers.info/federalistpapers/.Hayek, Friedrich A., (1945) “The Use of Knowledge in Society”,American Economic Review, 35, pp. 519-30.Hayek, Friedrich A., (1948) “The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism”,Individualismand Economic Order, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press), p. 255-272.Hirschman, Albert O., (1970) Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms,Organizations and States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press)Jin, Hehui, Yingyi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, (1999) “Regional Decentralization and FiscalIncentives: Federalism, Chinese Style”,Stanford Economics Working Paper, March 1999, http://www-econ.stanford.edu/faculty/workp/swp99013.htmlMigue, Jean-Luc, (1995/96) “Federalism and Individual Sovereignty: Comment on Buchanan”, Cato Journal, Vol. 15 Nº 2-3, (Fall/Winter 1995/96).Oates, Wallace, (1998) (editor) The Economics of Fiscal Federalism and Local Finance, The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics, 88 (Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.)Ostrom Vincent, (1971), The Political Theory of a Compound Republic: Designing the AmericanExperiment, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press).Teather, Richard (2005), The Benefits of Tax Competition (London: Institute of Economic Affairs).Tiebout, Charles M., (1956) “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures”, Jounal of Political Economy64 (October, 1956): 416-24, reproduced in Cowen, Tyler (editor) The Theory of MarketFailure, (Fairfax, Virginia: George Mason University Press, 1988).Civilizar Empresa y Economía117985La tragedia de los comunes en la competencia vertical entre jurisdiccionesThe tragedy of the Commons in the vertical competition between jurisdictionsCompetencia fiscalCompetencia institucionalDerecho de propiedad - ArgentinaCompetencia verticalTragedia ComunesLegalidadCompetenciainstitucionalismoTragedia Comunesinstitucionalismolegalidadcompetenciacommoninstitutionalismlegalityrivalryhttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2df8fbb1http://purl.org/redcol/resource_type/ARTArtículo de revistaORIGINALLa tragedia de los comunes en la competencia vertical entre jurisdicciones.htmltext/html235https://repository.usergioarboleda.edu.co/bitstream/11232/117/1/La%20tragedia%20de%20los%20comunes%20en%20la%20competencia%20vertical%20entre%20jurisdicciones.htmle0d03bc4a8407af696f58daf7d4cb72eMD51open accessTEXTLa tragedia de los comunes en la competencia vertical entre jurisdicciones.html.txtLa tragedia de los comunes en la competencia vertical entre jurisdicciones.html.txtExtracted texttext/plain38https://repository.usergioarboleda.edu.co/bitstream/11232/117/2/La%20tragedia%20de%20los%20comunes%20en%20la%20competencia%20vertical%20entre%20jurisdicciones.html.txt40ea728eed9f2fbf047725e423051ed6MD52open access11232/117oai:repository.usergioarboleda.edu.co:11232/1172022-06-08 09:54:02.049open accessRepositorio Institucional Universidad Sergio Arboledadspace-help@myu.edu |