Opportunistic renegotiation of infraestructure concessions as rent seeking : the effect of legal systems

This paper examines the problem of renegotiation of infrastructure conces-sions in Latin America using a model of litigation with an application to in-centive contracts. Opportunistic renegotiation is here defined as a rent seeking game, to show the effect of the legal system characteristics in the probability of renegotiation. A main conclusion is that legal systems where each party pays for their own legal expenses, such as the American, are more prone to opportunistic renegotiation. On the other hand, systems, such as the British, that concentrates legal expenses in one party might discourage opportunistic behavior by making it more costly.

• Fecha de publicación: 2010
• Institución: Universidad Tecnológica de Bolívar
• Repositorio: Repositorio Institucional UTB
• Idioma: eng
• OAI Identifier: oai:repositorio.utb.edu.co:20.500.12585/9694
• Acceso en línea: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12585/9694
• Palabra clave: SUBASTAS -- PUBLICACIONES SERIADAS; AUCTIONS -- PERIODICALS; TRASLADO DE COSTOS JUDICIALES -- PUBLICACIONES SERIADAS; FEE-SHIFTING -- PERIODICALS; INCENTIVOS -- PUBLICACIONES SERIADAS; PERIODICALS; LITIGACION -- PUBLICACIONES SERIADAS; TEORIA DE LA ELECCION PUBLICA -- PUBLICACIONES SERIADAS; PUBLIC CHOISE -- PERIODICALS; RENTISMO -- PUBLICACIONES SERIADAS; RENT SEEKING -- PERIODICALS
• Rights: openAccess
• License: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/