Static secure page allocation for light-weight dynamic information flow tracking

Dynamic information flow tracking (DIFT) is an effective security countermeasure for both low-level memory corruptions and high-level semantic attacks. However, many software approaches suffer large performance degradation, and hardware approaches have high logic and storage overhead. We propose a f...

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Autores:
Tipo de recurso:
Fecha de publicación:
2012
Institución:
Universidad Tecnológica de Bolívar
Repositorio:
Repositorio Institucional UTB
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:repositorio.utb.edu.co:20.500.12585/9091
Acceso en línea:
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12585/9091
Palabra clave:
Dynamic information flow tracking
Security attacks
Static control flow analysis
Critical information
Dynamic information flow tracking
Hardware-software codesign
High level semantics
Light weight
Memory corruption
Memory overheads
Memory pages
Page allocation
Performance degradation
Security attacks
Security countermeasures
Software approach
Static control
Storage overhead
System calls
Embedded systems
Hardware
Program compilers
Semantics
Digital storage
Rights
restrictedAccess
License
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
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network_acronym_str UTB2
network_name_str Repositorio Institucional UTB
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dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Static secure page allocation for light-weight dynamic information flow tracking
title Static secure page allocation for light-weight dynamic information flow tracking
spellingShingle Static secure page allocation for light-weight dynamic information flow tracking
Dynamic information flow tracking
Security attacks
Static control flow analysis
Critical information
Dynamic information flow tracking
Hardware-software codesign
High level semantics
Light weight
Memory corruption
Memory overheads
Memory pages
Page allocation
Performance degradation
Security attacks
Security countermeasures
Software approach
Static control
Storage overhead
System calls
Embedded systems
Hardware
Program compilers
Semantics
Digital storage
title_short Static secure page allocation for light-weight dynamic information flow tracking
title_full Static secure page allocation for light-weight dynamic information flow tracking
title_fullStr Static secure page allocation for light-weight dynamic information flow tracking
title_full_unstemmed Static secure page allocation for light-weight dynamic information flow tracking
title_sort Static secure page allocation for light-weight dynamic information flow tracking
dc.subject.keywords.none.fl_str_mv Dynamic information flow tracking
Security attacks
Static control flow analysis
Critical information
Dynamic information flow tracking
Hardware-software codesign
High level semantics
Light weight
Memory corruption
Memory overheads
Memory pages
Page allocation
Performance degradation
Security attacks
Security countermeasures
Software approach
Static control
Storage overhead
System calls
Embedded systems
Hardware
Program compilers
Semantics
Digital storage
topic Dynamic information flow tracking
Security attacks
Static control flow analysis
Critical information
Dynamic information flow tracking
Hardware-software codesign
High level semantics
Light weight
Memory corruption
Memory overheads
Memory pages
Page allocation
Performance degradation
Security attacks
Security countermeasures
Software approach
Static control
Storage overhead
System calls
Embedded systems
Hardware
Program compilers
Semantics
Digital storage
description Dynamic information flow tracking (DIFT) is an effective security countermeasure for both low-level memory corruptions and high-level semantic attacks. However, many software approaches suffer large performance degradation, and hardware approaches have high logic and storage overhead. We propose a flexible and light-weight hardware/software co-design approach to perform DIFT based on secure page allocation. Instead of associating every data with a taint tag, we aggregate data according to their taints, i.e., putting data with different attributes in separate memory pages. Our approach is a compiler-aided process with architecture support. The implementation and analysis show that the memory overhead is little, and our approach can protect critical information, including return address, indirect jump address, and system call IDs, from being overwritten by malicious users. Copyright 2012 ACM.
