The notion of Kierkegaardian conscience as an implication of the outside world: A critique of the Cartesian approach
This article aims at showing how the Danish philosopher SØren Kierkegaard, through his concept of conscience, criticizes Cartesian skepticism upon affirming the impossibility of doubting the outside world, since the very possibility of doubt presupposes the existence of a conscience that produces an...
- Autores:
- Tipo de recurso:
- Fecha de publicación:
- 2019
- Institución:
- Universidad Tecnológica de Bolívar
- Repositorio:
- Repositorio Institucional UTB
- Idioma:
- eng
- OAI Identifier:
- oai:repositorio.utb.edu.co:20.500.12585/8768
- Acceso en línea:
- https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12585/8768
- Palabra clave:
- Conscience
Doubt
Self
Subjectivity
Think
- Rights
- openAccess
- License
- http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
| Summary: | This article aims at showing how the Danish philosopher SØren Kierkegaard, through his concept of conscience, criticizes Cartesian skepticism upon affirming the impossibility of doubting the outside world, since the very possibility of doubt presupposes the existence of a conscience that produces and is produced by the trichotomic relationship between ideality and reality, or, in other words, mediateness and immediacy. For this, the Cartesian approach will be explained in the first place, namely: the three levels of doubt and the cogito ergo sum. Then the notion of conscience and ideal possibility of the doubt of the Danish author will be explained, and finally, it will be explained how, in the perspective of this notion of conscience, Kierkegaard makes a strong critique to the methodical doubt and to the cartesian cogito like demonstration of existence. © 2019 Universidad del Norte. All rights reserved. |
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