Chapter 20 OPEC and Russia

Russia has long been a potential dream partner for the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Russia could greatly enhance the cartel’s market power and has several allies among the OPEC member states. During the 2010s, it seemed that the potential of the OPEC–Russia relationship...

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Autores:
Tipo de recurso:
Book
Fecha de publicación:
2017
Institución:
Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano
Repositorio:
Expeditio: repositorio UTadeo
Idioma:
eng
OAI Identifier:
oai:expeditiorepositorio.utadeo.edu.co:20.500.12010/16879
Acceso en línea:
https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/37593/9780367195656_oachapter20.pdf?sequence=1
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12010/16879
Palabra clave:
Ciencias políticas
Exportadores de petróleo (OPEP)
Psicología del mercado
Política exterior Rusa
Rights
License
Abierto (Texto Completo)
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dc.title.spa.fl_str_mv Chapter 20 OPEC and Russia
title Chapter 20 OPEC and Russia
spellingShingle Chapter 20 OPEC and Russia
Ciencias políticas
Exportadores de petróleo (OPEP)
Psicología del mercado
Política exterior Rusa
title_short Chapter 20 OPEC and Russia
title_full Chapter 20 OPEC and Russia
title_fullStr Chapter 20 OPEC and Russia
title_full_unstemmed Chapter 20 OPEC and Russia
title_sort Chapter 20 OPEC and Russia
dc.subject.spa.fl_str_mv Ciencias políticas
topic Ciencias políticas
Exportadores de petróleo (OPEP)
Psicología del mercado
Política exterior Rusa
dc.subject.lemb.spa.fl_str_mv Exportadores de petróleo (OPEP)
Psicología del mercado
Política exterior Rusa
description Russia has long been a potential dream partner for the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Russia could greatly enhance the cartel’s market power and has several allies among the OPEC member states. During the 2010s, it seemed that the potential of the OPEC–Russia relationship was finally being realized as they grew closer. However, in this chapter we argue that the strengthened dialogue has little impact on physical oil output and the level of mutual commitment remains low. What they do share is an interest in the semblance of cooperation to push oil prices upward through impacting market psychology. This strategy is in line with the postmodern turn in Russian foreign policy, as proclaimed by Vladislav Surkov and others. It also has some important foreign policy side benefits for Russia, such as weakening its international isolation after the conflict in Ukraine and making it possible to simultaneously befriend various Middle Eastern countries that are at odds with each other. The OPEC–Russia dalliance is also convenient for a third party – the USA. Although the USA is still a net oil importer and its consumers dislike high oil prices, they benefit American oil companies and their employees and investors, especially in the shale oil sector. Arrangements between OPEC and Russia are thus not only a happy pro forma marriage, but also a successful ménage à trois.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.created.none.fl_str_mv 2017
dc.date.accessioned.none.fl_str_mv 2021-01-27T03:04:06Z
dc.date.available.none.fl_str_mv 2021-01-27T03:04:06Z
dc.type.coar.spa.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2f33
format http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2f33
dc.identifier.isbn.none.fl_str_mv 978-0-429-20319-0
dc.identifier.other.none.fl_str_mv https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/37593/9780367195656_oachapter20.pdf?sequence=1
dc.identifier.uri.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12010/16879
identifier_str_mv 978-0-429-20319-0
url https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/37593/9780367195656_oachapter20.pdf?sequence=1
http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12010/16879
dc.language.iso.spa.fl_str_mv eng
language eng
dc.rights.coar.fl_str_mv http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.local.spa.fl_str_mv Abierto (Texto Completo)
dc.rights.creativecommons.none.fl_str_mv https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode
rights_invalid_str_mv Abierto (Texto Completo)
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcode
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.format.extent.spa.fl_str_mv 11 páginas
dc.format.mimetype.spa.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.spa.fl_str_mv Taylor & Francis
institution Universidad de Bogotá Jorge Tadeo Lozano
bitstream.url.fl_str_mv https://expeditiorepositorio.utadeo.edu.co/bitstream/20.500.12010/16879/1/Chapter%2020%20OPEC%20and%20Russia_7.pdf
https://expeditiorepositorio.utadeo.edu.co/bitstream/20.500.12010/16879/2/license.txt
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spelling 2021-01-27T03:04:06Z2021-01-27T03:04:06Z2017978-0-429-20319-0https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/37593/9780367195656_oachapter20.pdf?sequence=1http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12010/1687911 páginasapplication/pdfengTaylor & FrancisCiencias políticasExportadores de petróleo (OPEP)Psicología del mercadoPolítica exterior RusaChapter 20 OPEC and RussiaAbierto (Texto Completo)https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/legalcodehttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2Russia has long been a potential dream partner for the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Russia could greatly enhance the cartel’s market power and has several allies among the OPEC member states. During the 2010s, it seemed that the potential of the OPEC–Russia relationship was finally being realized as they grew closer. However, in this chapter we argue that the strengthened dialogue has little impact on physical oil output and the level of mutual commitment remains low. What they do share is an interest in the semblance of cooperation to push oil prices upward through impacting market psychology. This strategy is in line with the postmodern turn in Russian foreign policy, as proclaimed by Vladislav Surkov and others. It also has some important foreign policy side benefits for Russia, such as weakening its international isolation after the conflict in Ukraine and making it possible to simultaneously befriend various Middle Eastern countries that are at odds with each other. The OPEC–Russia dalliance is also convenient for a third party – the USA. Although the USA is still a net oil importer and its consumers dislike high oil prices, they benefit American oil companies and their employees and investors, especially in the shale oil sector. Arrangements between OPEC and Russia are thus not only a happy pro forma marriage, but also a successful ménage à trois.http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_2f33Krutikhin, MikhailOverland, IndraORIGINALChapter 20 OPEC and Russia_7.pdfChapter 20 OPEC and Russia_7.pdfVer documentoapplication/pdf128941https://expeditiorepositorio.utadeo.edu.co/bitstream/20.500.12010/16879/1/Chapter%2020%20OPEC%20and%20Russia_7.pdfd52f6e04ff82ef40f66ac45a11d0d197MD51open accessLICENSElicense.txtlicense.txttext/plain; charset=utf-82938https://expeditiorepositorio.utadeo.edu.co/bitstream/20.500.12010/16879/2/license.txtabceeb1c943c50d3343516f9dbfc110fMD52open accessTHUMBNAILChapter 20 OPEC and Russia_7.pdf.jpgChapter 20 OPEC and Russia_7.pdf.jpgIM Thumbnailimage/jpeg8051https://expeditiorepositorio.utadeo.edu.co/bitstream/20.500.12010/16879/3/Chapter%2020%20OPEC%20and%20Russia_7.pdf.jpg737f9bc1fd299777adbfe66adf8931b8MD53open access20.500.12010/16879oai:expeditiorepositorio.utadeo.edu.co:20.500.12010/168792021-01-26 22:07:18.216open accessRepositorio Institucional - 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