publishDate 2012
dc.date.issued.none.fl_str_mv 2012
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2020-03-26T16:32:55Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2020-03-26T16:32:55Z
dc.type.coarversion.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85
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dc.type.driver.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject
dc.type.hasVersion.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
dc.type.spa.none.fl_str_mv Conferencia
status_str publishedVersion
dc.identifier.citation.none.fl_str_mv CASES'12 - Proceedings of the 2012 ACM International Conference on Compilers, Architectures and Synthesis for Embedded Systems, Co-located with ESWEEK; pp. 27-36
dc.identifier.isbn.none.fl_str_mv 9781450314244
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12585/9091
dc.identifier.doi.none.fl_str_mv 10.1145/2380403.2380415
dc.identifier.instname.none.fl_str_mv Universidad Tecnológica de Bolívar
dc.identifier.reponame.none.fl_str_mv Repositorio UTB
dc.identifier.orcid.none.fl_str_mv 26325154200
7103059457
35225236800
identifier_str_mv CASES'12 - Proceedings of the 2012 ACM International Conference on Compilers, Architectures and Synthesis for Embedded Systems, Co-located with ESWEEK; pp. 27-36
9781450314244
10.1145/2380403.2380415
Universidad Tecnológica de Bolívar
Repositorio UTB
26325154200
7103059457
35225236800
url https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12585/9091
dc.language.iso.none.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.relation.conferenceplace.none.fl_str_mv Tampere
dc.relation.conferencedate.none.fl_str_mv 7 October 2012 through 12 October 2012
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
dc.rights.uri.none.fl_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
dc.rights.accessRights.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess
dc.rights.cc.none.fl_str_mv Atribución-NoComercial 4.0 Internacional
rights_invalid_str_mv http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
Atribución-NoComercial 4.0 Internacional
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec
eu_rights_str_mv restrictedAccess
dc.format.medium.none.fl_str_mv Recurso electrónico
dc.format.mimetype.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
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institution Universidad Tecnológica de Bolívar
dc.source.event.none.fl_str_mv 2012 ACM International Conference on Compilers, Architectures and Synthesis for Embedded Systems, CASES 2012, Co-located with 8th Embedded Systems Week, ESWEEK 2012
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spelling 2020-03-26T16:32:55Z2020-03-26T16:32:55Z2012CASES'12 - Proceedings of the 2012 ACM International Conference on Compilers, Architectures and Synthesis for Embedded Systems, Co-located with ESWEEK; pp. 27-369781450314244https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12585/909110.1145/2380403.2380415Universidad Tecnológica de BolívarRepositorio UTB26325154200710305945735225236800Dynamic information flow tracking (DIFT) is an effective security countermeasure for both low-level memory corruptions and high-level semantic attacks. However, many software approaches suffer large performance degradation, and hardware approaches have high logic and storage overhead. We propose a flexible and light-weight hardware/software co-design approach to perform DIFT based on secure page allocation. Instead of associating every data with a taint tag, we aggregate data according to their taints, i.e., putting data with different attributes in separate memory pages. Our approach is a compiler-aided process with architecture support. The implementation and analysis show that the memory overhead is little, and our approach can protect critical information, including return address, indirect jump address, and system call IDs, from being overwritten by malicious users. Copyright 2012 ACM.ACM Spec. Interest Group Microarchitectural Res.;Process. (SIGMICRO);ACM Special Interest Group on Embedded Systems (SIGBED);ACM Special Interest Group on Design Automation (SIGDA)Recurso electrónicoapplication/pdfenghttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccessAtribución-NoComercial 4.0 Internacionalhttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16echttps://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-84869031279&doi=10.1145%2f2380403.2380415&partnerID=40&md5=43847ed3df6018aa90812c8dcf0c6dffScopus2-s2.0-848690312792012 ACM International Conference on Compilers, Architectures and Synthesis for Embedded Systems, CASES 2012, Co-located with 8th Embedded Systems Week, ESWEEK 2012Static secure page allocation for light-weight dynamic information flow trackinginfo:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObjectinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionConferenciahttp://purl.org/coar/version/c_970fb48d4fbd8a85http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_c94fDynamic information flow trackingSecurity attacksStatic control flow analysisCritical informationDynamic information flow trackingHardware-software codesignHigh level semanticsLight weightMemory corruptionMemory overheadsMemory pagesPage allocationPerformance degradationSecurity attacksSecurity countermeasuresSoftware approachStatic controlStorage overheadSystem callsEmbedded systemsHardwareProgram compilersSemanticsDigital storageTampere7 October 2012 through 12 October 2012Santos J.C.M.Fei Y.Shi Z.J.Chang, W., Streiff, B., Lin, C., Efficient and extensible security enforcement using dynamic data flow analysis (2008) Proc. Conf. Computer & Communications Security, pp. 39-50. , OctChen, H., Wu, X., Yuan, L., Zang, B., Yew, P.-C., Chong, F.T., From speculation to security: Practical and efficient information flow tracking using speculative hardware (2008) Proc. Int. Symp. Computer Architecture, pp. 401-412. , JuneChen, S., Kozuch, M., Strigkos, T., Falsafi, B., Gibbons, P.B., Mowry, T.C., Ramachandran, V., Vlachos, E., Flexible hardware acceleration for instruction-grain program monitoring (2008) Proc. Int. Symp. Computer Architecture, pp. 377-388. , JunChiueh, T.-C., Hsu, F.-H., RAD: A compile-time solution to buffer overflow attacks (2001) Proc. Int Conf. Distributed Computing Systems, pp. 409-417. , AprCowen, C., Pu, C., Maier, D., Hinton, H., Walpole, J., Bakke, P., Beattie, S., Zhang, Q., StackGuard: Automatic adaptive detection and prevention of buffer-overflow attacks (1998) Proc. 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Securesphere and Owasp 2010 Top Ten Most Critical Web Application Security Risks, , http://www.imperva.com/docs/TB_SecureSphere_OWASP_2010-Top-Ten.pdfIsaev, I.K., Sidorov, D.V., The use of dynamic analysis for generation of input data that demonstrates critical bugs and vulnerabilities in programs (2010) Programming and Computer Software, 36 (4), pp. 225-236. , SeptKannan, H., Ordering decoupled metadata accesses in multiprocessors (2009) Proc. Int. Symp. Microarchitecture, pp. 381-390. , DecKatsunuma, S., Kurita, H., Shioya, R., Shimizu, K., Irie, H., Goshima, M., Sakai, S., Base address recognition with data flow tracking for injection attack detection (2006) Proc. Pacific Rim Inter. Symp. Dependable Computing, pp. 165-172. , DecLam, L.C., Chiueh, T.-C., A general dynamic information flow tracking framework for security applications (2006) Proc. Annual Computer Security Applications Conf., pp. 463-472. , DecLivshits, B., Martin, M., Lam, M.S., Securifly: Runtime protection and recovery from web application vulnerabilities (2006) Technical Report, Stanford UniversityMartinez Santos, J.C., Fei, Y., Leveraging speculative architectures for run-time program validation (2008) Proc. Int. Conf. Computer Design, pp. 498-505. , OctMartinez Santos, J.C., Fei, Y., Shi, Z.J., Pift: Efficient dynamic information flow tracking using secure page allocation (2009) Proc. WkShp on Embedded Systems Security, pp. 61-68. , OctNethercote, N., Seward, J., Valgrind: A framework for heavyweight dynamic binary instrumentation (2007) Proc. Conference on Programming Language Design & Implementation, pp. 89-100. , JunNightingale, E.B., Peek, D., Chen, P.M., Flinn, J., Parallelizing security checks on commodity hardware (2008) Proc. Int. Conf. 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Microarchitecture, pp. 243-254Venkataramani, G., Doudalis, I., Solihin, Y., Prvulovic, M., Flexitaint: A programmable accelerator for dynamic taint propagation (2008) Proc. Int. Symp. High-Performance Computer Architecture, pp. 173-184. , FebWilander, J., Kamkar, M., (2002) A Comparison of Publicly Available Tools for Static Intrusion PreventionXu, J., Nakka, N., Defeating memory corruption attacks via pointer taintedness detection (2005) Proc. Int. Conf. on Dependable Systems & Networks, pp. 378-387Xu, W., Bhatkar, S., Sekar, R., Taint-enhanced policy enforcement: A practical approach to defeat a wide range of attacks (2006) Proc. USENIX Security Symp., pp. 121-136. , July-AugYounan, Y., Joosen, W., Piessens, F., Efficient protection against heap-based buffer overflows without resorting to magic (2006) Proc. Int. Conf. on Information & Communication Security, , DecYounan, Y., Pozza, D., Piessens, F., Joosen, W., Extended protection against stack smashing attacks without performance loss (2006) Proc. Annual Computer Security Applications Conf., pp. 429-438. , Dechttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_c94fTHUMBNAILMiniProdInv.pngMiniProdInv.pngimage/png23941https://repositorio.utb.edu.co/bitstream/20.500.12585/9091/1/MiniProdInv.png0cb0f101a8d16897fb46fc914d3d7043MD5120.500.12585/9091oai:repositorio.utb.edu.co:20.500.12585/90912021-02-02 14:07:02.198Repositorio Institucional UTBrepositorioutb@utb.edu.co